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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DeANN H. JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 20070885 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
1. Defendant/Appellant entered a Conditional Plea to an Amended 
Information on the 11th day of September, 2007. (See Appendix A) Judgment and 
Sentence was orally imposed by the Trial Court on the 23 rd day of October, 2007 and the 
Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment and Notice was signed and filed by the Trial 
Court on the 29th day of October, 2007. (See Appendix B) A Notice of Appeal was filed 
by the Defendant/Appellant on the 25 th day of October, 2007, with an Amended Notice 
of Appeal being filed on the 2 nd day of November, 2007 by the Defendant/Appellant. 
(See Appendix C) The Appeal is from a criminal judgment pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Annotated §77-18a-l, 
(1953 as Amended). Jurisdiction of this Court is established pursuant to provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(e), (1953 as Amended). 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
2. The Standard of Review on Appeal concerning the 
Defendant's/Appellant's challenge to the Trial Court's interpretation as to the validity of 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), (1953 as Amended) is a question of Statutory 
Interpretation which is reviewed for correctness without deference to the determination 
of the Trial Court. State vs. Hansen 2002 UT 125 (Utah 12/20/2002) (See Appendix D). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Is there an interaction and hierarchy within the law of Utah, as between 
rules of evidence and legislative enactments regarding matters prescribing 
procedure and questions of admissibility of evidence and does the legislative 
enactment, 58-37-8(3)(A)(ii), (1953 as Amended), amount to an intrusion 
upon the judicial powers and thereby violate the guarantees provided by 
Article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution? 
II. Whether the Prosecution presented a sufficient amount of evidence at the 
Preliminary Hearing to obtain a bindover. 
III. Whether, under the facts of this case, the Prosecution may present 
confidential patient information at the Preliminary Hearing over an 
objection based on Physician-Patient privilege as espoused by Rule 506 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
IV. Does testimony to a fact from which a negative inference may be drawn 
based on a patients neglect or refusal to provide useful and pertinent 
information to the attending Physician during diagnosis and/or treatment 
when the same is adduced from that patients attending physician, over 
Defendant's/Appellant's claim of privilege pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Evidence 506, amount to a communication which Defendant/Appellant is 
entitled to invoke privilege pursuant to Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence? 
V. Did the Plaintiff/Appellee, in failing to offer proof at the Preliminary 
Hearing that the Defendant/Appellant became a patient of Dr. Jaussi for the 
2 
purpose of obtaining a controlled substance in furtherance of an unlawful 
scheme, fail to provide proof of each element of crime alleged? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
3. This issue was adequately preserved by Motion to Quash (See Appendix 
E) and Objections to the admissibility of certain evidence presented during the 
preliminary Hearing (Tr. 1 pg. 11, 20) pursuant to the provisions of Rule 20 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; by a Motion to Quash Bindover (Appendix F) and 
ultimately by invocation of the Doctrine announced in State vs. Sery 758 P.2d 935 
(1988) regarding Conditional Pleas (See Appendix G). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
California Constitution, Article 1 Section 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17a-604 (4) (b) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(9) 
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) (1953 as Amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(9) 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-60-113 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1, (1953 as Amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e), (1953 as Amended). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 
Utah Constitution, Article V Section 1 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII Section 4 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 20 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 101 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1101 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
4. This Appeal is from a final Judgment and Sentence entered in the First 
District Court for Cache County, State of Utah on the 23 rd day of October, 2007 and 
signed on the 29 th day of October, 2007 based on a conviction of 3 violations of UCA § 
58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), (1953 as Amended) thereby established guilt with regard to 3 counts of 
Falsely Obtaining/Dispensing Prescription Medications, Third Degree Felonies. An 
application for a Certificate of Probable Cause was granted and ordered fines and 
confinement were thereby stayed pending this Appeal. (See Appendix H). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5. The Defendant/Appellant was charged on the 25 th day of January, 2006 by 
Information with five counts of criminal conduct, (See Appendix J) they being 
allegations that Defendant/Appellant had obtained prescription medication under 
circumstances amounting to violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) (1953 
4 
as Amended), third degree felonies, said conduct alleged to have occurred on or about 
the 7th day of June, 2005, the 28th day of June, 2005, the 1st day of August, 2005, the 22 nd 
day of August, 2005 and the 20 th day of September, 2005 all involving treatment 
rendered and medication prescribed by licensed physicians more than one in number 
during a given period and further alleging that Defendant/Appellant did not apprize each 
physician that Defendant/Appellant was obtaining similar medications from more than 
one source. 
6. The Plaintiff/Appellee, at Preliminary Hearing, (Tr. 1 pg. 10 & 11) 
purported to introduce evidence, offered by way of a written statement by one of 
Defendant/Appellant's treating physicians, alleging that Defendant/Appellant had failed 
to inform that Physician that Defendant/Appellant was being treated by another physician 
for a different malady. The written statement was allowed over Defendant's/Appellant's 
objection which invoked Rule of Evidence No. 506 and thereby asserted constitutional 
guarantees afforded by Article VIII Section 4 and by substantive and procedural Due 
Process. Defendant/Appellant was ultimately bound over to answer to the charges 
hereinbefore referenced. Defendant/Appellant thereupon moved to quash that Bindover 
invoking Article VIII Section 4 as well as additional collateral issues which Motion was 
denied. (See Appendix K). 
7. A Supplemental Memorandum filed 28 July 2006 (See Exhibit L) and a 
Second Supplemental Memorandum to the Motion to Quash was filed on the 18 th day of 
5 
October, 2006 further expanding arguments addressing the issues treated in the Motion 
to Quash the Bindover (See Appendix M). That Motion was also denied. 
8. Through plea negotiations, two of the charged counts of criminal conduct 
were dismissed and by stipulation a Conditional Plea entered with regard to the 
remaining three counts preserving certain issues for Appeal pursuant to the Doctrine 
announced in State vs. Sery (Supra), whereupon the Defendant/Appellant was ultimately 
convicted on her conditional Plea of three count of Falsely Obtaining/Dispensing 
Prescriptions in violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), (1953 as 
Amended). 
9. The Trial Court orally imposed Judgment and Sentence on the 23rd day of 
October, 2007 (Tr.#7 pg.5-6) whereby the Defendant/Appellant was sentenced to serve 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, the sentencing on 
all counts to run concurrently. The prison term was suspended in favor of probation; 
requiring Defendant/Appellant to serve an indeterminate term in the Cache County jail 
not to exceed 1 year and to pay a fine in the amount of $2,075.00 with other special 
conditions imposed. The Defendant/Appellant appealed and a certificate of probable 
cause was allowed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
10. The Defendant/Appellant is charged with violation of UCA §58-37-8 
(3)(a)(ii), (1953 as Amended). The statute, as written, purported to create an exception 
6 
to URE 506, Physician and Mental Health Therapist-Patient Privilege. The issue 
presented is the question as to whether the purported exception is constitutional, given 
the separation of powers clause in the Utah Constitution and in light of case law 
established in Burns vs. Boy den 133 P. 3d 370 (Utah 2006) (See Appendix N) and In re 
Young 976 P.2d 581 (Utah 1999) (See Appendix P) The Plaintiff/Appellee, in response, 
affirmatively alleged, among other points, that the legislature availed themselves of an 
exception provided within Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. There is an interaction and hierarchy within the law of Utah, as between 
rules of evidence and legislative enactments regarding matters prescribing 
procedure and questions of admissibility of evidence and the legislative enactment, 
58-37-6(9), (1953 as Amended), amounts to an intrusion upon the Judicial powers 
and thereby violates the guarantees provided by Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Point 1. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that Utah Courts have no 
obligation to give any weight, consideration or deference to a statutory based 
patient-physician privilege as found in the Utah Code. 
11. The Utah Court in Burns vs. Boyden (surpa) held that no obligation may be 
imposed on the Judiciary to give any weight, consideration or deference to a statutorily 
based Patient-Physician privilege. In that case the Court refused to espouse the 
Defendant's/Appellant's contention that UCA 78-24-8 had application to a case where a 
physician/accused invoked the physician-patient privilege. The Trial Court, in its ruling, 
relied solely on Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to resolve the issue on Appeal. 
7 
See also DeBry vs. Goates 999 P.2d 582 (2000) (See Appendix Q) and Sorensen vs. 
Barbuto 43 P.3d 295 (2006) (See Appendix R). 
Point 2. Statutes addressing evidentiary or procedural matters are neither 
valid nor enforceable even if there is no court rule directly on point. 
12. Despite the general rule that Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, 
Defendant/Appellant urges that a legislative enactment which addresses procedural 
and/or evidentiary matters is not to be presumed Constitutional. In society of Separatists 
Inc. and Whitehead 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993) (See Appendix S) the Utah Court noted 
that the general rule in reviewing statutes for constitutionality a statute is presumed 
constitutional. </Burns vs. Boyden (Supra), cf'West Jordan vs. Goodman 135 P.3d 874, 
2006 UT 27 (See Appendix T). But as the holdings in those recent cases established, 
said presumption did not survive attacks based on the contention that said statute 
purports to prescribe a rule of procedure or a rule of evidence. 
Point 3. Even if a Statute prescribing a Rule of Evidence or a Rule of 
Procedure might create some legal status outside of Court proceedings, that Statute 
would have no legal posture within the Judicial process if the enactment conflicted 
with a right or privilege established by Court rule, 
13. The Constitutional Provision provides as follows: 
"Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court — 
Judges pro tempore — Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used 
in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. 
The Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted 
by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both 
houses of the Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this 
constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
8 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro 
tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and admitted 
to practice law in Utah. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law. " 
Rules of Evidence and Procedure are mandatory and solely govern Judicial proceedings 
in Utah, Rule 101 Utah Rules of Evidence provides, "These rules govern proceedings in 
the courts of this State, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101." 
Legislation such as Utah Code Annotated 58-37-8 might be said to apply to questions of 
evidence offered in proceedings other than those before the Judiciary. Although not 
relevant here, the Legislature, in certain instances, has mandated that non-judicial 
proceedings are, nonetheless, subject to those certain rules promulgated by the Supreme 
Court. 
Point 4. Advisory committees comment on court rules may be taken as 
evidences of legislative intent to be given great deference with regard to 
interpretation in resolving conflicts arising from the interaction of legislation and 
judicial rule making. 
14. In Burns vs. Boyden (supra) (at footnote 6) the Court observed that 
committee notes merit great weight, particularly under the Utah system where the 
legislative power to reject or modify rules is not integral to the rulemaking process. 
"There has been significant debate regarding what weight should be afforded advisory 
committee notes to judicial rules. Compare Eileen A. Scallen, The Federal Rules of 
Evidence in Retrospect: Observations from the 1995 AALS Evidence Section: 
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory 
9 
Committee Notes, 28, Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 1283, 1287-93, 1302 (1995) (describing the 
advisory committee's and Congress's involvement in the adoption of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, and arguing that committee notes should be given 'great weight'), and 
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the advisory committee notes are 'particularly relevant' in determining the meaning of a 
rule and the intent of the drafters (internal quotation marks omitted)), with id. At 167-68 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (conceding that the committee notes are 'ordinarily the most 
persuasive' scholarly commentary, but that arguing that the notes are not 'authoritative[]' 
because there is no 'procedure by which [the Court] formally endorse[s] or disclaim[s] 
then'). We note that, although not authoritative, the advisory committee notes to the 
Utah Rules of Evidence merit great weight in any interpretation of those rules. Indeed, 
the primary argument against giving great weight to the notes- that the court does not 
'formally endorse them,' id.-is of less concern under Utah Law. Whereas, upon 
receiving proposed rules or amendments from the United States Supreme Court, 
Congress has the authority to modify or reject the rules, Scallen, suprs, at 1288-90, we 
have primary constitutional authority to adopt these rules. Utah Const, art. VIII, §4. 
Thus, the absence of the intervening legislative step makes the advisory committee notes 
a more reliable indicator of our intent in adopting the rules." 
Point 5. It might be maintained that the power of the legislature to amend 
rules of procedure and/or rules of evidence is ineffective as a tool to assert or to 
implement public policy in that the court, by readoption, might reinstate the rule 
which was adopted prior to the legislative enactment purporting to assert a new or 
10 
different rule or purporting to modify an existing Rule. 
15. The burden to establish validity is constitutionally cast upon that body 
which might suggest the validity or applicability of the impinging legislation and, in fact, 
in the classification of constitutionally protected rights such as privilege the burden is 
one of strict scrutiny, see Lee vs. Gaufin 867 P.2d 572 (Ut. 1993). (See Appendix U) in 
the Lee case this Court discussed legislation as to whether the limitation imposed was 
procedural or substantive and went on to hold that a heightened level of scrutiny was 
justified in cases where constitutional rights were affected. 
16. The reasoning behind a contention that the power of the Legislature to 
Amend Rules of Procedure and/or Rules of Evidence is actually ineffective as a tool to 
assert or to implement public policy becomes apparent in that the Court, by readoption, 
may reinstate the Rule as it existed prior to any purported amendment or nullification, 
hence the committee approach to resolution of these conflicts. In the aftermath of Bums 
vs. Boyden (supra) upon expression of concern by Legislators, a panel member acting as 
liaison for the Supreme Court ventured to assure the panel that the Supreme Court 
exercised a policy that whichever body spoke last, be it the Legislature or the Court, set 
the Rule (Notes of the Legislative Counsel for the joint committee., Appendix V) Must 
the Court then scan all new Legislation and continually tinker with the Judicial process 
until a corrective rule may thereby be adopted or readopted by the Supreme Court? The 
Utah Court has yet to speak to this proposition, probably because no case has been 
11 
presented with that issue proposed, whereby that the Court might endorse or refute that 
apparently unworkable proposition. It is suggested that in determining which body 
"spoke last" one need not study and compare all legislation with the questioned Rule but 
only consider the rule as it is authoritatively published. 
Point 6. This being a case involving fundamental rights, the prosecution 
must 
survive a standard of strict scrutiny and demonstrate a compelling Governmental 
interest unfettered by prohibitions founded within the Constitution. 
17. The 1985 Constitutional Amendment, by implication, requires a 
preliminary affirmative showing of a particularized legislative proceeding purporting to 
override the purpose espoused by the questioned rule prior to validation of any 
impinging Legislative enactment as operative law. Defendant/Appellant suggests that a 
joint resolution of the Legislature is, at a minimum, required with respect to 
enact legislation directly focusing on the rule but even that procedure would not suffice 
with respect to incidental legislation collaterally affecting that Rule. 
II. Whether prosecution presented a sufficient amount of evidence at the 
Preliminary Hearing to obtain a Bindover. 
18. The purpose of a Preliminary Hearing is to determine whether there is 
sufficient cause to believe a crime has been committed and thereby warrant further 
proceedings. This function is important because it not only relieves the accused of the 
substantial degradation and expense which accompanies a criminal trial, but also operates 
to conserve judicial resources and promotes confidence in the judicial system. The 
12 
Preliminary Hearing is a critical stage in the criminal process, and proper consideration 
for a Defendant's/Appellant's rights to due process must be observed. See State vs. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 7823 n.9, citing Coleman vs. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969) (See 
Appendix W). 
19. Presented as evidence at the Preliminary Hearing was a note 
signed by a Dr. Jaussi (See Appendix X) and the Trial Court ruled that the writing 
satisfied Rule 1102 for the purposes of a preliminary hearing. The only additional 
evidence was an unverified and insupportable compilation of excerpts from records of 
various pharmacies. Defendant/Appellant contends that as provided, the evidence does 
not support probable cause and that the Motion to Quash the Bindover should have been 
granted by the Trial Court. 
III. Whether under the facts of this case the Prosecution may present 
confidential medical information at the Preliminary Hearing over an objection 
based on Physician-Patient privilege as espoused by Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
20. Physician-patient privilege is codified in both U.C.A. 78-24-8 and Article 
V of Utah Rules of Evidence (Rule 506). U.C.A. 78-24-8 (4) provides: 
A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be 
examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending the 
patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the 
patient. 
Though the case at bar constitutes a criminal action, defense contends that a criminal 
action is likewise subject to the strictures imposed by the statute. Therefore, the above 
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statute as applied to the criminal case at bar should be construed liberally to afford 
Defendant/Appellant due process. 
21. Utah Rule of Evidence 506 (b) provides: 
If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of 
diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the 
patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a 
physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by 
examination of the patient 
Even if it could be said that physician-patient privilege does not arise under common law 
and is not recognized in absence of a statute, the Utah courts clearly recognize and afford 
this privilege to litigants; interestingly Utah law has long been construed to provide that a 
legislative enactments may not overrule a rule of evidence promuleated by the judiciary.1 
22. Little case law on physician-patient privilege in Utah was available prior to 
the comparatively recent case of State vs. Mark E. Anderson 972 P.2d 86 (Utah 1998) 
(See Appendix Y). In the Anderson case, there is dicta to the effect that 
Defendant/Appellant may not employ a Rule or Statute as a shield and thereby suppress 
evidence of wrongdoing. This more or less casual observations, if generally applied ot 
criminal cases, would largely eviscerate Rule 506. Only two reported cases in the prior 
fifty years deal with the privilege but focus on psychotherapist-patient privilege, with 
little discussion of the issues important to the case at bar. State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 
1
 Nasfell vs. Ogden City 122 Utah 344 249 P.2d 507 (1952) (See Appendix BB). 
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(Utah, 1979) (See Appendix Z); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah, 1958) (See 
Appendix AA). Since psychotherapist-patient privilege addresses fact issues unique to 
the field of psychotherapy, there is little direct applicability to the case at bar. The cases 
do however, make it clear that physician-patient privilege is recognized by Utah courts. 
23. Public policy considerations mandating recognition of this privilege are 
compelling. Much like attorney-client privilege, physician-patient privilege is designed 
to inspire confidence in the relationship established between the people and certain 
classes of professionals by preventing that professional from revealing confidential, 
possibly embarrassing and highly personal information. This privilege ensures that 
patients make a full and complete disclosure of the symptoms and causes of their injury 
in order that the physician may more fully diagnose and treat the patient. State v. Lata 
601 P.2d 520 (Wash., 1979) (See Appendix CC). Included under this privilege is 
"information. . . communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or 
treating the patient." 81 Am. Jur. 2d 443. This privilege has been rigorously defended 
by courts in America. Courts require exceptions to the privilege to be construed 
narrowly. In the Matter of the Guardianship of Marie Arkins 790 P.2d 210 (Wash. App. 
1990) (See Appendix DD); State v. Mark, 597 P.2d 406 (Wash. App., 1979) (See 
Appendix EE). No court known to Defendant/Appellant has crafted an exception based 
on a physicians knowledge of the case despite the patients denial or nondisclosure. 
24. The scope of this privilege includes evidence of drug addiction. Indeed, 
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drug addiction is a medical malady which is especially scorned by society and evidence 
of one's drug addiction is almost certainly accompanied with a negative social stigma. In 
People v. Overton, 759 P.2d 772, 774 (Colo. App. 1988) (See Appendix FF), the 
Colorado Court held that evidence of a witness's past drug addiction was inadmissible as 
privileged medical information, stating that the records in this case are subject to the 
physician patient privilege.... And where, as here, there is neither an express nor an 
implied waiver, and there being no showing of particularized need, the privilege is 
absolute. In the instant case, no medical records were subpoenaed in violation of Utah 
law but the volunteered medical information, thought to suggest addiction or abuse, 
should not have been subjected to public scrutiny and scorn. Surely the responsible 
branches of Utah Government intended to prevent just such a result in enacting U.C.A. 
78-24-8 and in promulgating Rule 506. On the other hand, Defendant/Appellant 
suggests that relevant records; if they had been subpoenaed and if admitted into evidence 
over a Motion to Quash, might well have assisted the State in bolstering the deficient 
case presented in support of the Bindover sought during the 3rd of May, 2006 Hearing. 
25. Privileges, of course, are maintained only insofar as they are not waived or 
do not fall under an exception. At no time has the Defendant/Appellant or defense 
counsel waived this privilege and did, in fact, specifically invoke the privilege at 
preliminary hearing even though certain evidentiary questions are, by law, not to be 
considered by the committing magistrate. c/State vs. Anderson (supra) U.C.A. 78-24-8 
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(4) asserts that waiver occurs when "the patient places his medical condition at issue as 
an element or factor respecting his claim or defense." Defendant/Appellant has, at no 
time, asserted any medical condition as a defense. With respect to exceptions to 
physician-patient privilege, Rule 506 allows three instances in which the privilege does 
not apply: 1. When the condition is an element of a claim or defense (discussed supra); 2. 
When the privilege-holder is hospitalized for mental illness; 3. When the court orders 
examination of the privilege-holder. None of the three exceptions apply nor can those 
exceptions apply to the case at bar. Defendant/Appellant has not been hospitalized for 
mental illness, nor has the Trial Court ordered any examination of Defendant/Appellant, 
nor can the Trial Court, in light of constitutional mandates, require this defendant be 
subjected to such inquiry. 
26. Courts have, however, made it clear that this privilege does not extend to 
pharmaceutical records {State v. Mark, 597 P.2d 406 (Wash.App. 1979) ("[Prescriptions 
are subject to inspection for law enforcement purposes."). U.C.A. 58-17a-604 (4) (b) 
allows disclosure of pharmaceutical information to a "lawfully authorized federal, state 
or local drug enforcement officer." For the purposes of the issues litigated in this 
Appeal, the defense does not dispute that pharmaceutical records obtained in discovery2 
fall beyond the bounds of physician-patient privilege. However, any of 
2
 That is, if records are properly subpoenaed directly from the pharmacies, which 
did not happen here. 
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Defendant/Appellant's medical records, subpoenaed directly from the physicians' office, 
are clearly covered by the physician-patient privilege. These medical records might 
contain the physician's notes on Defendant/Appellant, including 
Defendant's/Appellant's confidential disclosures and impressions of physical symptoms. 
Furthermore, such disclosures might provide information as to consumption of other 
drugs, not relevant to the case at bar, on the basis that they might unduly prejudice the 
court/jury against Defendant/Appellant and should also be excluded as irrelevant and/or 
on the basis that the prejudicial impact outweighs any possible relevancy. 
27. The bindover, in light of the analysis provided in Anderson, was clearly in 
excess of the Courts authority so to do. In Anderson, in considering a claim of privilege, 
the court observed that section 58-37-6(9) excludes from the physician patient privilege 
any information communicated in an attempt to unlawfully procure drugs. Obviously the 
rationale in Anderson supports Defendant's/Appellant's view. Defendant/Appellant is 
not alleged to have communicated information for any unlawful purpose and the 
objective facts adduced at Preliminary Hearing demonstrated that Defendant/Appellant 
had submitted to emergency treatment by a new physician for a new and unexpected 
procedure as opposed to a scheme concocted to tap a heretofore unobtainable supply of 
prescription drugs. At the best rationale available to Plaintiff/Appellee, there is simply 
no showing available that would or could establish an unlawful purpose and thus the 
exception drawn in UCA 58-37-6(9) is overbroad and not particularly controlling in this 
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case. 
IV. Does testimony to a fact from which a negative inference may be drawn 
based on a patients neglect or refusal to provide useful and pertinent information to 
the attending Physician during diagnosis and/or treatment when the same is 
adduced from that patients attending physician, over Defendant's/Appellant's 
claim of privilege pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 506, amount to a 
communication which Defendant/Appellant is entitled to invoke privilege pursuant 
to Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence? 
28. Defendant/Appellant first contends that insofar as Rule 506 is concerned, 
the interests of the patient, whether in connection with a civil proceeding or a criminal 
proceeding, coincide and no meaningful distinction as to the breadth of the protection 
may be argued, see Mangrum et al (Infra) (See Appendix GG). See also Rule 101 of the 
Utah Rule of Evidence. 
29. In the recent case of Hill vs. National Collegiate Athletic Association 7 Cal 
4th 126, 865 p.2d 633 (1994) (See Appendix HH) the Supreme Court of California 
discussed the protections afforded by the physician-patient privilege with regard to 
Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution3 noting that a successful invocation of 
that provision must demonstrate: 
" A. A legally protected privacy interest 
B. A reasonable expectations of privacy in the circumstances 
C. Conduct constituting a serious invasion of privacy." 
3
 That provision, not within the Utah Constitution, averts that: 
"All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, 
happiness, and privacy." 
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30. Since this instant case involves only an interaction between a physician and 
his patient the inquiry as to whether a legally protected interest exists is easily answered 
within the framework of Rule 506 Utah Rules of Evidence. The rule as adopted and as 
authoritatively construed is inviolate save three exceptions incorporated within that rule, 
none of which are relevant here. The only questions then left to be answered are (a) 
whether the information was imparted to the physician by the patient during the time 
when a physician-patient privilege might be invoked and (b) whether the inference may 
be derived from a communication or observation made only in connection with the 
diagnosis and treatment rendered by the physician. 
31. In Mangrum and Benson on Utah Evidence Thompson (2005) at page 229 
it is said that foundational to any such claim based on rule 506, there must be existent the 
following elements, 
A. The patient or patient's representative on behalf of the patient 
asserts either the physician-patient or the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. 
B. The information the patient or the patient's representative seeks to 
protect is either a communication or an observation. 
C. The communication was relayed or the observation was made 
concerning the patient. 
D. The communication was made to or the observation was made by a 
physician, psychiatrist, psychologist or social worker performing 
psychotherapy or their representatives, [citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 
518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996)]. (See 
Appendix JJ). 
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E. The communication or observation was made in confidence. 
F. The communication or observation was made for purposes of 
facilitating the rendition of psychotherapy, [or physician] (the Jaffe 
case involved a psychotherapist) 
G. The communication or observation does not fall within any 
exception. 
H. The privilege has not been waived. 
32. Ordinarily any indication of a communication is sufficient to invoke the 
privilege and any negative inference arising from a failure to communicate arising within 
the framework of the treatment regimen such as ". . . The patient communicated with me 
but I didn't ask and/or the patient didn't tell. . ." as in this case, with regard to the only 
relevant question that being whether another physician was dispensing similar 
medications. Surely if a physician had put the question "Are you receiving drug therapy 
for any purpose from another doctor?" and a patient responded "no" the response would 
have been protected from disclosure under Rule 506. Would this court hold that oral 
evidence which is misleading is protected by the privilege4 but a negligent and possibly 
4
 The case of State vs. Anderson 972 P.2d 86, (1998) denies the privilege (by way 
of dictum) to he who would seek treatment by a physician for the sole purpose of 
obtaining controlled substances for illicit consumption; this is not the case here. 
Defendant/Appellant was referred by her attending physician for a condition which was 
neither subject to prior diagnosis nor had the attending physician offered treatment. (See 
Appendix KK) The referring physician was a practitioner whose expertise was, to his 
view, deficient with respect to the recent untreated injury presented by the patient. 
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injury induced5 oversight during a like colloquy between physician and patient is not 
subject to the same protection? 
33. Since an observation is protected and the failure to disclose must, by 
definition, be a product of some observation by the physician or the physicians 
representatives, how else could the observation occur? If some mechanism is available, 
other than the physicians testimonial or documentary evidence, whereby the 
Plaintiff/Appellee might provide the controverted element most necessary to establish 
prima facia proof of the violation of the statute; the State might then present that 
evidence, if the rules of evidence otherwise permit. 
34. Interestingly, it seems that the common practice is to provide each new 
patient with a form to fill out, either with or without the assistance of office personnel 
and/or medical staff; representative forms are provided herewith. (See Exhibit LL). Two 
logical inferences derive from use of the form. If the form, in its completed condition, 
notes meds, is it not sufficient to satisfy 58-37-6(9) or is it that the form may not be 
considered a communication at all? Is the form provided in aid of diagnosis and/or 
treatment or for some other purpose such as to fulfill some obligation imposed on the 
physician by governmental regulation as opposed to the patient? 
V, Did the Plaintiff/Appellee, in failing to offer proof at the Preliminary 
Hearing that the Defendant/Appellant became a patient of Dr. Jaussi for the 
5
 In cases such as this, where the patient had received a traumatic head injury, 
could the defense of mental confusion induce by the pain and brain trauma be raised? 
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purpose of obtaining a controlled substance in furtherance of an unlawful scheme, 
fail to provide proof of each element of crime alleged? 
35. It is apparent from reading he Statute and from the interpretation adopted 
by the Utah Court of Appeals in State vs. Anderson 972 P.2d 86, 89 (Ut. App. 1998) that 
one of the elements that support the charge is proof that the Defendant/Appellant failed 
to offer the information in order to obtain prescription medication for an unlawful 
purpose. To convict, the Jury must find that there was an unlawful purpose as opposed 
to a legitimate need for treatment. 
36. In this case, let us assume that a patient had been referred by a medical 
specialist for a new traumatic condition out of his area of expertise. The Physician that 
the patient was referred to was a specialist in diseases and conditions involving the eye. 
The Physician observed impact trauma to the eye and surrounding issues and further 
observed the patient to be in considerable pain from the contusions and noted resultant 
swelling and thereupon prescribed appropriate medication. There is no evidence that the 
wound was self-inflicted nor that the patient had voluntarily aggravated or prolonged the 
condition. Where does the illegality lie? 
37. Another hypothetical: a patient presents at a medical emergency facility 
with acute pancreatitis, causing unremitting pain of a most acute nature which can be 
only suppressed by large dosages of drugs. Where is the fraud or illegality? 
38. In the Preliminary Hearing of this case, there was no evidence to support 
any state of mind other than the desire for treatment which would relieve the symptoms 
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of the trauma and the proof offered by the State failed to provide any other explanation. 
CONCLUSION 
Private medical records cannot be open to discovery given the applicable Utah 
statutes. The Utah legislature has spoken clearly on the issue and the applicable 
provisions will not tolerate such disclosure unless it falls within one of the exceptions or 
has been waived by Defendant/Appellant, neither of which are raised by the facts of this 
case. In view of the clear mandate of the Utah Code and of the rules of evidence, 
Defendant's/Appellant's physician-patient privilege was violated in allowing use of 
confidential medical records or testimony of an attending physician under the facts of this 
case. 
In response to the limited issue addressed herein and as authoritatively construed, 
the interaction between physician and patient such as it occurred in this case amounts to a 
communication. 
The Trial Court clearly admitted evidence essential to the Prosecution, which 
evidence is subject to the physician-patient privilege and did so over 
Defendant's/Appellant's objection and the Bindover should have been quashed for that 
reason alone. 
The Trial Court erred when it relied on Legislation which has been superceded by 
Court Rule and without that enabling legislation the State would have failed to offer 
sufficient evidence upon which to base a Bindover. 
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This case should be dismissed in that: 
1. Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence forbids that a Physician be permitted 
to testify as to any communication, observation or diagnosis obtained in treatment of his 
patient. 
2. UCA 58-37-8(9) infringes upon a strictly Judicial area and by purporting to 
create or modify Rules of Procedure or Rules of Evidence violates the provisions of the 
Utah Constitution at Article V Section 1 and Article VIII Section 4. 
3. Utah Legislation is internally contradictory in that UCA 58-37-8(9) commands 
that which UCA 58-60-113 forbids. 
Respectfully S»b*«itted, 
A.W\Lauritzen 
Attorneyfor Dpfcr^^t/ Appellant 
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Article 1 Section 1 
ARTICLE 1 DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among 
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, 
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
58-17a-604(4)(b) 
(f) the directions for use and cautionary statements, if any, which are 
contained in the prescription order or are needed; and 
(g) the trade, generic, or chemical name, amount dispensed and strength of 
dosage form, but if multiple ingredient products with established 
proprietary or nonproprietary names are prescribed, those products' 
names may be used. 
(6) If the prescriber specifically indicates the name of the prescription product 
should not appear on the label, then the trade, generic, or chemical name and 
strength of dosage form may not be included. 
58-17a-603. Identification of drug outlet personnel. 
All individuals employed in a drug outlet having any contact with the public or 
patients receiving services from that drug outlet shall wear on their person a 
clearly visible and readable identification showing the individual's name and 
position. 
58-17a-604. Medication profiles. 
(1) (a) Each pharmacy shall establish a medication profile system for pharmacy 
patients according to standards established by division rules made in 
collaboration with the board, 
(b) The rules shall indicate the method for recording all prescription 
information. 
(2) The pharmacy shall maintain the medication profile for any pharmacy patient 
who expresses a desire for that professional service. 
(3) The pharmacy may charge an appropriate professional fee for this service and 
for copying or providing information in the medication profile to another 
authorized person. 
(4) A pharmacist, pharmacy intern, or pharmacy technician may not release or 
discuss the information contained in a prescription or patient's medication 
profile to anyone except: 
(a) the pharmacy patient in person or the pharmacy patient's legal guardian 
or designee; 
(b) a lawfully authorized federal, state, or local drug enforcement 
officer; 
(c) a third party payment program administered under terms authorized by 
the pharmacy patient; 
(d) a pharmacist, pharmacy intern, or pharmacy technician providing 
pharmacy services to the patient or a prescribing practitioner 
providing professional services to the patient; 
(e) another pharmacist, pharmacy intern, pharmacy technician, or 
prescribing practitioner to whom the patient has requested a 
prescription transfer; or 
(f) the pharmacy patient's attorney, after the presentation of a written 
authorization signed by the: 
(i) patient, before a notary public; 
(ii) parent or lawful guardian, if the patient is a minor; 
(iii) lawful guardian, if the patient is incompetent; or 
(iv) personal representative, if the patient is deceased. 
58-17a-605. Drug product equivalents. 
(1) A pharmacist or pharmacy intern dispensing a prescription order for a 
specific drug by brand or proprietary name may substitute another drug 
product equivalent if: 
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58-37-6(9) 
§ 58-37-6 OCCUPATIONS & PROFESSION 
dispense a controlled substance to another licensee or any other authorised 
person not authorized by this license. 
(/) A person licensed under this chapter may not omit, remove, alter, or 
obliterate a symbol required by this chapter or by a rule issued under this 
chapter. 
(m) A person licensed under this chapter may not refuse or fail to make 
keep, or furnish any record notification, order form, statement, invoice, or 
information required under this chapter. 
(n) A person licensed under this chapter may not refuse entry into any 
premises for inspection as authorized by this chapter. 
(o) A person licensed under this chapter may not furnish false or fraudu-
lent material information in any application, report, or other document 
required to be kept by this chapter or willfully make any false statement in 
any prescription, order, report, or record required by this chapter. 
(8)(a)(i) Any person licensed under this chapter who is found by the division 
to have violated any of the provisions of Subsections (7)(k) through (7)(o) is 
subject to a penalty not to exceed $5,000. The division shall determine the 
procedure for adjudication of any violations in accordance with Sections 
58-1-106 and 58-1-108. 
(ii) The division shall deposit all penalties collected under Subsection 
(8)(a)(i) in the General Fund as a dedicated credit to be used by the division 
under Subsection 58-37-7.7(1). 
(b) Any person who knowingly and intentionally violates Subsections (7)(h) 
through (7)(j) is: 
(i) upon first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) upon second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who knowingly and intentionally violates Subsections (7)(k) 
through (7)(o) shall upon conviction be guilty of a third degree felony. 
(9) Any information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an attempt 
to_unlawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled sub-
stance is not considered to be a privileged communication. 
Laws 1971, c. 145, § 6; Laws 1972, c. 21, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 5; Laws 1979, c. 12, 
§ 4; Laws 1980, c. 6, § 39; Laws 1984, 2nd Sp. Sess., c. 15, § 96; Laws 1985, c. 187, 
§ 81; Laws 1986, c. 23, § 4; Laws 1986, c. 194, § 13; Laws 1987, c. 92, § 99; Laws 
1987, c. 161. § 202; Laws 1989, c. 225, § 61; Laws 1989, c. 253, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 
198, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 39, § 2; Laws 1994, c. 8, § 2; Laws 1994, c. 313, § 59; Laws 
1995, c. 333, § 2, eff. July 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 170, § 54, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 
1996, c. 247, § 43, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 64, § 5, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 
1998, c. 13, § 55, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 145, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 
2002, c. 137. § 1, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 33, § 3, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, 
c. 241, § 2; Laws 2004, c. 280, § 53, eff. July 1, 2004. 
Historical and Statutory Notes 
Composite section by the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2004, c. 
241, § 2 and Laws 2004, c. 280, § 53. 
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ing less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor* and 
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside,the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility, as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsec-
tion (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as 
listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term 
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively 
and not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in 
his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negli-
gent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 
or the death of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or 
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufactur-
er, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense 
to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or 
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresen-
tation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
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substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alter-
ation of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the 
use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, 
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of 
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render 
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not author-
ized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under 
this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon convic-
tion subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if 
the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
. i (i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
•li grounds of any of those schools; 
^ ' (ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution 
£J'or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
tH^ (jii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure 
jj, or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
fh sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
'• and (ii); 
i m (iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
^ ; , (v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
^ (vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 
at!*-™-' 
y^i(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
®^°^XSe' Plavhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
j^^ vViiO in a public parking lot or structure; 
Ij&W within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
^ s e c t i o n s (4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
W in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, 
r& ^ a r ^ e s s °f w he re the act occurs; or 
ldbir-l ^ e P u r P o s e °f facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, 
Vtty, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an 
*c or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 
$11.3. 
person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
'd shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five vears if the 
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penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of tht 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would 
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person 
convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one 
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d)U) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the 
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person 
who, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encour-
ages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsec-
tion (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the 
time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the 
actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as 
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another 
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the 
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or 
substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
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(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manu-
factures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as 
a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the 
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope 
0f his employment. 
(10) If ar*y provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
Uiy person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall 
kg given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
uws 1971, c. 145, § 8; Laws 1972, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 6; Laws 1979, c. 12, 
| Y Laws 1985, c. 146, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 196, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 92, § 100; Laws 
1987, c. 190, § 3; Laws 1988, c. 95, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 50, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 56, § 1; 
Uws 1989, c. 178, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 201, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 
t j i f 1; Laws 1990, c. 163, §§ 2, 3; Laws 1991, c. 80, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 198, § 4; 
Uws 1991, c. 268, § 7; Laws 1995, c. 284, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 1, § 8, 
a Jan. 31, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 64, § 6, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 139, § 1, eff. 
11^4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 12, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 303, § 1, eff. May 
J 1999; Laws 2003, c. 10, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2003, c. 33, § 6, eff. May 5, 
2003; Laws 2004, c. 36, § 1, eff. March 15, 2004. 
Cross References 
Attest of school employee, notice required, see § 53-10-211. 
jjriempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
ftjOipiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
JtH conviction defined, see § 41-6-44. 
fbciupon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
bcboate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302. 
Minors, suspension of driver's license for certain offenses, see § 78-3a-506. 
taftlties for felonies, see § 76-3-203. 
faftlties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204. 
Ught to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
Library References 
Controlled Substances «>20 to 51. 
!
'Vfeltlaw Key Number Searches: 96Hk20 to 
96Hk51. 
I--
Stop. Research References 
library 4 A.L.R.5th 1, Minimum Quantity of Drug 
" | A.L.R.Fed. 567, Permissibility Under Required to Support Claim that Defendant 
|Wrth Amendment of Detention of Motor- is Guilty of Criminal "Possession" of Drug 
~*jy Police, Following Lawful Stop for Under State Law. 
"C Offense, to Investigate Matters Not 57 A.L.R. 3rd 1319, Conviction of Possession 
^
 tQ0ffense. of Illicit Drugs Found in Automobile of 
!jK.5th 593, validity, Construction and
 w h i c h Defendant was Not Sole Occupant. 
ucation of State Statutes Prohibiting 
J to Possession of Controlled Substances „, . , „ . 
i Specified Distance of Schools. Treatises and Practice Aids 
L5th 125, Criminality of Act of Direct- Restatement (Second) of Property, Land. & 
JJV or Recommending, Source from Ten. § 9.1, Property Leased for Illegal Pur-
^ Illicit Drugs May be Purchased. pose. 
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58-60-113 
§ 58-60-111 OCCUPATIONS & p; ROFE88RH 
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204. 
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
Unlawful or unprofessional conduct, generally, see § 58-1-501. 
Library References 
Health <2>163. C.J.S. Licenses §§ 82 to 83. 
Licenses <S=*40. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 238k40; 
19SHkl63. 
§ 5 8 - 6 0 - 1 1 2 . Reporting of unprofessional or unlawful conduct—-Immunity 
from liability 
(1) Upon learning of an act of unlawful or unprofessional conduct as defined 
in Section 58-60-102 by a person licensed under this chapter or an individual 
not licensed under this chapter and engaged in acts or practices regulated 
under this chapter, that results in disciplinary action by a licensed health'care 
facility, professional practice group, or professional society, or that results in a 
significant adverse impact upon the public health, safety, or welfare; the 
following shall report the conduct in writing to the division within ten dayi 
after learning of the disciplinary action or the conduct unless the individual or 
person knows it has been reported: 
(a) a licensed health care facility or organization in which ah individual 
licensed under this chapter engages in practice; 
(b) an individual licensed under this chapter; and 
(c) a professional society or organization whose membership is individual! 
licensed under this chapter and which has the authority to discipline or expel 
a member for acts of unprofessional or unlawful conduct. 
(2) Any individual reporting acts of unprofessional or unlawful conduct by an 
individual licensed under this chapter is immune from liability arising out of 
the disclosure to the extent the individual furnishes the information in good 
faith and without malice. 
Laws 1994, c. 32, § 12. 
Library References 
Health C=»195. C.J.S. Licenses §§ 37 to 38. 
Licenses G=>2\. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 198Hkl95; 
238k21. 
§ 58-60—113". Evidentiary privilege 
Evidentiary privilege for mental health therapists regarding admissibility 
any confidential communication in administrative, civil, or criminal procec 
ings is in accordance with Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Laws 1994, c. 32, § 13. 
Library References 
Witnesses <&=>214.5. Westlaw Key Number Search: 410k2l4.5«'>V 
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77^18a-1 • Appeals—When proper. 
77^18a-2. Capital cases. 
§ 7 7 - 1 8 a - 1 . Appeals—When proper 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the 
defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony informa-
tion following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence 
when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal 
Would be in the interest of justice; 
(0 under circumstances not amounting to a final order under Subsection 
(2Xa)# a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial on a felony as charged or 
^pretrial order dismissing or quashing in part a felony information, when 
U^pon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the appeal would 
w in the interest of justice; 
&^ V8) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or 
So contest; 
| | $ 0 a finding pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 15a, Exemptions from Death 
IfPWty in Capital Cases, that a capital defendant is exempt from a sentence 
jBjSr*"1* when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the 
JlRffl would be in the interest of justice; or 
H r a j * finding pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency for 
^ • p u o n , that an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be executed. 
M H K ? ' c 7, § 10; Laws 1995, c. 65, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 364, § 1, 
H S j o n ' Laws 2003' c' H' § 10' eff" March 15' 2003; Laws 2004' c* 137' § !' 
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78-2a-3(e), (1953 as Amended) 
SUPREME COURT § 78-2-2 
otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice. 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief justice as 
consistent with law. 
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1; Laws 1969, c. 247, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 47, § 40; Laws 1988, c. 
248, § 4; Laws 1990, c. 80, § 4. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp , § 104-2-1. 
Cross References 
Judges Contributory Retirement Act, see § 49-17-101 et seq. 
Judges Noncontributory Retirement Act, see § 49-18-101 et seq. 
Supreme court, generally, see Const. Art. 8, § 2. 
Supreme court jurisdiction, see Const. Art. 8, § 3. 
Library References 
Courts <S=>48. C.J.S. Courts § 4. 
Judges @=>3, 1. c.J.S. Judges §§ 2 to 7, 12 to 13. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k48, 
227k3; 227k 1 
§ 7 8 - 2 - 1 - 5 . Repealed by Laws 1971, c. 182, § 4 
§ 7 8 - 2 - 1 . 6 . Repealed by Laws 1981, c. 267, § 2, eff. July 1, 1982 
§ 78—2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to earn- into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating 
with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources re-
viewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
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78-24-8 
WITNESSES § 78-24-8 
and legal questions; and, unless sooner discharged, must remain until the 
testimony is closed. 
U w s 1951, c. 58, § 1. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-24-6. 
Library References 
Witnesses <S=>7. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 410k7. 
CJ.S. Witnesses §§ 2, 20 to 31. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Trial Handbook for Utah Lawyers § 12:2, 
Compelling attendance of witnesses. 
§ 78-24-7 . Liability to forfeiture and damages 
A witness disobeying a subpoena shall, in addition to any penalty imposed for 
contempt, be liable to the party aggrieved in the sum of $100, and all damages 
which he may sustain by the failure of the witness to attend, which forfeiture 
aiid damages may be recovered in a civil action. 
Laws 1951, c. 58, § 1. 
Codifications C. 1943, Supp., § 104-24-7. 
Library References 
Witnesses e=»21, 22. CJ.S. Witnesses §§ 2. 53 to 56, 59 to 64. 
Wcstiaw Key Number Searches: 410k21; 
4I0k22. 
§ 78—24—8. Privileged communications 
There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage 
confidence and to preserve it inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be exam-
ined as a witness in the following cases: 
(l)(a) Neither a wife nor a husband may either during the marriage or 
afterwards be, without the consent of the other, examined as to any communi-
cation made by one to the other during the marriage, 
(b) This exception does not apply: 
(i) to a civil action or proceeding by one spouse against the other; 
(ii) to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one 
spouse against the other; 
(iii) to the crime of deserting or neglecting to support a spouse or child; 
(iv) to any civil or criminal proceeding for abuse or neglect committed 
against the child of either spouse; or 
(v) if otherwise specifically provided by law. 
J2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to 
»&y communication made by the client to him or his advice given regarding the 
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UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article V Section 1 
Article V, Section 1. [Three departments of government] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, 
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
No History for Constitution 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 CO_06002.ZIP 1,765 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title|AH Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Monday, December 18, 2006 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article VIII Section 4 
Article VIII, Section 4. [Rulemaking power of Supreme Court — Judges pro tempore — 
Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore 
shall be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. The Supreme 
Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law. 
No History for Constitution 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 COJ)9005.ZIP 2,032 Bytes 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 26 
gULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 26 
for 
1953. 
ourpose of preliminary examination. U.C.A. 
76-3-204(1), 76-5-102.4, 77-10-5, 
77-15-17, 77-15-19, 77-51-1 et 77110-5(3), 
a 77-51-1 to 77-51-4, 77-51-6, 78-4-16; 
rCA 1953, 78-5-4(3). Laws 1951, c. 58. Van 
pam v. Morris, 1977, 571 P.2d 1325. Criminal 
U W ^ 2 2 6 
7 Sanction against prosecutor 
Dismissal of city's criminal information 
aeainst defendant as contempt sanction for fail-
ure of particular city prosecutor to appear at 
hearing could not be justified under rule of 
criminal procedure providing sole authority for 
dismissal. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 25. Salt 
take City v. Dorman-Ligh, 1996, 912 P.2d 452. 
Criminal Law <S=> 700(1) 
g. Mew information following dismissal 
The dismissal of a criminal action, and the 
discharge of accused from custody after the 
filing by the district attorney of an information 
as provided by statute, requiring the filing of an 
information within a specified time after ac-
cused has been examined and committed by the 
magistrate, etc., terminates the action, and a 
new information without a new preliminary ex-
amination cannot be filed, though a new infor-
mation without a new preliminary examination 
may be filed after the dismissal of the original 
information. State v. 
36 Utah 396, 104 P. 
formation <£=» 41(6) 
Second Dist. Court, 1909, 
282. Indictment And In-
9. Mandamus 
Where a court without authority refuses juris-
diction and dismisses an action, mandamus lies 
to compel it to reinstate it, and to proceed with 
it. State v. Second Dist. Court, 1909, 36 Utah 
396, 104 P. 282. Mandamus «=» 43 
10. Testimonial privileges 
Defendant who was jointly charged with oth-
ers with conspiracy to commit 10 alleged 
crimes who, when called by state as witness at 
perjury trial of one conspiracy codefendant, re-
fused to testify, but who, on motion of district 
attorney, was dismissed as defendant in con-
spiracy case and was granted immunity from all 
offenses growing out of his testimony at perjury 
trial, could not claim right to remain silent 
since he was no longer defendant in case, but 
had all rights and immunities of any other wit-
ness and was not required to answer question if 
it tended to incriminate him for any other 
crime. Const, art. 1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 76-12-1, 
76-28-58, 77-31-7, 77-31-9, 77-51-4, 77-51-6, 
78-4-9. In re Petty, 1967, 18 Utah 320, 422 
P.2d 659. Witnesses &=* 304( 1) 
RULE 2 6 . WRITTEN ORDERS, JUDGEMENTS AND DECREES 
(a) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct, 
file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the 
ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served 
upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court 
and counsel within five days after service. 
(c) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner as 
to show whether they are entered based on a ruling after a hearing or 
argument, the stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel or upon the court's 
own initiative, and shall identify the attorneys of record in the cause or 
proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is made. If the order, 
judgment, or decree is the result of a hearing, the order shall include the date 
of the hearing, the nature of the hearing, and the names of the attorneys and 
parties present at the hearing. 
(d) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or motion upon which the order is based. 
1281 
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(e) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation shall be si^u 
or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of reon 
for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was ny 
on the record. 
[Adopted effective November 1, 2003.] 
Historical Notes 
Former Rule 26, relating to appeals in crimi-
nal cases, was repealed effective April 1, 1999. 
Library References 
Criminal Law <3=*632(3.1), 977 to 995. C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1420 to 1422, 14^ 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 1474 to 1475, 1480 to 1481, 1483 to 14tf 
110k632(3.1); 110k977 to 110k995. 1504 to 1505, 1511 to 1516, 1547. 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 1 by jury in convicting insured of arson wm 
virtually identical to issues raised by insured'* 
. - * civil claims and insurer's counterclaims. Car 
' ^
g CI1 T t rf , .. . . . penter v. Nova Cas. Co., 2005, 403 F.Supp.2<! 
Under Utah law, insured s arson conviction in Kn,Q T ^_ ->rr-» T J ywv£<». 
11
 t n . J I c i-4- . 1068. Insurance <S=^  3557: Judgment <&=» 828J 
state court collaterally estopped her irom htigat- ' B 
ing, in subsequent civil action against insurer, In determining whether there was full and 
claim that insurer made false representations fair litigation in a previous criminal proceedinf 
regarding coverage to induce her to enter into sufficient to support the invocation of collatenl 
contract for business property insurance, and estoppel in a subsequent civil proceeding, the 
claim that insurer negligently misrepresented seriousness of the allegations or the criminal 
material facts to induce insured's reliance on charge at the prior hearing is a factor to be 
insurance contract. Carpenter v. Nova Cas. considered. Carpenter v. Nova Cas. Co., 2005, 
Co., 2005, 403 F.Supp.2d 1068. Insurance €=>
 4 0 3 F .Supp.2d 1068. Judgment e=» 648 3557; Judgment ®=> 828.8 _, , . £
 t , . f - . „ r : m i n a | 
, , . , , . 1 i
 t t- i • i -. • . J The higher standard of proof in a criminal Under Utah law, substantial similarity existed . . ° ,, ,, f
 4 , . k a ftn. 
between issues presented at insured's state conviction a"ows collateral estoppel to be •£ 
criminal trial, in which she was convicted of P 1 ^ * 0 t h e l o w e r s t ^ d a r d of proof imposed to 
arson, and issues presented in her subsequent f c ' v l 1 cxase> s i n c e r t h e government is held to a 
civil action against insurer involving claims for h i S h e r b u r d e n o f P r o o f i n criminal cases a 
denial of insurance claim, breach of contract, criminal defendant can be estopped from rem-
misrepresentations, and bad faith, as well as igatmg any issue decided against him in a ennv 
insurer's counterclaims for breach of contract, inal proceeding in a subsequent civil action, 
breach of covenant of good faith and fair deal- even when the government ostensibly is not a 
ing, and fraud, as required for insured to be party in the later action. Carpenter v. Nova 
collaterally estopped from relitigating issues in Cas. Co., 2005, 403 F.Supp.2d 1068. Judgment 
subsequent civil action, where issues resolved <®=» 648 
R U L E 2 7 . STAYS PENDING APPEAL 
(a)(1) A sentence of death shall be stayed if an appeal or a petition for other 
relief is pending. 
(a)(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall be stayed if a n 
appeal is taken and a certificate of probable cause is issued. 
(a)(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order of judgment 
in favor of the defendant may be granted by the court upon good cause pending 
disposition of the appeal. 
(b) A person who has been found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a terro 
of incarceration in jail or prison, and who has filed a notice of appeal, shall DC 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 101 
RULES OF 
fact that these rules govern s ta te r a t h e r t han federal p roceedings and (211 
smal l n u m b e r of ins tances in w h i c h the ru le adop t ed w a s considered su 
ly s u p e n o i to the federal ru le to justify d e p a r t u r e from the objectivifS 
u n i f o r m m be tween Utah a n d federal ru les W h e r e such modifications ham 
been necei , san n u m b e r i n g cons i s t en t wi th the Fede ra l Rules has been maU. 
t a m e d Unless modified, r e fe rence to the no tes of the Advisory Committctli 
the Fede ia l Rules of Ev idence is pe r t i nen t to the m e a n i n g and effect of thtt 
ru les , together with notes of the Advisory C o m m i t t e e to these rules 
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
RULE 101. SCOPE 
These rules govern p r o c e e d i n g s m the cou r t s of th is Sta te , to the extent Ul4 
with the e \Lept ions s ta ted in Rule 1101 
Advisory Committee Note 
Adapted horn Rule 101, Uniform Rules Rule 101 adopts a general policy m*kta| 
of Evidence (1974) Rule 1101 contains the Rules of Evidence applicable la i l 
exceptions dealing with preliminary ques instances in courts of the state includlflf 
tions of fau grand jury proceedings situations previously governed by^UUII^  
miscellaneous judicial or quasi-judicial except to the extent that specific Statutory 
proceedings and summary contempt pro provisions are expressly retained.(,lwjt 
ceedmgs Rules 101 and 1101 are com 101 also rejects Lopes v Lopes, 30 Uuk U 
parable to Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of 393, 518 P 2d 687 (1974) to the cxtcntlhll 
Evidence (1971) except that Rule 2 it permits ad hoc development of Sp*cW 
made applicable other procedural rules rules of court inconsistent with these Raw 
(I e civil/cnnunal) or applicable statutes of Evidence 
to the extent that they relax the Rules of The position of the court in StewJ^ 
Evidence In addition Rule 2 of the Hansen, 588 P 2d 164 (Utah l 9 ' * * * f 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) expressly statutory provisions of evidence law WCOfr 
made the rules applicable to both civil sistent with the rules will take preoUWM 
and criminal proceedings is rejected 
Cross References 
Juvenile courts applicability of rules of evidence see Juv Proc Rule 43 _.._•»
 9m 
Lawyer discipline and disability applicability of rules of evidence see Lwyr Disc an TJIR^ *** 
Rules Rult 14-517 
Nonbinding arbitration applicability of rules of evidence, see ADR Rule 102 
Small claims application of rules of evidence, see Small Claims Proc Rule 7 
Trials evidence see Rules Civ Proc Rule 43 
Library References 
Courts <3=>85 
Westlaw Ke\ Number Search 106k85 
C J S Courts § 130 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 506 
Rule 505 RULES ORKVH 
and preserved to be made available to the appellate court in the^ i 
appeal, and the contents shall not otherwise be revealed without 
the government. 
Rule 505 incorporates the concept re-
flected in Roviaro v. United States, 353 
U.S. 53, 1 L.Ed.2d 639, 77 S.Ct. 623 
(1957), that the government has a "privi-
lege to withhold from disclosure the iden-
tity of persons who furnish information of 
violations of law to officers charged with 
the enforcement of that law." The Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the Roviaro ap-
proach in State v Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222 
(Utah 1980) 
Subparagraph (b) makes it clear that it 
is the government which holds the privi-
lege rather than the informer, the witness, 
or the law enforcement officer. This is so 
even though the earlier Rule 36, Utah 
Rules of Exidence, (1971) was couched in 
language that suggested that it was the 
witness' prrwlege. 
Subparagraph (c) allows the privilege to 
be claimed by counsel for the government 
or, in the absence of counsel, allows the 
court to determine who is "another appro-
priate repiesentative" of the government 
for the purposes of claiming the privilege. 
Subparagraph (d) makes it clear that the 
privilege is lost if (1) the informer appears 
Advisory Committee Note 
as a witness for the governing ^ 
informer discloses his or her I 
the party opposed to the priviL 
the government discloses thc , ltt 
identity to the party opposed ttH 
lege. W9f\ 
Subparagraph (d)(1) sets forth (kli fl^H 
be applied by the court in detfcHAkftt 
whether to allow the privilege or|t&'if. 
quire the government to elect to ^flft* 
the identity of the informer or todltmh^ 
in a criminal case. The rule conteropltfa 
discretion in the court to hold in Cifflm 
hearings to determine whether the leal b 
met and to seal and preserve any inform** 
tion disclosed in such hearings, for appft 
late review. 
Subparagraph (d)(2) provides proowjuri 
in conformity with Franks v. Delawarij431 
U.S. 154, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674 
(1978), to be followed in a motion to top-
press or similar proceeding where a pwty 
opposed to the privilege wishes to leant 
the identity of a confidential informant to 
order to attack the probable cause upon 
which the search was based. 
Criminal Law <S=>627.10. 
Witnesses C=>216(4). 
Westlaw Ke\ Number Searches: 
410k216(4) 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 11:59, 
Overview 
Library References 
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 533 to 540. 
C J.S. Witnesses § 365. 
110k627 10; 
Research References 
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 43:46. 
Utah 
ewed 
RULE 506. PHYSICIAN AND MENTAL HEALTH THERAPIST-PATIENT 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviev 
by a physician or mental health therapist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed bytn 
patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in any state. 
1546 
PRIVILEGES Rule 506 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably 
believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any state as a physician, 
psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family thera-
pist, advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered psychiat-
ric mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor while that person 
is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, 
including alcohol or drug addiction. 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. If the information is communicated in confi-
dence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a 
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice 
given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by 
examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a 
physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in the 
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health 
therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family who are 
present to further the interest of the patient because they are reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communications, or participation in the 
diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health 
therapist. 
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was the 
physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is 
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege 
on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. As to a communication 
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the 
patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim 
or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any 
party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for Mental Illness. For communications relevant to an 
issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the mental 
health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that 
the patient is in need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court Ordered Examination. For communications made in the course 
of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of the 
physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or 
witness, unless the court in ordering the examination specifies otherwise. 
[Amended effective July 1, 1994.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
Rule 506 is modeled after Rule 503 of §§ 78-24-8(4) and 58-25a-8. There is no 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, and is corresponding federal rule. By virtue of 
intended to supersede Utah Code Ann. 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 1101 
Rule 1007 RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Rules of Evidence (1971), but the rule ap-
There was no comparable rule in the Utah pears to be in accord with Utah practice. 
Library References 
Criminal Law <®=>398 to 403. C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 833 to 845. 
Evidence <s=>172. c.J.S. Evidence § 1064. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110k398 to 
U0k403; 157kl72. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 132:37, 
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 15:12, Ad- Utah. 
versary's Admission. 
R U L E 1 0 0 8 . FUNCTIONS OF COURT AND JURY 
When the admissibility of other evidence of contents of writings, recordings, 
or photographs under these rules depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of 
fact, the question whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for the 
court to determine in accordance with the provisions of Rule 104. However, 
when an issue is raised (a) whether the asserted writing ever existed, or (b) 
whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the trial is the 
original, or (c) whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the con-
tents, the issue is for the trier of fact to determine as in the case of other issues 
of fact. 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, 
and is substantially the same as Rule 
70(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
Library References 
Criminal Law C=>398 to 403. C J.S. Criminal Law §§ 833 to 845. 
Evidenced 187. C.J.S. Evidence §§ 1065. 1102, 1123. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110k398 to 
110k403; 157kl87. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 133:37, 
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 15:6, Func- Utah, 
tions of the Court and Jury. 
ARTICLE XI. MISCELLANEOUS RULES 
R U L E 1 1 0 1 . APPLICABILITY OF RULES 
(a) Courts and Magistrates. These rules apply to all actions and proceedings 
in the courts of this state except as otherwise provided in Subdivisions (b) and 
(c). 
1704 
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Note 3 
(b) Rules Inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do 
not apply in the following situations: 
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under Rule 
104(a); 
(2) Grand jury proceedings; 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, sentencing or granting or 
revocation of probation, issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses 
and search warrants and proceedings with respect to release on bail or 
otherwise; 
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily. 
(c) In a criminal preliminary examination, reliable hearsay shall be admissi-
ble as provided under Rule 1102. 
[Amended effective January 1, 1995; April 1, 1999.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
This rule is substantially Rule 1101, Uni- Subdivision (3) changes the rule of Chy-
form Rules of Evidence (1974). It departs noweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah 
from the Federal Rules of Evidence pri- 1977), concerning the application of the 
marily in applying the Rules of Evidence
 R u l e s o f Evidence to bail proceedings, 
to preliminary examinations in criminal 
cases. 
Library References 
Courts <3=>85. CJ .S . Courts § 130. 
Criminal Law <s=>234.
 c j s Criminal Law § 348. 
Grand Jury <£=»36. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 106k85; 
U0k234; 193k36. 
Research References 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 134:46, 
Utah. 
Notes of Decisions 
Bail hearings 2 3. Restitution hearings 
Juvenile court 1 The four hearings conducted on question of 
Restitution hearings 3 restitution did not afford defendant the full 
Sentencing hearings 4 hearing mandated by statute where defendant 
objects to imposition or amount of restitution; 
1. Juvenile court defendant missed the first hearing due to lack of 
*The rules of evidence apply to recall proceed- n o t i c t e ' sfc o n d h e a r i n f ^sui ted in scheduling of 
ings in juvenile court. Rules of Evid., Rule another hearing, third hearing resulted in grant 
1101(a). State in Interest of R.D.S., 1989, 777 o f another hearing before entry of judgment, 
P.2d 532, certiorari granted 789 P.2d 33, certio- a n d a t t h e f o u r t h hearing the trial court relied 
rari denied 836 P.2d 1383. Infants <3=> 68.6 on Utah Rule of Evidence 1101 to bar defendant 
from introducing evidence. U.C.A.1953, 
2. Bail hearings 76-3-201(c); Rules of Evid., Rule 1101; U.C.A. 
Utah Rules of Evidence are applicable to and 1953, 77-35-1 (Repealed). State v. Starnes, 
controlling at bail hearings. Rules of Evidence, 1992, 841 P.2d 712. Sentencing And Punish-
rule 2. Chvnoweth v. Larson, 1977, 572 P.2d ment©=>2191; Sentencing And Punishment <S=> 




A. W. Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant 
P.O.Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 





AGREEMENT TO ENTER 
CONDITIONAL PLEA 
Case No.: 061100071 FS 
Judge: Thomas Willmore 
COMES NOW the Defendant with this, an agreement to plead guilty, entered on the 
express condition that Defendant reserves the right to appeal pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures and thereby apply for review of 
all issues presented by the proceedings had in this matter. 
1. Subject to the express reservation hereinabove, Defendant agrees to waive any right 
to a Trial by Jury and does hereby withdraw the plea of not guilty previously entered and agrees 
to enter a plea of guilty to 3 counts within the information filed in this case conditioned as 
recited hereinabove all in reliance on the apparent holding in State of Utah v. Sery 758 P.2d 935 
1987 Utah Adv. Rep. 32(1988). 
2. The issues reserved for appeal specifically include the following points: 
Point I. Utah Statute 58-37-6(9) has no application to cases now filed in Utah in 
light of the provisions of Article VIII section 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
1 
Point II. Within the most expansive application of the evidence regarding the 
violation of the statute the evidence provided by the Plaintiff would not satisfy the burden 
imposed upon the party who would press that charge. 
Point III. The evidence of wrongdoing proposed by Plaintiff is tainted by 
inattention to the rules of evidence whereby privileges afforded by doctor patient privilege as 
expounded by case law court rule and constitutional mandate as well as by legislative enactment. 
Point IV. The enactment providing the basis for the charges filed by Plaintiff 
operates to shift the burden of persuasion and burden of proof in violation of Article 1 section 7 
and parallel provisions of the U.S Constitution. 
3. Defendant incorporates herein by reference as stating possible issues on appeal 
various defense motions and responses to Plaintiffs motions within the Trial Court file as well 
as various oral arguments and presentations by Defendant's counsel as well as any and all other 
issues fairly raised during the litigation in case number 061100071 to date. 
4. Defendant has provided a standard Plea Agreement adjunct to this pleading which 
plea agreement should be read and understood in light of this pleading and limited thereby. 
Dated this 1 Ith day of September, 2007 
JeAnn Johnson 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
AGREEMENT TO ENTER CONDITIONAL PLEA, postage prepaid, to the following listed 
below on the 11"' day of September, 2007. 
Bruce Ward, Esq. 
199 North Main, 2nd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
^ ^ 
^ \ 
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APPENDIX B 
Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment and Notice 
OCT 
too? 
FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANN H JOHNSON, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 061100071 FS 
Judge: THOMAS WILLMORE 
Date: October 23, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lesliec 
Prosecutor: WARD, BRUCE G 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAURITZEN, ARDEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 24, 1958 
Video 
Tape Count: 1:32 
CHARGES 
1. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIO - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/11/2007 Guilty 
2. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIO - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/11/2007 Guilty 
3. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIO - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/11/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING 
PRESCRIPTIO a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING 
PRESCRIPTIO a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Paae 1 
Case No: 061100071 
Date: Oct 23, 2007 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING 
PRESCRIPTIO a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Sentence will r ui i concurrent. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Court orders Defendant to serve an indeterminate term in jail not 
to exceed 1 year. State stipulates to the Probable Cause Statement 
allowing Defendant to remain out of jail pending the appeal. A 
review will be held after 90 days. 
SENTENCE FINE 








Charge # 2 










Case No: 061100071 
Date: Oct 23, 2007 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Fine will be paid through Adult Probation and Parole on a schedule 
set up by probation. 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Consume or possess no alcohol/drugs - frequent no places alcohol 
served or consumed including bars, parties, liquor store. 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to random search and seizure. 
Submit to alcohol & drug testing and urinalysis upon request of law 
enforcement, probation officer or substance abuse counselor. 
Defendant will enter into agreement with Probation and abide by all 
terms and conditions. 
Prison term is suspended upon successful completion of probation. 
Defendant to complete alcohol and/or drug counseling and all 
recommended aftercare - pay all fees and file notice of completion 
with the Court. 
Defendant to have 1 dentist, 1 doctor, and 1 pharmacy. 
Pending the appeal, Defendant will meet with her probation officer 
and sign a Probation Agreement. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 01/28/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 5 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
13 5 NORTH 100 WEST 
LOGAN, UT 84321 
before Judge THOMAS WILLMORE 
Paqe 3 
Case No: 061100071 
Date: Oct 23, 2007 
Dated this #^ f day of Q ("h 20 on 
THOMAS WILLMORE 
District Court Judge 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) should call at 435-750-1300 at Leas.t three ;; 
working days prior to the proceeding. (For TTY^^^y^e^all Utah 
Relay at 1-800-346-412 8 or 711) The general ^^tbxma^ j^^^one 
number is 435-750-1300. if "V ,^>.. V^ v 
APPENDIX C 
Notice of Appeal/Amended Notice of Appeal 
A.W. Lauritzen(l «>()<> I 
Attorney at Law 
P.O.Box 171 
15 East 600 North #1 





IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DeANN H. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 061100071 FS 
Judge Willmore 
You wih please take notice that the Defendant appeals the Judgment and Conviction of 
the First District Court for Cache County, State of Utah, made aiul entered on the ?V'* day of 
October, 2007, said Appeal taken to the Utah Court of Appeals; as provided by law. 
Dalai the 1 $ day of Oefobn, 2007. 
A.W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, NOTICE OF 
APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the ^S_ day of October, 2007. 
\\{i(!kw hkhmcfon 
Bruce Ward, Esq. 
199 North Main, 3rd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
A.W.Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law 
15 East 600 North #1 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, UT 84321 




IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
NT) FOR THF COUNTY OF rACTTF STATF OF T 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DeANN H. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF 
APPEAL 
Case No. 061100071 FS 
Judge Willmore 
You will please take notice that the Defendant Appeals the Written Minutes, Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment and Notice of the First District Court for Cache County, State of Utah, 
made and enten the 29lh day of October, 2007 (See Exhibit A), said Appeal taken to the 
Utah Court of Appeals; as provided by law. 
Dated the
 c/s d^ay of November, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the day of 
November, 2007. 
Bruce Ward, Esq. 
199 North Main Street, 3rd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 




FIRST DISTRICT CACHE 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANN H JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 061100071 FS 
Judge: THOMAS WILLMORE 
Date: October 23, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lesliec 
Prosecutor: WARD, BRUCE G 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LAURITZEN, ARDEN W 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 24, 1958 
Video 
Tape Count: 1 :32 
CHARGES 
1. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIO - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/11/2007 Guilty 
2. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIO - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/11/2007 Guilty 
3. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIO - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/11/2007 Guilvy 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING 
PRESCRIPTIO a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING 
PRESCRIPTIO a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in che Utah State 
Case No: 061100071 
Date: Oct 23, 2007 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING 
PRESCRIPTIO a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Sentence will run concurrent. 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Court orders Defendant to serve an indeterminate term in jail not 
to exceed 1 year. State stipulates to the Probable Cause Statement 
allowing Defendant to remain out of jail pending the appeal. A 
review will be held after 90 days. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 
Charge # 2 









Total Fine: $2075.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $966.89 
Total Principal Due: $2075.00 
Plus Interest 
Case No: 061100071 
Date: Oct 23, 2007 
SENTENCE FINF PAYMENT NOTE 
Fine will be paid through Adult Probation and Parole on a schedule 
set up by probation. 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Consume or possess no alcohol/drugs - frequent nc places alcohol 
served or consumed including bars, parties, liquor store. 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to random search and seizure. 
Submit to alcohol & drug testing and urinalysis upon request of law 
enforcement, probation officer or substance abuse counselor. 
Defendant will enter into agreement with Probation and abide by all 
terms and conditions. 
Prison term is suspended upon successful completion of probation. 
Defendant to complete alcohol and/or drug counseling and all 
recommended aftercare - pay all fees and file notice of completion 
with the Court. 
Defendant to have 1 dentist, 1 doctor, and 1 pharmacy. 
Pending the appeal, Defendant will meet with her probation officer 
and sign a Probation Agreement. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 01/28/2008 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: COURTROOM 5 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
13 5 NORTH 100 WEST 
LOGAN, UT 84321 
before Judge THOMAS WILLMORE 
Case No: 061100071 
Date: Oct 23, 2007 
Dated this # ^ day of Q ch 20 D~1-
THOMAS WILLMORE 
District Court Judge 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) should call at 435-750-1300 at .^eaat three 
working days prior to the proceeding. (For TTY ^rv--^^ut^~- ^  ^  T-
Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711) 
number is 435-750-1300. 
The gene ra l 
11 Utah 
>.rmati^b"whone 
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APPENDIX D 
State vs. Hansen 2002 UT 125 (Utah 12/20/2002) 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 (Utah 12/20/2002) 
[ 1 ] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
[2] No. 20010100 
[3] 2002 UT 125, 2002.UT.0000550< http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] December 20, 2002 
[5] STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND PETITIONER, 
v. 
SHAYNE M. HANSEN, DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT. 
[6] Third District, Salt Lake The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
[7] Attorneys: 
[8] Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Att'y Gen., Nicholas M. D'Alesandro, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
[9] Linda M. Jones, Otis Sterling, III, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Durrant, Associate Chief Justice 
[11] On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
[12] INTRODUCTION 
[13] HI This appeal concerns the validity of an automobile search. After finishing a routine 
traffic stop, an officer asked the defendant, Shayne M. Hansen, for consent to search his 
vehicle. Hansen allegedly consented. During the search of the vehicle and subsequent 
search of Hansen, the officer discovered drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine. 
[14] Tf2 Hansen filed a motion to suppress the evidence, claiming that (1) he was illegally 
detained by the officer because the officer's questioning and the subsequent search 
exceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop, (2) his consent was involuntary, and (3) the 
APPENDIA F 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Bindover, Amended Memorandum 
A. W. Lauritzen (1906) . ^ J f t E K I — 5-lfr XjO 
Attorney at Law 
15 East 600 North 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DeANN H. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
1 MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO QUASH 
BINDOVER 
(ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED) 
Case No. 061100071 FS 
JUDGE: Willmroe 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, by and through her Attorney, A.W. Lauritzen, and 
hereby submits this Verified Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash the Bindover entered 
- * 
as a result of the Preliminary Hearing which was held on the 3 day of May, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant began a course of treatment with Dr. Bedell and continues this course 
of treatment even now. Physicians computer records only date back to the 10th day of January, 
2000 showing treatment of Defendant, however, had been a patient prior to this time. Dr. Bedell 
was prescribing opiates for migraines from which chronic malady Defendant has endured for 
years. 
2. On the 5th day of June, 2005, Defendant suffered a sports injury, a baseball struck 
her face which affected visual acuity and focus. In light of the specialized nature of the indicated 
- * ~T1A^ ^o fevncs i t f jO v i j O ^ C4X>^^t5z>5?JbC5r T & ^ / ^ O v F ^ B y 
treatment, Patricia S. Jones, P.A.-C assistant to Dr. Mortensen, Defendant's family Physician, 
referred the eye injury to Dr. Walter Reed Jaussi for treatment. 
3. During the admitting process, Defendant apprised the admitting Nurse of the 
pending treatments with Dr. Bedell having been referred by Patricia S. Jones, P.A.-C who later 
confirmed the referral with a letter that is attached herewith as Exhibit A. Dr. Jaussi's nurse was, 
during the admitting procedure, advised of the medications being prescribed by Dr. Bedell. 
4. Dr. Jaussi apparently prescribed opiates for Defendant's medical condition; this 
prescription was for the eye condition and not to treat the condition wherein Dr. Bedell was the 
^y
 Afs>y ?epr**J 
attending physician. Defendant was not informed that the independently prescribed medications, 
which often bore different names, were related chemically one to the other. 
5. Defendant was charged on the 26th day of January, 2006 as follows: 
Five (5) counts of OBTAINING A PRESCRIPTION UNDER FALSE 
PRETENSES, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), a third degree 
felony. 
6. The Preliminary Hearing was had on the 3rd day of May, 2006 at which Hearing 
the Prosecution attempted to introduce enough evidence to proceed to Trial. Defendant 
maintains that the State was, as a matter of law, unable to present sufficient evidence to merit a 
Trial. 
ISSUES 
I. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT 
OF EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TO OBTAIN A 
BINDOVER. 
II. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THE PROSECUTION 
MAY PRESENT CONFIDENTIAL PATIENT INFORMATION AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING OVER AN OBJECTION BASED ON PHYSICIAN-
2 
PATIENT PRIVILEGE AFFORDED UNDER UTAH LAW. 
DISCUSSION 
I. WHETHER PROSECUTION PRESENTED A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF 
EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TO OBTAIN A BINDOVER. 
1. The purpose of a Preliminary Hearing is to determine whether there is sufficient 
cause to believe a crime has been committed and thereby warrant further proceedings. This 
function is important because it not only relieves the accused of the substantial degradation and 
expense which accompanies a criminal trial, but also operates to conserve judicial resources and 
promotes confidence in the judicial system. The Preliminary Hearing is a critical stage in the 
criminal process, and proper consideration for a Defendant's rights to due process must be 
observed. See State vs. Anderson, 612 P.2d 7823 n.9, citing Coleman vs. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 
(1969). 
2. All that was presented as evidence was a note signed by Dr. Jaussi; it was ruled 
that the writing satisfied Rule 1102 for the purposes of a preliminary hearing. The only other 
evidence was unverified and insupportable compilation of excerpts from records of various 
pharmacies. 
II. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THE PROSECUTION 
CAN PRESENT CONFIDENTIAL MEDICAL INFORMATION AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING OVER AN OBJECTION BASED ON PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE. 
3. Physician-patient privilege is codified in both U.C.A. 78-24-8 and Article V of 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Rule 506). U.C.A. 78-24-8 (4) provides: 
A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a 
civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was 
3 
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient. 
Though the case at bar constitutes a criminal action, defense contends that a criminal action is 
likewise subject to the strictures imposed by the statute. Therefore, the above statute as applied 
to the criminal case at bar should be construed liberally to afford defendant due process. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 506 (b) provides: 
If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or 
treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment 
provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information 
obtained by examination of the patient 
Even if it could be said that physician-patient privilege does not arise under common law and is 
not recognized in absence of a statute, the Utah courts clearly recognize and afford this privilege 
to litigants; interestingly Utah Law has been construed to provide that a legislative enactments 
may not overrule a rule of evidence promuleated by the judiciary.1 
4. Little case law on physician-patient privilege in Utah was available prior to the 
recent case of State vs. Mark E. Anderson 972 P.2d 86 (Utah 1998). Two reported cases in the 
prior fifty years deal with the privilege but focus on psychotherapist-patient privilege, with little 
discussion of the issues important to the case at bar. State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah, 
1979); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah, 1958). Since psychotherapist-patient privilege 
addresses fact issues unique to the field of psychotherapy, there is little direct applicability to the 
case at bar. The cases do however, make it clear that physician-patient privilege is recognized by 
Utah courts. 
5. Public policy considerations mandating recognition of this privilege are 
1
 Nasfell vs. Ogden City 122 Utah 344 249 P.2d 507 (1952). 
4 
compelling. Much like attorney-client privilege, physician-patient privilege is designed to inspire 
confidence in the patient-physician relationship by preventing the physician from revealing 
confidential, possibly embarrassing and highly personal, information. This privilege ensures that 
patients make a full and complete disclosure of the symptoms and causes of their injury in order 
that the physician may more fully diagnose and treat the patient. State v. Lata 601 P.2d 520 
(Wash., 1979). Included under this privilege is "information... communicated in confidence and 
for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient." 81 Am. Jur. 2d 443. This privilege has 
been rigorously defended by courts. Courts require exceptions to the privilege to be construed 
narrowly. In the Matter of the Guardianship of Marie Arkins 790 P.2d 210 (Wash. App. 1990); 
State v, Mark, 597 P.2d 406 (Wash. App., 1979). No court known to Defendant as crafted an 
exception based on a physicians knowledge of the case despite the patients denial or 
nondisclosure. 
6. The scope of this privilege includes evidence of drug addiction. Indeed, drug 
addiction is a medical malady which is especially scorned by society and evidence of one's drug 
addiction is almost certainly accompanied with a negative social stigma. In People v. Overton, 
759 P.2d 772, 774 (Colo. App. 1988), the court found evidence of a witness's past drug addiction 
to be inadmissible as privileged medical information, stating that 
the records in this case are subject to the physician patient privilege.. . . And where, 
as here, there is neither an express nor an implied waiver, and there is no showing of 
particularized need, the privilege is absolute. 
In the instant case, no medical records were subpoenaed in violation of Utah law but the 
volunteered medical information, thought to suggest addiction or abuse, should not be subjected 
to further public scrutiny and scorn. Surely the agencies of Utah Government intended to prevent 
5 
just such a result in enacting U.C.A. 78- 24-8 and Rule 506. On the other hand, Defendant 
suggests that records; if they had been subpoenaed, might well have assisted the State in 
bolstering the deficient case presented in support of the Bindover on the 3rd of May, 2006 
Hearing. 
7. Of course, privileges are maintained only insofar as they are not waived or do not 
fall under an exception. At no time has Johnson or defense counsel waived this privilege and 
specifically invoked the privilege at preliminary hearing even though certain evidentiary 
questions are, by law, not to be considered by the committing magistrate. C/State vs. Anderson 
(supra) U.C.A. 78-24-8 (4) asserts that waiver occurs when "the patient places his medical 
condition at issue as an element or factor respecting his claim or defense." Defendant has, at no 
time, asserted any medical condition at issue as a defense. With respect to exceptions to 
physician-patient privilege, Rule 506 allows three instances in which the privilege does not 
apply: 1. When the condition is an element of a claim or defense (discussed supra)\ 2. When the 
privilege-holder is hospitalized for mental illness; 3. When the court orders examination of the 
privilege-holder. None of the three exceptions apply to the case at bar. Defendant has not been 
hospitalized for mental illness, nor has the court ordered any examination of Defendant, nor can 
the court, in light of constitutional mandate, require that defendant be subjected to such inquiry. 
8. Courts have, however, made it clear that this privilege does not extend to 
pharmaceutical records {State v. MarK 597 P.2d 406 (Wash.App. 1979) ("[Prescriptions are 
subject to inspection for law enforcement purposes."). U.C.A. 58-17a-604 (4) (b) allows 
disclosure of pharmaceutical information to a "lawfully authorized federal, state or local drug 
enforcement officer." The defense does not dispute that pharmaceutical records obtained in 
A 
6 
discovery2 fall beyond the bounds of physician-patient privilege. However, any of Johnson's 
medical records, subpoenaed directly from the physicians' office, are clearly covered by the 
physician-patient privilege. These medical records might contain the physician's notes on 
Johnson, including Johnson's confidential disclosures ana physical symptoms. Furthermore, 
A 
such disclosures might provide dtgoloourc of information as to consumption of other drugs, not 
relevant to the case at bar, HWrunduly prejudice the court/jury against Ms. Johnson and should 
also be excluded as irrelevant and/or4«*k4y pre judic ia l /^ ,^ ojyrua^^m A>*y> i^SCiftt-c O^BV^ 
9. The bindover in light of the analysis provided in Anderson, was clearly in excess 
of tkeHHiiiU&Uyns- the Courts authority so to do. In Anderson, in considering a claim of privilege, 
the court observed that section 58-37-6(a) excludes from the physician patient privilege any 
information communicated in an attempt to unlawfully procure drugs. Obviously the rationale in 
Anderson supports Defendant's view. Defendant is not alleged to have communicated 
information for any unlawful purpose and the objective facts demonstrated that Defendant had 
submitted to emergency treatment by a new physician for a new and previously unexpected 
p r o c e d u r e s <*M****> ^ « * * * " * * C ^ O c ^ e r o © T*> ~nrP * l f r * « K ^ 
CONCLUSION 
Private medical records cannot be open to discovery given the applicable Utah 
statutes. The Utah legislature has spoken clearly on the issue and the Utah Cuile will not tolerate 
such disclosure unless it falls within one of the exceptions or has been waived by Defendant, 
neither of which are raised bv the facts of this case. In view of the clear terms of the Utah Code 
2
 That is, if records are properly subpoenaed directly from the pharmacies, which did not happen 
here. 
7 
and rules of evidence, Johnson's physician-patient privilege was violated in allowing use of 
confidential medical records or testimony of the attending physician under the facts of this case. 
Oral Argument is Requested. 
Dated the \ffiday of May, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF HWD pgUVtfP^ 
I hereby certify that IhorJ M^z true and correct copy of the foregoing, VERIFIED 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER, postage 
prepaid, to the following listed below on the ofMav,2006. 
'm hh t>mm 
James Swink, Esq. 




Intermountain Health Care 
JOHNSON, DEANN HENINGER 
1357 N 1560 E 
NORTH LOGAN, UT 84341 
Home Phone: (435) 753-4697 
Sex: F 
Date of Service: 02/22/2006 
Status: Preliminary Signable 
Encounter: Not Encounter Related 
MMI: 542112749 
Letters (02/22/2006 17:13) 
(Status: Preliminary Signable) 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Deann was seen in my office on June 6, 2005 for a contusion from getting hit in the face by a baseball. After seeing her 
I referred her to Dr. Jaussi (opthamolgist) for further evaluation. 
Sincerely, 
Patricia S. Jones, P A -C. 
PSJ/db 
Author: BAILEY, DELENE R 
Author For: JONES, PATRICIA S. 





Printed on 0Z"2Z"2OO6 at 1 7 16 
ROOM: 
DOB: 03/24/1958 
A G E : 47Y Age A; Da;e Of Not.? 
Name: JOHNSON, DEANN HENINGER 
Author: BAILEY, DELENE R 
Author For: JONES, PATRICIA S. 
Footer. Version CO 1 01.27/00 
A. W. Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law 
15 East 600 North 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DeANN H. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO QUASH 
BINDOVER 
(ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED) 
Case No. 061100071 FS 
JUDGE: Willmroe 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT, by and through her Attorney, A.W. Lauritzen, and 
hereby submits this Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash the Bindover entered 
as a result of the Preliminary Hearing which was held on the 3rd day of May, 2006.] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant began a course of treatment with Dr. Bedell and continues this course 
of treatment even now. Physicians computer records only date back to the 10th day of January, 
2000 showing treatment of Defendant, however, had been a patient prior to this time. Dr. Bedell 
was prescribing opiates for migraines from which chronic malady Defendant has endured for 
years. 
2. On the 5th day of June, 2005, Defendant suffered a sports injury, a baseball struck 
1
 This submission is, of course, subject to and modified by the supplement presenting the issues of 
preclusion and separation fo powers filed by Defendant. 
her face which affected visual acuity and focus. In light of the specialized nature of the indicated 
treatment, Patricia S. Jones, P.A.-C assistant to Dr. Mortensen, Defendant's family Physician, 
referred the eye injury to Dr. Walter Reed Jaussi for treatment. 
3. During the admitting process, Defendant apprised the admitting Nurse of the 
pending treatments with Dr. Bedell having been referred by Patricia S. Jones, P.A.-C who later 
confirmed the referral with a letter that is attached herewith as Exhibit A. Dr. Jaussi's nurse was, 
during the admitting procedure, advised of the medications being prescribed by Dr. Bedell. 
4. Dr. Jaussi apparently prescribed opiates for Defendant's medical condition; this 
prescription was for the eye condition and not to treat the condition wherein Dr. Bedell was the 
attending physician. Defendant was not informed by any person that the independently prescribed 
medications, which often bore different names, were related, chemically or therapeutically, one 
to the other. 
5. Defendant was charged on the 26th day of January, 2006 as follows: 
Five (5) counts of OBTAINING A PRESCRIPTION UNDER FALSE 
PRETENSES, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), a third degree 
felony. 
6. The Preliminary Hearing was had on the 3rd day of May, 2006 at which Hearing 
the Prosecution attempted to introduce enough evidence to proceed to Trial. Defendant 
maintains that the State was, as a matter of law, unable to present sufficient evidence to merit a 
Trial. 
ISSUES 
I. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT 
OF EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TO OBTAIN A 
BINDOVER. 
2 
II. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THE PROSECUTION 
MAY PRESENT CONFIDENTIAL PATIENT INFORMATION AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING OVER AN OBJECTION BASED ON PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE AFFORDED UNDER UTAH LAW. 
DISCUSSION 
I. WHETHER PROSECUTION PRESENTED A SUFFICIENT AMOUNT OF 
EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING TO OBTAIN A BINDOVER. 
1. The purpose of a Preliminary Hearing is to determine whether there is sufficient 
cause to believe a crime has been committed and thereby warrant further proceedings. This 
function is important because it not only relieves the accused of the substantial degradation and 
expense which accompanies a criminal trial, but also operates to conserve judicial resources and 
promotes confidence in the judicial system. The Preliminary Hearing is a critical stage in the 
criminal process, and proper consideration for a Defendant's rights to due process must be 
observed. See State vs. Anderson, 612 P.2d 7823 n.9, citing Coleman vs. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 
(1969). 
2. All that was presented as evidence was a note signed by Dr. Jaussi; it was ruled 
that the writing satisfied Rule 1102 for the purposes of a preliminary hearing. The only other 
evidence was unverified and insupportable compilation of excerpts from records of various 
pharmacies. 
II. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THE PROSECUTION 
CAN PRESENT CONFIDENTIAL MEDICAL INFORMATION AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING OVER AN OBJECTION BASED ON PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE. 
3. Physician-patient privilege is codified in both U.C.A. 78-24-8 and Article V of 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Rule 506). U.C.A. 78-24-8 (4) provides: 
A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a 
civil action as to any information acquired in attending the patient which was 
necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient. 
Though the case at bar constitutes a criminal action, defense contends that a criminal action is 
likewise subject to the strictures imposed by the statute. Therefore, the above statute as applied 
to the criminal case at bar should be construed liberally to afford defendant due process. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 506 (b) provides: 
If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or 
treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment 
provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information 
obtained by examination of the patient 
Even if it could be said that physician-patient privilege does not arise under common law and is 
not recognized in absence of a statute, the Utah courts clearly recognize and afford this privilege 
to litigants; interestingly Utah Law has been construed to provide that a legislative enactments 
may not overrule a rule of evidence promuleated by the judiciary.2 
4. Little case law on physician-patient privilege in Utah was available prior to the 
recent case of State vs. Mark E. Anderson 972 P.2d 86 (Utah 1998). Two reported cases in the 
prior fifty years deal with the privilege but focus on psychotherapist-patient privilege, with little 
discussion of the issues important to the case at bar. State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah, 
1979); Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah, 1958). Since psychotherapist-patient privilege 
addresses fact issues unique to the field of psychotherapy, there is little direct applicability to the 
case at bar. The cases do however, make it clear that physician-patient privilege is recognized by 
Utah courts. 
2
 Nasfell vs. Ogden City 122 Utah 344 249 P.2d 507 (1952). 
4 
5. Public policy considerations mandating recognition of this privilege are 
compelling. Much like attorney-client privilege, physician-patient privilege is designed to inspire 
confidence in the patient-physician relationship by preventing the physician from revealing 
confidential, possibly embarrassing and highly personal, information. This privilege ensures that 
patients make a full and complete disclosure of the symptoms and causes of their injury in order 
that the physician may more fully diagnose and treat the patient. State v. Lata 601 P.2d 520 
(Wash., 1979). Included under this privilege is "information... communicated in confidence and 
for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient." 81 Am. Jur. 2d 443. This privilege has 
been rigorously defended by courts. Courts require exceptions to the privilege to be construed 
narrowly. In the Matter of the Guardianship of Marie Arkins 790 P.2d 210 (Wash. App. 1990); 
State v. Mark, 597 P.2d 406 (Wash. App., 1979). No court known to Defendant as crafted an 
exception based on a physicians knowledge of the case despite the patients denial or 
nondisclosure. 
6. The scope of this privilege includes evidence of drug addiction. Indeed, drug 
addiction is a medical malady which is especially scorned by society and evidence of one's drug 
addiction is almost certainly accompanied with a negative social stigma. In People v. Overton, 
759 P.2d 772, 774 (Colo. App. 1988), the court found evidence of a witness's past drug addiction 
to be inadmissible as privileged medical information, stating that 
the records in this case are subject to the physician patient privilege. . . . And where, 
as here, there is neither an express nor an implied waiver, and there is no showing of 
particularized need, the privilege is absolute. 
In the instant case, no medical records were subpoenaed in violation of Utah law but the 
volunteered medical information, thought to suggest addiction or abuse, should not be subjected 
5 
to further public scrutiny and scorn. Surely the agencies of Utah Government intended to prevent 
just such a result in enacting U.C.A. 78- 24-8 and Rule 506. On the other hand, Defendant 
suggests that records; if they had been subpoenaed, might well have assisted the State in 
bolstering the deficient case presented in support of the Bindover on the 3rd of May, 2006 
Hearing. 
7. Of course, privileges are maintained only insofar as they are not waived or do not 
fall under an exception. At no time has Johnson or defense counsel waived this privilege and 
specifically invoked the privilege at preliminary hearing even though certain evidentiary 
questions are, by law, not to be considered by the committing magistrate. Cf State vs. Anderson 
(supra) U.C.A. 78-24-8 (4) asserts that waiver occurs when "the patient places his medical 
condition at issue as an element or factor respecting his claim or defense." Defendant has, at no 
time, asserted any medical condition at issue as a defense. With respect to exceptions to 
physician-patient privilege, Rule 506 allows three instances in which the privilege does not 
apply: 1. When the condition is an element of a claim or defense (discussed supra); 2. When the 
privilege-holder is hospitalized for mental illness; 3. When the court orders examination of the 
privilege-holder. None of the three exceptions apply to the case at bar. Defendant has not been 
hospitalized for mental illness, nor has the court ordered any examination of Defendant, nor can 
the court, in light of constitutional mandate, require that defendant be subjected to such inquiry. 
8. Courts have, however, made it clear that this privilege does not extend to 
pharmaceutical records (State v. Mark, 597 P.2d 406 (Wash.App. 1979) ("[Prescriptions are 
subject to inspection for law enforcement purposes."). U.C.A. 58-17a-604 (4) (b) allows 
disclosure of pharmaceutical information to a "lawfully authorized federal, state or local drug 
6 
enforcement officer." For the purposes of this Motion the defense does not dispute that 
pharmaceutical records obtained in discovery3 fall beyond the bounds of physician-patient 
privilege. However, any of Johnson's medical records, subpoenaed directly from the physicians' 
office, are clearly covered by the physician-patient privilege. These medical records might 
contain the physician's notes on Johnson, including Johnson's confidential disclosures and 
impressions of physical symptoms. Furthermore, such disclosures might provide information as 
to consumption of other drugs, not relevant to the case at bar, on the basis that the unduly 
prejudice the court/jury against Ms. Johnson and should also be excluded as irrelevant and/or on 
the basis that th prejudicial impact outweighs any possible relevancy. 
9. The bindover in light of the analysis provided in Anderson, was clearly in excess 
of the Courts authority so to do. In Anderson, in considering a claim of privilege, the court 
observed that section 58-37-6(a) excludes from the physician patient privilege any information 
communicated in an attempt to unlawfully procure drugs. Obviously the rationale in Anderson 
supports Defendant's view. Defendant is not alleged to have communicated information for any 
unlawful purpose and the objective facts adduced at Preliminary Hearing demonstrated that 
Defendant had submitted to emergency treatment by a new physician for a new and unexpected 
procedure as opposed to a scheme concocted to tap a heretofore unobtainable supply of 
prescription drugs. 
That is, if records are properly subpoenaed directly from the pharmacies, which did not happen here. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
Private medical records cannot be open to discovery given the applicable Utah 
statutes. The Utah legislature has spoken clearly on the issue and the applicable provisions will 
not tolerate such disclosure unless it falls within one of the exceptions or has been waived by 
Defendant, neither of which are raised by the facts of this case. In view of the clear terms of the 
Utah Code and rules of evidence, Johnson's physician-patient privilege was violated in allowing 
use of confidential medical records or testimony of the attending physician under the facts of this 
case. 
Oral Argument is Requested. 
Dated the day of July, 2006. 
A.W. Lauritzen 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER, 
postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the 28th day of July, 2006. 
Bruce Ward, Esq. 





State vs. Sery 758 P.2d 935 (1988) 
07/27/88 STATE UTAH v. MARK JOSEPH SERY 
[ 1 ] COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
[2] No. 860333-CA 
[3] 1988.UT.182 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 758 P.2d 935, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 
[4] July 27, 1988 
[5] STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
v. 
MARK JOSEPH SERY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
[6] Karen Stam (Argued), Joan C. Watt, Attorneys at Law, Salt Lake, City, UT 
[7] David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General, Kimberly Hornak (Argued), Asst. Attorney General 
[8] Before Judges Norman H. Jackson, Gregory K. Orme (concur) and Richard C. Davidson. 
[9] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Davidson 
[10] FACTS. - Sery arrived at Salt Lake City airport and was stopped by police. Sery's carry-on 
bag was found to contain cocaine. 
[11] PROCEEDINGS. - Sery moved to suppress, and his motion was denied. He pleaded nolo 
contendere on condition that he be able to appeal the denial of suppression. He was 
convicted of possession and appealed 
[12] RESULT. - Reversed and remanded. Per Jackson; Orme concurs; Davidson Dissents. 
[13] HELD. - Conditional plea preserved denial of suppression for appellate review, and 
conviction on the plea was a final, appealable order. Police lacked reasonable suspicion to 
stop Sery and search his baggage. 
[14] NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge: 
APPENDIX H 
Certificate of Probable Cause 
A.W.Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 171 
15 East 600 North #1 
Logan, UT 84321 
Phone:435-753-3391 
Fax: 435-753-8331 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE 
Plaintiff, OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
vs. I 
DeANN H. JOHNSON, Case No. 061100071 FS 
Defendant. I Judge Willmore 
COMES NOW the Defendant with this her application for a Certificate of Probable 
Cause and alleges: 
1. Defendant plead guilty conditionally to the charges on which she was sentenced 
on the 23rd day of October, 2007. 
2. Defendant conditioned her plea reserving the question of: 
A. Point I. Utah Statute 58-37-6(9) has no application to cases now filed in Utah 
in light of the provisions of Article VIE Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
B. Point II. Within the most expansive application of the evidence regarding the 
violation of the statute the evidence provided by the Plaintiff would not satisfy the 
burden imposed upon the party who would press that charge. 





inattention to the rules of evidence whereby privileges are afforded by doctor 
patient privilege as expounded by case law, court rule and constitutional mandate 
as well as by legislative enactment. 
D. Point IV. The enactment providing the basis for the charges filed by Plaintiff 
operates to shift the burden of persuasion and the burden of proof in violation of 
Article 1 Section 7 and parallel provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 
3. Defendant certifies that Probable Cause exists for Appeal and that the issues have 
merit and are arguable and have not been heretofore addressed by the Appellate Courts in this 
jurisdiction and case law exists that is supportive of Defendants position. 
4. Defendant suggests that a Certificate of Probable Cause is warranted in this case. 
Dated the ^ 3 a y of October, 2007. 
I, Attorney for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing. APPLICATION 
FOR CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE, postage prepaid, to the following listed below 
on theff^day of October, 2007. 
ffljtekiM 6/Mtimafot, 
Bruce Ward, Esq. 
199 North Main, 3rd Floor 




IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 






OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
Case No. 061100071 FS 
Judge Willmore 
Upon having received and reviewed the Application for Certificate of Probable Cause 
submitted by Defendant and the same having been served on Plaintiff and said Certificate having 
been Stipulated to by the Plaintiff and having found that the issues presented are not without 
merit and that the issues are fairly arguable and Good Cause appearing: 
1. A Certificate of Probable Cause is hereby issued with respect to the instant case 
and as provided by law. 
Dated the5Q_ day of October, 2007. 
A.W. Lauritzen(1906) 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 171 
15 East 600 North #1 
Logan, UT 84321 
Phone: 435-753-3391 
Fax: 435-753-8331 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, CERTIFICATE OF 
7 CIS. PROBABLE CAUSE, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the ^ day of October, 
2007. 
M/jjfta/i (niklmwdm 
Bruce Ward, Esq. 
199 North Main, 3rd Floor 




N. George Daines, 0803 
Cache County Attorney 
James M. Swink, 7998 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
199 North Main, 3rd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (435)716-8361 
Fax: (435)716-8381 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANN H. JOHNSON 
1357 N 1560 E 




' Case No. bC?W ° O C 1 \ 
Judge 
OTN#: 
The undersigned James M. Swink, Deputy Cache County Attorney, under oath 
states on inforaiation and belief that the defendant, in Cache County, State of Utah, 
committed the following crime(s): 
COUNT 1: 
OBTAINING A PRESCRIPTION UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), as follows: 
That DEANN H. JOHNSON on or about 6/07/2005, did knowingly and 
intentionally acquire or obtain possession of, procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of, obtain a prescription for, prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or failure to disclose receiving any controlled substance from another 
source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or 
address. 
. ' J D ; : ' : * 
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COUNT 2: 
OBTAINING A PRESCRIPTION UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), as follows: 
That DEANN H. JOHNSON on or about 6/28/2005, did knowingly and 
intentionally acquire or obtain possession of, procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of, obtain a prescription for, prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of or 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or failure to disclose receiving any controlled substance from another 
source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or 
address. 
COUNT 3: 
OBTAINING A PRESCRIPTION UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), as follows: 
That DEANN H. JOHNSON on or about 8/01/2005, did knowingly and 
intentionally acquire or obtain possession of, procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of, obtain a prescription for, prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of or 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or failure to disclose receiving any controlled substance from another 
source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or 
address. 
COUNT 4: 
OBTAINING A PRESCRIPTION UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, a tlnrd degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), as follows: 
That DEANN H. JOHNSON on or about 8/22/2005, did knowingly and 
intentionally acquire or obtain possession of, procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of, obtain a prescription for, prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or failure to disclose receiving any controlled substance from another 
source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or 
address. 
COUNT 5: 
OBTAINING A PRESCRIPTION UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii), as follows: 
That DEANN H. JOHNSON on or about 9/20/2005, did knowingly and 
intentionally acquire or obtain possession of, procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of, obtain a prescription for, prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of. or 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or failure to disclose receiving any controlled substance from another 
source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or 
address. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness(es): R. 
Italasano, LCPD 
Authorized this January 25, 2006 for presentment and filing: 
By_ £fr*#^ 
James j^TSwink 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
Presented and filed this day of ,2006. 
APPENDIX K 
Order Denying Motion to Quash 
N. George Daines, 0803 
Cache County Attorney 
Donald G. Linton, 4997 
Deputy Cache County Attorney 
199 North Main, 3rd Floor 
Logan, UT 84321 
Telephone: (435)716-8361 
Fax: (435)716-8381 
FEB 0 6 2007 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANN H. JOHNSON 
Defendant. 
I ORDER DENYING 
j DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO QUASH AND MOTION 
IN LIMINE 
Case No. 061100071 
Judge Thomas L. Willmore 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion to Quash the 
Bindover. After reviewing the Defendant's motion, Defendant's Memoranda in Support of the 
Motion, Plaintiffs Memoranda in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion and the relevant case law 
and statutory provisions, and after consideration of the oral arguments of the parties, the Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision. Attached as Exhibit A. Based upon the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law contained in the attached Memorandum Decision, the Court Orders that the 
Defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover in this case be denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED,, THIS • b DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2007. 
f !• 
y Judge Thomas L. Willmore 
First District Court 
>w> 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Arden 
Lauritzen, in his box at First District Court, 135 N 100 W, Logan UT 84321. 
DATED this J ^ . day of February 2007. 
Nancy Lucafef I 
Legal Assistant 
EXHIBIT A 
RECEIVED JAN 22 2007 
LOGAN COURTS 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE^O? FEB - 2 PM 3' 31
 ( 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANN H. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No: 061100071 
Judge: Thomas L. Willmore 
1 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Quash 
Bindover. The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion, Defendant's Memoranda in Support, 
Plaintiffs Memoranda in Opposition, and relevant case law and statutory provisions. The Court 
also heard oral arguments on this matter January 2, 2007. 
On September 20,2006, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision requesting additional 
briefing by the parties concerning the issue of whether U.C.A. § 58-37-6(9) is an unconstitutional 
exception to the Rule 506 privilege because the statute violates the separation of powers 
provision of the Utah Constitution Article VIII, § 4 and pursuant to Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14 
T[15, n.3. The parties have briefed and argued this issue. 
The pertinent portion of Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 4 states: 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the 
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The Legislature 
may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court 
-upon, a -vote of two4hirds -of all members of both-houses of the Legislature. 
The legislative history of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-6(9) is undisputed. The bill was passed 
by both the Senate and the House by the required two-thirds vote. The Legislative history shows that 
1 
section 58-37-6(9) was considered by the Utah State Senate on Friday, January 25, 2002, which 
passed it by 72%. The bill was sent to the House on Monday, February 25, 2002, which passed it 
by over 94%. 
The critical issue in this matter is whether the Legislature complied with Article VIII, § 4 of 
the Utah Constitution in passing 58-37-6(9) which amended Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
by creating an exception to the privilege. The State asserts that the Legislature complied with Article 
VIII, § 4 because U.C.A § 58-37-6(9) was passed by more than a two-thirds vote of both houses of 
the legislature. The Defendant asserts that in order for U.C.A. § 58-37-6(9) to be constitutional the 
Legislature was required to understand and intend to amend the Rule 506 privilege. 
A careful reading of Article VIII, § 4 does not contain any requirement of intent to amend 
or an understanding by the Legislature that they are amending a rule controlled by the Supreme 
Court. Article VIH, § 4 simply allows a rule amendment by a two-thirds vote of both houses. 
However, in maintaining the separation of powers between the Legislative branch and the 
Judicial branch, the Court must look to whether the Legislature was aware it was amending a rule 
controlled by the Judiciary. In making this determination the only indication is in the language of 
§ 58-37-6(9) where it states: "Any information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an 
attempt to unlawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled substance is not 
considered to be a privileged communication." (emphasis added.) The specific language "privileged 
communication" persuades the Court to believe the Legislature recognized that the passing of § 58-
37-6(9) would affected privileged communications and more specifically amend Rule 506. 
In the case of Roosevelt City Corp. v. Nebeker, 815 P.2d 738 (Utah Ct Of App. 1991) the 
2 
courts states, "It is also a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes 'are endowed 
with a strong presumption of validity; and should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any 
reasonable basis upon which they can be found to come within the constitutional frame work [sic].1" 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314,1317 (Utah 1983) (quoting Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 
(Utah 1974)). 
Therefore, based upon the above, the Court finds the statute to be valid and not 
unconstitutional because of the specific language used in § 58-37-6(9), and the proper procedure 
followed the Legislature pursuant to Article VIII, § 4. 
The Court's decision is further supported by the case of State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 
(Ut. App. 1998). In that case, the Court of Appeals considered the U.C.A. § 58-37-6 exception to 
the physician/patient privilege of Rule 506(b). The Court of Appeals upheld the exception. The 
Court of Appeals also determined that the Rule 506 privilege was not available because Defendant 
was attempting to commit a fraud by manipulating the privilege to protect his fraud. Id. at 89. Also, 
the Court ruled that Anderson's failure to withhold information from his doctors was, "not 
communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient and therefore, 
does not fall within the scope of the privilege." Id. at 89. 
In this case, the Court finds that Johnson is attempting to use the privilege to protect her 
alleged fraud. Also, the Court finds that Jolinson's failure to inform her doctor of other prescriptions 
from other physicians is not a communication in confidence for the purpose of diagnoses or 
-treatment and does notlall _within_the.scope.of the privilege.. 
Therefore, the Court finds that sufficient and admissible evidence was presented at the 
preliminary hearing to bind Defendant over. 
3 
Therefore, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion in Limine./sBhi 
| | | ) i ^ This matter is hereby set for a 
pretrial conference on February 6, 2007, at 1:30 p.m. 
Dated this | \ day of January, 2007 
BY THE COURT 
ige Tliomas L. Willmore 
First District Court 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 06110A>071 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
M a i l SBDE& W i<&IS3JJ1l'2B2. 
ATTORNEY DEF 
15 E 600 N # 1 
POB 171 
LOGAN, UT 8 4 3 2 1 
Mail DON LINTON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
199 N MAIN ST 
LOGAN UT 84321 
Dated this [\ day of '"""TF?1 *Y"> • 20 Q ( . 
lulun 
Deputy Court Clerk 
APPENDIX L 
Supplemental Memorandum 
.. W. LAURITZEN (1906) 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DeANN H. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
| SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
AND RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
REPLY TO 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
\ APPLICABILITY OF 78-24-8(4) UCA AS 
AMENDED AND 58-37-6(a) UCA AS 
AMENDED TO DECIDE ISSUES IN 
PENDING MOTION TO QUASH 
BINDOVER 
Case No. 061100071 
Judge Willmore 
FACTS RELIED ON BY DEFENDANT 
1. Defendant in connection with this litigation, appeared at a Preliminary Hearing on 
the 3rd day of May, 2006. 
2. In the course of presenting evidence, the Plaintiff sought to introduce statements 
of Defendant's attending Physician with regard to aspects of treatment for Defendant's medical 
condition as well as regarding communications between Defendant and her phvsician in 
connection therewith. 
3. The Court did, over Defendant's Objection, admit reports into evidence prepared 
1 
by Defendants privately retained Physician regarding treatment administered to Defendant. 
4. The Defendant did, in a timely manner, specifically assert the privilege reserved to 
a patient under UCA 78-24-8(4) as well as the privileged provided by Rule 506 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
ISSUE 
L IS THERE AN INTERACTION AND HIERARCHY AVAILABLE IN THE 
LAW AS BETWEEN RULES OF EVIDENCE AND LEGISLATIVE 
ENACTMENTS REGARDING MATTERS OF PROCEDURE AND 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE-
DISCUSSION 
5. Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution1 provides: 
"The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the 
Court's of the State and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
legislature may amend the Rule of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature..." 
6. The Utah Court's have, for some time, expressed concern with regard to the 
role assumed by the Legislature in promulgation of rules respecting procedure and evidence as 
the same are employed and utilized in litigation proceeding within the Court system of Utah. 
7. The recent case of Burns vs. Boyden 133 P.3d 370 (2006) once again points up 
the inconstancies of Utah Law when the Rules of Evidence are pitted against Legislative 
enactments. Defendant contends that to allow Legislative enactments to encroach upon the rule 
making process reserved to the Court's is a clear violation of procedural due process and of the 
separation of powers doctrines as they operate as guarantees to each of us in our dealings with 
For the purposes of this Motion Defendant does not rely on any parallel sections of the U.S. Constitution 
other than general constructions related to separation of powers arguments. 
2 
our Government. 
8. The Utah Courts have, with respect to claimed separation of powers violations, 
articulated a three part test. Jones vs. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 94 P3d 283, (2004 UT 
53). Complicating this particular matter are the issues created as to: 
A. The interplay between legislative enactments and constitutionally adopted 
rules of evidence. 
B. The serious question as to whether the constitutionally created rules are 
merely superior to legislative enactments or whether those enactments are 
themselves void in their inception. 
C. Whether, in questions such as presented here, the three part inquiry 
mandated in connection with resolution of questioned governmental -
functions where separation of powers is the principal inquiry, is pivotal to 
any analysis. 
9. As a starting point, Defendant alleges that a legislative enactment which addresses 
procedural and/or evidentiary matters is not to be presumed Constitutional. Burns vs Boyden 
(Supra), c/West Jordan vs. Goodman 135 P.3d 874, 2006 UT 27. In footnote three to the Burns 
opinion, the court observed that: 
"We have not previously addressed the issue of whether these or other 
procedural or evidentiary statutes are valid in light of article VIII, section 4 
of the Utah Constitution. Article VIII, section 4 vests in the Utah Supreme 
Court both the authority and the duty to "adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used in the courts of the state" and resen es to the 
Legislature only the authority to "amend the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all 
members of both houses of the Legislature.." 
3 
10. Although the Utah Court has not made the distinction as to whether the 
proposition Defendant denotes in sub-paragraph B above invalidates legislative enactments or 
merely subordinates them to judicially crafted rules mandated pursuant to Article VIII section 4 
(Supra), one point stands out with clarity, the burden is constitutionally cast upon he who would 
suggest the validity or applicability of the impinging legislation. The 1984 Amendment, by 
implication, requires a preliminary affirmative showing of a particularized legislative proceeding 
prior to any validation of the questioned enactment, thus the three part analysis which is deemed 
mandatory to other separation of powers inquiries has no initial application in this inquiry.2 
11. Notwithstanding what has been said hereinbefore, if the three step inquiry that the 
Utah court has often specified applies, as expounded In Re Young 976 P2d 581 (1999). Where 
that Court said: 
"The analytical model can be stated as a relatively straightforward three-step 
inquiry. First, are the legislators in question 'charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to' one of the three branches of government0 Second, is the 
function that the statute has given the legislators one appertaining to another 
branch of government? The third and final step in the analysis asks if the answer 
to both of the above questions is yes, does the constitution expressly direct or 
permit exercise of the otherwise forbidden function? If not, Article V, Section 1 
is transgressed. Utah Const. Ar. V, § I."3 
12. The function exercised by the Legislature with respect to the issues in Young 
(Supra) is also present with regard to the questioned legislation here. It is said that "the power to 
In point of fact the legislature has taken no meaningful steps to amend existing rules, at best it could be 
said that the legislature has adopted or let stand legislation purporting to annul certain rules. 
Article V Section 1 provides: 
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted." 
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vote on proposed laws" is a power primary and exclusive to the Legislature, Rampton vs. Barlow 
464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970). In light of the holding in Rampton, the answer to the first inquiry 
as expounded in paragraph eleven above must be yes. 
13. The next inquiry is as to whether the prerogative regarding promulgation of 
evidence is reserve to a branch other than the Legislature. Article VIII Section Four Summarily 
deals with that inquiry imposing the mandates relegated to the Judiciary found therein, the 
answer to the second inquiry is, likewise, yes. 
14. Since an answer to the third question is only necessary if the first two are 
answered in the affirmative, the inquiry must now proceed and the question is then asked, "Does 
the Constitution expressly direct or permit exercise of the otherwise forbidden function?" 
Although the short answer is, "That Depends" the long answer is "no, not unless the Legislature 
has, by special and overriding enactment, purposely amended the rule. Here the burden to show 
that the rules propounded by the Judiciary have been purposely and particularly amended resides 
with he who would rely on some other rule than the rule promulgated by the Judiciary, the same 
to be easily located within the body of Utah Law. 
15. Discussion of the Rule of Evidence 506 becomes, by default, the only legitimate 
inquiry bearing on the admissibility of evidence given by a physician at a point whereafter his 
patient has invoked the privilege reserved to the patient. 
16. In this case the Defendant's physician affirmed that Defendant had not 
volunteered facts regarding treatments afforded by another physician; the factual basis for this 
agreement was clearly obtained by the physician by examination or observation and is just as 
much subject to the privilege as a communication or lack thereof would be. 
5 
17. The rule only provides three exceptions to the otherwise blanket privilege; 
none of these exceptions apply to the instant case but are hereinafter set down for the 
convenience of Court and Counsel: 
A. Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication relevant to 
an issue of the physical, mental, ro emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or, after 
the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any part relies upon the condition 
as an element of the claim or defense; 
B. Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant to an issue in 
proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the mental health 
therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is 
in need of hospitalization; 
C. Court Ordered Examination. For communications made in the course of, and 
pertinent to the purpose of, a Court-Ordered examination of the physical, mental, 
or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or witness, unless the Court in 
ordering the examination specifies otherwise. 
18. The Legislative history indicates that Rule 506 is intended to supercede UCA 78-
24-8(4) and UCA 58-25a-8. Debry vs. Goates 999 P.2d 582 (2000) in the commentary on Rule 
506 found in Utah Evidence, Mangrum and Benson 2004 West Publishing it is said that: 
"The physician-patient privilege is somewhat distinctive in that it applies not only 
to communication between patient and physician, but also to tacts obtained by the 
physician by examination or observation." 
CONCLUSION 
The Court clearly admitted evidence essential to the Prosecution, which evidence is 
subject to the physician-patient privilege and did so over Defendant's objection and the Bindover 
should be Quashed for that reason alone. 
The Court erred when it relied on Legislation which has been superceded by Court Rule 
6 
and without that enabling Legislation the State would have failed to provide sufficient evidence 
upon which to obtain a Bindover. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF a/Wt> DpLJUepy 
I hereby certify that £ fonJ $pa true and correct copy of the foregoing. SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: APPLICATION OF 78-24-8(4) I CA AS AMENDED 
AND 58-37-6(A) UCA AS AMENDED TO DECIDE ISSUES IN PENDING MOTION TO 
QUASH BINDOVER, postage prepaid, to the following listed below on the ;^^day of July, 
2006. 
Bruce Ward, Esq. 
199 North Main Street, 3rd Floor 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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APPENDIX M 
Second Supplemental Memorandum 
A. W. LAURITZEN (1906) 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-




AND RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
REPLY TO 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
APPLICABILITY OF 78-24-8(4) UCA AS 
AMENDED AND 58-37-6(a) UCA AS 
AMENDED TO DECIDE ISSUES IN 
1
 PENDING MOTION TO QUASH 
BINDOVER 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Case No. 061100071 
Judge Willmore 
ISSUE 
I. Does testimony to a fact from which a negative inference may be drawn based on 
a patients neglect or refusal to provide useful and pertinent information to the 
attending Physician during diagnosis and/or treatment when the same is adduced 
from that patients attending physician, over Defendant's claim of privilege pursuant 
to Utah Rule of Evidence 506, amount to a communication which Defendant is 
entitled to invoke of privilege pursuant to Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence? 
1. Defendant first contends that insofar as Rule 506 is concerned the interests of the 
patient, whether in connection with a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding, coincide and no 
l 
meaningful distinction as to the breadth of the protection may be argued, see Mangrum et al 
(Infra). See Rule 101 of the Utah Rule of Evidence. 
2. In the recent case of Hill vs. National Collegiate Athletic Association 7 Cal 4th 
126, 865 p.2d 633 (1994) the Supreme Court of California discussed the protections afforded by 
the physician-patient privilege with regard to Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution1 
noting that a successful invocation of that provision must demonstrate: 
" A. A legally protected privacy interest 
B. A reasonable expectations of privacy in the circumstances 
C. Conduct constituting a serious invasion of privacy." 
3. Since this instant case involves only an interaction between a physician and a 
patient the inquiry as to whether a legally protected interest exists is easily answered within the 
framework of Rule 506 Utah Rules of Evidence. The rule as adopted and as authoritatively 
construed is inviolate save three exceptions incorporated within that rule, none of which are 
relevant here. The only questions then left to be answered are (a) whether the information was 
imparted to the physician by the patient during the time when a physician-patient privilege might 
be invoked and (b) whether the inference may be derived from a communication or observation 
made only in connection with the diagnosis and treatment rendered by the physician. 
In Mangrum and Benson on Utah Evidence Thompson (2005) at page 229 it is said that 
foundational to any such claim based on rule 506 must be existent the following elements, 
A. The patient or patient's representative on behalf of the patient asserts 
either the physician-patient or the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
That provision, not within the Utah Constitution, averts that: 
" All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are 
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." 
2 
B. The information the patient or the patient's representative seeks to protect 
is either a communication or an observation. 
C. The communication was relayed or the observation was made concerning 
the patient. 
D. The communication was made to or the observation was made by a 
physician, psychiatrist, psychologist or social worker performing 
psychotherapy or their representatives, [citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 
U.S. 1, 116 S.Q. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996)]. 
E. The communication or observation was made in confidence. 
F. The communication or observation was made for purposes of facilitating 
the rendition of psychotherapy, [or physician] (the Jaffe case 
involved a psychotherapist) 
G. The communication or observation does not fall within any exception. 
H. The privilege has not been waived. 
4. Ordinarily any indication of a communication is sufficient to invoke the privilege 
and any negative inference arising from a failure to communicate arising within the framework of 
the treatment regimen such as " . . . The patient communicated with me but 1 didn't ask and/or 
the patient didn't tell. . ." as in this case, with regard to the question as to whether another 
physician was dispensing similar medications. Surely if a physician had put the question "Are 
you receiving drug therapy for any purpose from another doctor?" and a patient responded "no" 
the response would have been protected from disclosure under Rule 506. Would this court hold 
that oral evidence which is misleading is protected by the privilege2 but a negligent and possibly 
2
 The case of State vs. Anderson 972 P.2d 86, (1998) denies the privilege (by way of dictum) to he who 
would seek treatment by a physician for the sole purpose of obtaining controlled substances for illicit consumption; 
this is not the case here. Defendant was referred by her attending physician for a condition which was neither subject 
to prior diagnosis nor had the attending physician he offered treatment. The referring physician was a practitioner 
whose expertise was, to his view, deficient with respect to the recent and untreated injury presented by the patient. 
3 
the same protection. 
5. Since an obser vation is protected and the failure to disclose must, by definition, be 
a product of some observation by the physician or the physicians representatives, how else could 
the observation, occur? If some mechanism,, is available, other than the physicians testimonial or 
il a ' . " 
necessary to complete prima facia, proof of the violation of the statute; the State might, then 
present that evidence, if the rules of evidence permit. 
Interestingly, it seems th.ii i •/' . *•> provide ear! . >aiient with a 
form to r" •. . i iMcr \ :,i * r \%r
 v o the assistance A office personnel and/oi medicai staff, 
use of the fonn. If the form, in its completed, condition, notes meds, is it not sufficient to satisfy 
58 3 i; 6(. . . : . . * . . m may not be considered a communication at aii :> J.c "orm 
provided in aid of diagnosis and/or treatment or for some other purpose such a* to lulliii some 
obligation, imposed oi I the physician, by governmental regulation as opposed to the patient? 
In case such as this, where the patient had received a traumatic head injury, could the defense of mental 
confusion iridi ice by the pain and brain trauma be raised? 
4 
CONCLUSION 
In response to the limited issue address herein; as authoritatively construed the interaction 
between physician and patient such as it occurred in this case amounts to a communication. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing. SECOND 
JSUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM AND RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: APPLICABILITY OF 78-24-
8(4) UCA AS AMENDED AND 58-37-6(a) UCA AS AMENDED TO DECIDE ISSUES IN 
PENDING MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER, postage prepaid, to the following listed below 
on the ju_ day of October, 2006. 
fdkOAj^/*kn..„ 
James Swink, Esq. 
199 North Main Street, 3rd Floor 





STATUS:*£**SINGLE MARRIED CHILD 
EMPLOYER 





W P R K # . ( ) 
I N S U R A N C E I N F O R M A T I O N 
: • :, . . - . • • . K - V - • • • • • • ,. '•.•^ •^ •-"••: . / v v . •:•«. v.: •-'•.• v . - v ; v ^ ^ '•• • 
ID 
ID 





ADDRESS HOW REALATED7 
ADDRESS 
I N C O M P L I A N C E W I T H T H E F E D E R A L H I P A A L A W S 
(HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY & ACCOUNTABILITY ACT) 
H I P A A ARE FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY AND HEALTH INFORMATION. W E CAN NOT 
GIVE ANY OF YOUR P E R S O N A L / HEALTH/ BILLING INFORMATION OUT (EXCEPT TO YOU) U N L E S S YOU 
SPECIFY WHO YOU W O U L D LIKE TO HAVE A C C E S S . IF YOU WOULD LIKE A FAMILY MEMBER OR F R I E N D TO 
HAVE A C C E S S TO YOUR ACCOUNT / H E A L T H / P E R S O N A L INFORMATION P L E A S E WRITE THEIR N A M E , 
RELATION, AND PHONE NUMBER ON THE LINES BELOW. 
N O R T H E R N UTAH EYE C E N T E R O F F I C E POLICIES 
W E A P P R E C I A T E T H E O P P O R T U N I T Y T O S E R V E Y O U . T H A N K YOU F O R C H O O S I N G N O R T H E R N U T A H 
E Y E C E N T E R . 
B I L L I N G A N D I N S U R A N C E : 
W E PARTICIPATE WITH MOST INSURANCE COMPANIES. IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO 
CONTACT YOUR INSURANCE TO S E E IF W E ARE PROVIDERS FOR YOUR SPECIFIC PLAN 
A N D FIND OUT HOW MUCH THEY WILL COVER. YOU ARE R E S P O N S I B L E FOR ANY CO-PAYS AT THE TIME 
OF S E R V I C E . IF YOU HAVE A PORTION/PERCENTAGE/DEDUCTIBLE, W E WILL BILL YOUR I N S U R A N C E A N D 
BILL YOU THE ALLOWED AMOUNT. YOU ARE R E S P O N S I B L E FOR ANY AMOUNT THAT IS NOT COVERED BY 
YOUR I N S U R A N C E COMPANY. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE I N S U R A N C E AVAILABLE WE WILL WORK WITH YOU TO 
OBTAIN A R E A S O N A B L E PAYMENT P L A N . 
T H E R E WILL B E A $ 3 0 . 0 0 R E T U R N E D CHECK F E E . 
D R J A U S S I IS A F E E P E R SERVICE DOCTOR, IF WE DO NOT RECEIVE PAYMENT WITHIN 9 0 DAYS FROM 
THE DATE OF SERVICE WE WILL TURN YOUR ACCOUNT OYER TO OUR COLLECTION AGENCY TO OBTAIN 
MONEY OWED. YOU WILL BE CHARGED UP TO 4 0 % COLLECTIONS FEE OF THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT DUE 
AND A $2.00 PER MONTH STATEMENT FEE IF YOUR ACCOUNT DOES GO TO COLLECTIONS. 
CONSENT FOR TREATMENT 
I AUTHORIZE AND CONSENT TO THE MEDICAL TREATMENT/S RENDERED TO ME BY 
W. REED JAUSSI MD AND HIS STAFF AS SEEN NECESSARY BY DR JAUSSI. I ALSO 
AUTHORIZE THE RELEASE OF ANY MEDICAL INFORMATION NECESSARY TO PROCESS 
MY INSURANCE CLAIMS OR TO OBTAIN ANY MONEY THAT MAY BE OWED. 
SIGNED PRINTED D A T E 
This report must be filed oersuant to rule R568-2*3-(A) 
Industrial Commission - Industrial Accidents Division 
160 East 300 South 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146610, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610 









] 1. Employee's First Name: Middle Initial: Last Name: 2. Social Security No.: 
[ 5. Street Address: City: State: Zip: 
9. Name of Employer: 
- . _ 





6. Phone No.: 
10. Address: 
12. Date Injured: Hour: AM O 113, Last Date Worked: 
PM O 
4. Sex: 
7 Ht.: 8.Wt. 
I I .Phon fNo . : 
14a. Has This Part Been Injured Before? 
Q yes Q no 
14b. If "Yes" State When and Described: 
15. Employee's Statement of Cause of Injury or Illness (In First Person): 
I 16 Describe Complaints (In First Person): 
| 17, Findings-of Examinatior 
18. X-Rays? Q Yes ( I No 
I Findings: 
I 20. Diagnosis (Written Description) 
I 21 . Is the Condition Requiring Treatment the Rest lit of 
tl >e Industrial Injury or Exposure Described? 
.11 "No" Explain: 
19.1CD-9 Codes: 
• " - — 
Q undetermined 
22. Date of First Treatment: Hour: AM a 
PM a 
23. Type of Treatment: 
24. If Hospitalized. What Hospital? 
Q In-Patient Q Out-Patient 
25. If Case Referred to Another Physician, Give Physician's Name and Address 
26. Is Condition Medically Stationary? 
Q yes Q no 
27. Is Any Further Treatment Required? Q yes Q no 
If "Yes" Date of Next Visit and How Many Estimated? 
'ill Injury Cause Permanent Impairn tent? 
yes Q no 
Ooes Injury Prevent Return to Regular Employment? n yos f) no 
II Yes* Estimate Time Loss: 
Modified Employment? Q yr-: l n" 
If 'Yes Explain Restrictions: 
31 Remarks of Outline of Pioposud 1 reatmon': 
30 Date Released, for Work: 
32. Are There Any Conditions That Would Retard or Prevent Recovery? Q yes Q no 
33. Name of Physician and Degree: 34. Address: 35. Phone No.: 
36 Federal Ta x 1.0. Mi umber 37. Date: 
White: Industrial Commission 
38. Signatt ire (f 'hysicians Own Signature Please): 
Yellow: Employ 'ee Pink: Insurance Carrier Goldeni od: Physicians' File 
Jtsru^e A . Isaacson, IVJCU. 
550 East 1400 North Suite Z a Logan, Utah 84341 o Phone 435-755-5799 n Fax 435-755-5839 
Name: 
FIRST MIDDLE LAST 
Birthday: 
MONTH DAY YEAR 
Address: 








In C a s e O f E m e r g e n c y Not i fy Whom?(Sorneone living at a different address> 
Relationship to Patient: Phone:( ) 
Parent or Responsible Party (If Different from Patient) 
Name: _Birthday:_ 
FIRST MIDDLE LAST MONTH DAY YEAR 
Address: 




Social Security Number: 
Employer Name: 
Relationship to Patient:_ 
Insurance Information 
Primay Insurance Company:_ 
Insured 
Insured Birthday / 
Month Day Year 
Insurance ID Number_ 
Employer Name: 
Relationship to Patient: 
Group Number 
Work Phone:^ 
Seconday Insurance Company: Insured Birthdav / 
Month Day Year 
Insured Relationship to Patient: 





D O W E H A V E Y O U R P E R M I S S I O N TO:Leave a message on your answering machine at horn? Yes No 
Discuss your medical condition with any member of your household? Yes No 
If yes, Whom: Relationship: . 
I hereby authorize Bruce A. Isaacson, M.D. to furnish my designated insurance carrier all information concerning my illness or 
injury. I also authorize benefits under this claim to be made payable directly to Bruce A. Isaacson, M.D. I understand I am 
responsible financially to the physician, for charges not covered by this authorization. 
Patient or responsible party signature: Date: " 
SURGICAL/HOSPITAL 
List the year of any Operation/Procedures you have had (if year unknown X): 
Year 
Appendix surgery 
Breast growth removal 
Carpal tunnel 
Cataract surgery 
Cesarean section delivery 
Colonoscopy (looking into bowel) 
Jer surgery/Laparoscopy 















List any Trauma/Broken Bones/Serious Accidents: 
List any other Ho.s|>H:ilr/jitP"ii 
What other doctor s have you seen? _ 
Yean 
Year: 
| FAMILY HISTORY 
Are you adopted 
1 i: - ;v cau.se oi .j*,;:). '.* 
Father 
Mother 
' j l t : .. ,. —Ar to ? o e ^0 ^Hn noi 
. * « j ^ 
. **!«.: s Mother 
hv 
) 
O Alcoholism/Substance Abi^t 
Q Alzheimers/Dementia 
Q Cancer (Breast) 
D Cancer (Colon) 
D Cancer (Prostate) 




 airier 's Mother 
**> • ** • mother (m), ft* tn 
emotional/ivicuidi
 tt, 
Q High Blood Pressure 
U I leart Attack prior to age 55 
L) Osteoporosis 
CJ Stroke 
i, ,„l Tuberculosis 
U«.i i d p a j e n t (g) : 
1 Occupation: 
3 Marital Status 
4 List your ethnic origin: 
Q White Q Hispanic CJ American/Alaskan Indian 
; ;g|e Q Widowed — ^JNUILLU : pu-viotw mamu.. io vM.uin' 
5 Please list numbei >^  ^ 
Number of Sons 
If yoi ) have mil K ] u> 
Births Number of Daughters _ 
LJ ' i t , i,„l N o 





heck major, significant illnesses which apply to you 
Q Anemia a 
a Asthma Q 
Q Arthritis Q 
O Bleeding/Blood disorder Q 
Q Breast cancer Q 
Q Cancer(s) Q 
a Cataracts Q 
Q Colitis a 
a Depression Q 
Q Diabetes
 Q 








High blood pressure 
HIV/AIDS 
Others: 
a doctor has told you that you have a physical disability please describe: 
Telephone # 
a Kidney disease 
Q Kidney stones 
Q Liver disease 
a Osteoporosis 
a Rheumatic fever 
Q Stroke 




















Self Breast Exam 
Mastectomy 
Mastectomy Location 
Year Over Age 40 
Mammogram 
IF Age 50 or above 
Stool Guaiac 









List all medications you are currently taking which have been ordered by a doctor (including inhalers) and all over the counter 
drugs, vitamins or herbs. Please list prescribed medications first: 











CHECK ANY ALLERGIES 
Q Medications List/Describe: 
Q Food a Animals Q Latex Q Tape Q Pollens Q Iodine Q Other: 
JifiJI IHCWORKMED 
I M <C A Service of Intermountain Health Care 
PHYSICIANS FIRST REPORT OF WORK INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE - FORM 15 
WHITE: Industrial Commission YELLOW: Employee PINK: Insurance Carrier GOLD: Physicians File 






NAME (1 - 6) 
PHONE 
SOCSEC# 
DATE OF BIRTH: AGE: SEX. 
INSURANCE CARRIER 




« A<-T n^T<" W O R K E D 
HAS THIS PART BEEN INJURED BEFORE? [ ' vt 
IF YES, DESCRIBE: 
DYES 




















IS THE CONDITION REQUIRING TREATMENT THE RESULT OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL INJURY OR EXPOSURE DESCRIBED? (21) 
D YES D NO Q UNDETERMINED 
IF NO OR UNDETERMINED EXPI AIN: DATE OF FIRST TREATMEN1 : 
(22) 
TIME; 






IF HOSPITALIZED, WHAT HOSPITAL: (24) 
D INPATIENT D OUTPATIENT 
REFERRAL TO ANOTHER PHYSICIAN? (25) 
GIVE PHYSICIANS NAME: 
REFERRED TO PT / OT? 








IS CONDITION MEDICALLY STATIONARY? 
D YES O NO (26) 
IS FURTHER TREATMEN ' -• * A r,1'-
QYES D NO 
WILL PERM i.v«f-Ai",MENI Hf SUi T ^ 
DYES - • \-lum J i -JVi'-MlD 
ARE THERE ANY CONDITIONS THAT 
COULD DELAY RECOVERY? (32) 
n YES a NO 
D RETURN TO WORK IMMEDIATELY 
ft • f Ml LEASED FOR WORK 
i J RELEASED FROM CARE ON 
TJ NO LIFTING OVER 
, NO • JSL OF 
D REGULAR DUTY D MODIFIED DUTY 
D NO WORK ABOVE SHOULDER 
I D NO KNEELING OR SQUATTING 
D NO DRIVING OR WORK AROUND 
MACHINERY 
. lbs 
Ll L 1D USE OF 
D NO REPETITIVE MOTION OF . 
PHYSICIAN NAME: (33 - 38) 
ADDRESS: 
Peterson Chiropr.ctic, P.C, Br*„f *. J>eUraoo D.C, J.mea L. Miauatt* O.C 
Peteraoii Chiropractic 
HIS North 400 East 
Logto, UT 84341 
Q u r Privacy P | 7 H g t 
have. ^ ^ ^ Ul l 0 * i v c y ° u t h i l d i 3 d 0 , U f C « ? < " * u ^ l U n d d w l W c 
There arc several cireumaUnce, in which we may ruve to uac or diacloac your health care informal 
to thTrn^r A t 0 di$cIo5.c yout h c i J l h '"formation to another health care provider or a hospital if ft is necessary to refer you 
W i r t h c d l i S n 0 1 1 ' ' •MCMmort. or treatment. 
t l i ' S e S ° ou?ierJy°Ur k ^ i n f ° m ) a t i D n l n d b i l l i n* I c c w c b to l n o t h c r P"1* v t h c* i r c potcnlWIy responsible for 
Wc mov nCC<d!? *"* y 0 U r hC*Uh l n f o m u l 5 o n ^ i n °«r practice for quality control or other operational purposes. 
send vou Vih v * * T* p c n q D t l tofo™»tton to rtmiad you of your appointment, icnd you a birthday card, 
W ^ ; J ' J?1 n **out toryw refemb, acknowledge your referral on an in offlce referral board, lend you t 
«n o«Tr! ? i ° 5 C e l n f o "" t t i o o » 1 k«w. Invite you lo participate in patient appreciation dip , atnd you 
•» office newsletter or .end promotional Jnforrnattoa 
htve7h7riJht°to r?""PlC!u 1 ° ^ lhf: p f0VidcJ a dcu51cd dM^ption of how your health information may 6c uicd or disclosed. You 
W<rcleric8J
 c TM W n°UCC b c f 0 f e y ° U ' ^ ( h » « » * " ' *™< 
notify you in wriifno wh *' °Uf P". t C y P'1Cl icM " bribed in that notice. U wc make a change to our privacy practice*, we will 
nung wncn you come for treatment
 OT by mail. Please feel free to call us at anytime for a copy of our privacy notices. 
Xswjiahl to limit
 <t,r, o r jiJV|ffjllr„ 
yo^wouIdVk nfhl |f0 fCqUC51 Ihftl w c d o n o ! ^««lowyou health information lo specific individuals, companies or organizations. If 
required lo 1 t *"* r c 3 t n c t i o n s o n t h c U5C or disclosure of your health information, please let us fcnow in writing. We arc not 
grcc lo your restrictions. However, if wc agree wiih your restrictions, the restriction h binding upon ur 
^9™ fjglM tQ revoke vour i^»1hpri7lHmn 
You may revoke your consent to us at any time; however, your revocation must be in writing. Wc will not be ab(e to honor your 
rcvocahon request if wc have already released your health information before wc receive your request lo revoke your authorization. If 
you were required to give your authorization as a condition of obtiininfl insurance, thc insurance company may have a right to your 
health information if they decide to contest any of your claims. 
I have rend your consent policy and agree to it's terms I am also acknowledging that 1 have received a copy of this notice. 













What you preter to b* called. 
FIRST 
^ge:. SS#: 
Home Phone: Work Phone 










Status: O Minor Q Single Q Married • Divorced Q Separated • Widowed 
Spouse's Name: Do you have children? Q YES U Nt) How n lany?. 
Nearest Relative not living with you: 
^ADDRESS JB^E-•*,~>ir^>^~:^ 
V REASON FOR 
, I.- reason for this visit is a result of (please circle): Work 
yplam what happened: 
. . < • ">plaint:_ 
•_;pui ID Ai Jto Trat ima CI iroi lie 
tin- ne col idition begin? / I Is the condition getting worse? Q Yes QNo • Constant Q Comes anc 
, us condition interfering with your (please circle): Woi k Sleep Daily Roi Jtine 
,() please explain: 
,\ i - vou lost any days from work? Q Yes Q No How Long? 
.ad this or similar conditions in the past? Q Yes Q No If so, please explain: 
Have you been treated by a Medical Physician for this condition? • Yes Q No If so, where9 . 
Have you been treated by a Chiropractor before? Q Yes G No If so, whom? _ 
HEALTH HIST 
Ar. ,;! yoi J taking any medications? Q'Yes O Mo II yes, what: 
Please list any serious medical condition(s) you have ever had: 
Please list anything that you may be allergic to: 
List previous surgeries/treatments with dates: 
Lisl ar ly past serious accidents with dates: 
Family health history: 
Do you: Take supplements 01 vitamins? • Yes Q No Exercise7 • Yes • No Do you Smoke? Q Yes Q No I-low much? How Long? _ 
For Women: Are you taking Birth Control? Q Yes Q No Are you pregnant? • Yes Q No If yes, how long? Nursing? Q Yes 
I understand and agree that health and accident insurance policies are an arrangement between an insurance carrier and mysell 
assign and authorize payment directly to Peterson Chiropractic of any insurance benefits that I may have payable to me, and under! 
that these funds will be credited to my account(s) upon receipt. I also give Peterson Chiropractic power of attorney to endorse d" 
made out to me, to be credited to my account(s). Furthermore, I clearly understand and agree that I am personally responsible f< 
payment of any and all charges for services rendered. If payment is not fully satisfied or financial arrangements agreed to by Pete 
Chiropractic within 90 days, I agree to be assessed reasonable collection fees, attorney fees, interest and/or court costs in conne 
with collecting the full amount owed on my account(s), whether or not a legal law suit is filed. As with any medical procedures, th 
are inherent risks that can occur. Although these risks are not highly prevalent in the administration of chiropractic care, they are 
nevertheless present. If I have any concerns in this regard it is my responsibility to discuss them with the doctor. By signing belo 
acknowledge that I have received satisfactory informed consent for any and all procedures performed by Peterson Chiropractic. 
Qa.m. Qp.m. 
Were you the: Q Driver Q Front Passenger Q Rear Passenger 
If a traffic violation was issued, to whom was it issued? 
Date & Time of Accident: Qa.m. Qp.m. 
Was your accident directly related to your work? 
QYes Q N o 
Briefly describe the events that occurred just before and 
during your accident: 
Give the address where accident occurred: (if other than 
employer's address) _ 
Number of people in accident vehicle? 
Did the police come to the accident site? . .Q Yes Q No 
Was a police report filed? • Yes Q No 
Were there any witnesses? Q Yes Q No 
Were you wearing your seat belt? Q Yes Q No 
Was this vehicle equipped with airbags? . .Q Yes Q No 
If yes, did it/they inflate? Q Yes Q No 
In relation to the base of your skull, where was the 
headrest? Q Above Q Below Q At base of skull 
What did your vehicle impact? _i Another vehicle Q Other 
\i other, explain: 
Did any part of your body strike anything \n the vehicle?Q Yes Q No 
If yes, please describe:. 
J Make & model of the vehicle you were occupying' 
Was anyone else present during your accident9 
Q Yes Q No 
Did you report your accident to your employer? 
QYes Q N o 
What recommendations did your employer make just 
after your accident? 
Name of the location/street on which you were traveling? 
In which direction were you headed? QN QS QE QW 
What was the approx. speed of your vehicle? 
Did the impact to your vehicle come from the: 
Q Front Q Rear Q Right Side Q Left Side Q Other 
During impact, were you facing: J Right QLeft Q Forward 
Were you Q aware or Q surprised by the impact? 
If accident vehicle made impact with another vehicle... 
Make and model of that other vehicle? 
Has this type of accident happened to you before? 
QYes Q N o 
To the best of your knowledge, has this accident occurred 
n your workplace before? Q Yes Q No 
n general: 
Is your job physically stressful? Q Yes Q No 
Is your job mentally stressful? Q Yes Q No 
Is your workplace noisy? Q Yes Q No 
Have you changed jobs in the last year? Q Yes Q No 
Direction other vehicle was headed? QN QS QE QW 
Speed of the other vehicle?... P 
In your words, please describe the accident: _ h 
r 
• — ~ - • - T R — • - • ' ? ' •?-•.• •-""'•"'-
PL-LA6L CONTINUE. M bAOi 
1 
Did accident render you unconscious? Q Yes Q No 
If yes, for how long? 
Please describe how you felt immediately after the accident 
r
* 1 Have you gone to a Hospital or seen any other Doctor? Q Yes Q No 
When did you go? Q Just after accident Q The next day Q 2 days plus 
How did you get there? Q Ambulance or Q Private transportation 
Name of Hospital ai id oi Attendir ig doctoi : 
m 
Was he/she a: Q D.C. Q M.D. Q D.O.. Q D.D.S. 
Describe any treatment you received: 
Were X-rays taken7 U Yes Q No 
I Was medication prescribed? Q Yes Q No 
J Have you been able to work since this injury?Q Yes Q No 
^ Are youi work activities restricted as a result of this injury? 
• Yes Q No 
Indicate H'the symptoms that are a result of this accident: 
Q Dizziness 
Q Memory loss 
• Headache(s) 








U Neck pain 
• Neck stiff 
• Arms/Shoulder pain 
• Numb Hands/Fingers 
• Chest pain 
• Shortness of breatl i 
1 1 Stomach upset 
• Nausea 
• Back pain 
• Lower back pain 
• Back stiffness 
1
 11 eg pain 
1 Ill In i rnb Feet/Toes 
Is your condition getting worse? 
Q Yes Q No • Constant Q Comes & goes 
Indicate your degree of comfort while performing the 










Lying oi \ back . 
Lying on side . 














Have you retainer ^t, atu 
If yes, whom: 
Uncomfortable Painful 





















"nt ;y J r p% . j f \ j 0 
CtfVfcfci 
To evaluate the effect that continuing work will ha 
on your recovery please complete the following: 
How many hours are in your normal work day? 
Please indicate ©fyour daily job duties and any activitie 
which you are occasionally asked to perform. 
Q Standing Q Driving Q Operating equipment 
Q Sitting Q Twisting Q Work with arms above he 
Q Walking G Crawling Q Typing 
Q Lifting 
Q Other 
Q Bending G Stooping 
What positions ca 
effort and for how long? 
"' v f t - *-> i Physical 
_ GNy 
Prior to the injury were you capable of working on an 
equal basis with others your age?. . G Yes G No Q HI 
Do you work with others who can help you with any 
heavy lifting? . . . Q Yes G No G N/ 
While in recovery, is there any fight duty work you could 
request? Q Yes Q No G HL 
brp^NAL lN5U£ANC 
2nd Ins \ • • • Source or Auto Insurance 
Ivpv i>! Insurance:_ 
d Ndrne: 
Afj'ire^ s 
f',,, ,no P: 
i.- .ur^d's Name: 






D.O.B. / / 
| If any of your medical or account information has changed, 
olease infor i n our fror it desk personnel 





OFFICE USE ONLY OFFICE USE ONLY OFFICE USE ONLY OFFICE USE ONLY OFFICE USE ONLY 
His/Her Phone #: 
APPENDIX N 
Burns vs. Boyden 976 P.2d 581 (Utah 2006) 
. Boyden, 133 P.3d 370, 2006 UT 14 (Utah 03/03/2006) 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF F TAH 
No. 20050039 
133 P.3d 370, 2006 UT 14, 546 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 2006.UT.0000095< 
http://www.versuslaw.com> 
March 3, 2006 
\ 
, .E HONORABLE AiV\ ~v , , ,*,,A, , , J I IDGE IN I I IE THIRD . U ; D 1 U \ l 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, STATE OF l i l ' Il l , R E ' PARTY ; M 
INTEREST. RESPONDENT 
Attorneys: 
M = - • .1-- \ Mainnez, Sarah Lynn Mathews. Salt Lake City, for petitioner. 
Brei 11 M Io 1 11 isc: >n, Sa 11 I ake City, lo 1 i espondei 11. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att 'y Gen . , Laura B. Dupa ix , Daryl L. BL i. • I >em- .M»ii Jav S tone . 
Asst, Att 'ys Gen Salt [ ake City, for real p;»- lv in " ^ — \ 
The opinioi \ of the coi irt was delivered by: Durrani h istice 
(,)i iginal Proceeding ! f' v 
]\l 1 1 ns case presents two distil ict issues ; ; .nether I.)i Bn<in . - liinu^ may claim the 
physician-patient privilege as a shield against a slate investigation into ins allegedly 
fraudulent billing practices, and (2) whether a secrecy order obtained by the State respecting 
this investigation is constitutional. As to the first issue, rule 506 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence provides a physician presumptive authority to claim the ph\ sician-patient 
privilege "on behalf of the patient/' \VV h-. o il. :"ir State has rebutted this presumption by 
demonstrating that Burns is asserting the privilege not on behalf of his patients but for his 
own benefit. As to the second issue. Utah law allows the State, with approval and oversight 
iniiii a district court, to conduct a criminal investigation in secret. Despite the secrecy order 
APPENDIX P 
In Re Young 976 P.2d 581 (Utah 1999) 
In re Young 
1999 UT 6 
976 P.2d 581 
Case Number: 970032 
Decided: 01/22/1999 
Utah Supreme Court 
Cite as: 1999 UT 6, 976 P.2d 581 
In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, the Honorable Davia ^ 
From the Judicial Conduct Commissio 
Attc I i leys: 
Steven H. Stewart, Francis M. Wikstrom, Salt Lake City, for Judicial Conduct Commission 
Daniel L. Berman, Peggy A. Tomsic, D. Frank Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for Judge Young 
Brent M. Johnson, Richard H. Schwermer, Margaret K. Gentles, Salt Lake City for amici l Ital) 
Judicial Council and Administrative Office of the Courts 
M. Gay Taylor, Robert H. Rees, Salt Lake City, for amici legislative r I lembei s of Judicial Coi iduct 
Commission 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Annina M. Mitchell, Asst. Att'y Gen.,, Salt Lake City, for amici Governor 
Leavitt and Attorney General Graham 
On Petition for Rehearing 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice; 
fl1 This matter is before us on a petition for rehearing. The original decision in this case was handed down oi ,li1 
10, 1998, and was published as In.re Young, 961 P.2d 918 (Utah 1998) (hereinafter referred to as original 
opinion). 1 In that decision, we held that sections 78-7-27(1 )(a) and (b) of the Code were violative of article V, 
section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Those Code subsections provide that two members of the Senate, appointed 
by the President, and two members of the House, appointed by the Speaker, shall serve on the ten-member 
Judicial Conduct Commission. As a consequence, we held void proceedings of the commission that led it to 
recommend that this court, enter a public sanction against Judge David S. Young, 
1(2 1 he Judicial Conduct Commission moved for permission to file a petition for rehearing, This court granted the 
motion, as well as the motions of various parties for permission to file briefs as amici curiae in support of the 
petition for rehearing. 2 The respondent, Judge Young, filed an opposition to the petition for rehearing. Oral 
argument was held on December 21, 1998, We now grant the petition and issue this opinion on rehearing,.. 
fl3 1 he petition for rehearing ai id tl le briefs of tl le various amici I lave r aised several issues of substantial it i ipoi t 
First and foremost, the amicus brief of the legislative members of the Judicial Conduct, Commission has brought 
to our attention much new material about the origins of the present judicial article of the Utah Constitution, article 
VIII, which was rewritten in its entirety and passed by the voters in 1984. Section 13 of that article elevated the 
Judicial Conduct Commission to constitutional status. The legislator amici contend that this new material 
demonstrates that the drafters of the amended article, the judges who participated in the hearings preceding its 
being finalized, the legislators who then passed the proposed amendment and put it on the ballot, and the voters 
who approved it at a general election all understood that the amended article contemplated legislative 
participation on the Judicial Conduct Commission Therefore, they argue, our original decision holdino i 
participation unconstitutional was in error 
||4 1 he objective importance of this historical material cannot be overstated. The petition of the Judicial Condi ict. 
Commission for rehearing had narrowly asked only that we declare whether the commission can continue to 
function without the legislative members. But at oral argument, the chair of the commission, who previously had 
been unaware of the historical materials provided us by the amici, apologized for failing to bring this critical 
material to our attention in the original proceeding. He also announced in open court that he was now convinced 
that our original decision was wrong and should be reversed 
APPENDIX Q 
DeBry vs. Goates 999 P.2d 582 (2000) 
Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App 58 (Utah App. 03/09/2000) 
[1 ] IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
[2] Case No. 981420-CA 
[3] 2000 UT App 58, 2000.UT.0042058 <http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] March 9, 2000 
[5] JANICE L. DEBRY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, 
v. 
DELBERT T. GOATES, M.D., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. 
[6] Attorneys: Bel-Ami De Montreux, Salt Lake City, for Appellant Mark L. McCarty and P. 
Keith Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
[7] Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme. 
[8] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Billings, Judge 
[9] OPINION 
[ 10] (For Official Publication) 
[11] Third District, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
[12] 1J1 Plaintiff Janice Debry appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in her 
malpractice claim in favor of defendant Dr. Delbert Goates. Debry argues that the court 
erred in determining she had no therapist-patient relationship with Dr. Goates, and that even 
if a relationship was established, she could not assert the privilege because her mental state 
was put at issue in the divorce proceeding. We reverse. 
[13] BACKGROUND 
[14] [^2 m[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We state the 
APPENDIX R 
Sorensen vs. Barbuto 43 P.3d 295 (2006) 
\Afestlaw. 
143 P.3d295 
143 P.3d 295, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2006 UT App 340 
(Cite as: 143P.3d295) 
f> 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nicholas SORENSEN, Kevin Sorensen, and Pamela 
Sorensen, limited guardians and 
conservators of Nicholas Sorensen, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
John P. BARBUTO, individually; and John P. 
Barbuto, M.D., P.C., dba Neurology 
In Focus, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20050501-CA. 
Aug. 10,2006. 
Background: Patient, who was injured as result of 
being passenger in single-automobile accident, 
brought action for breach of contract, and various tort 
claims, against former treating physician after 
physician engaged in ex parte communications with 
defense counsel in patient's underlying personal 
injury action against alleged tortfeasor. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone 
Medley, J., granted physician's motion to dismiss. 
Patient appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held 
that: 
(1) physician's conduct would not support claim for 
breach of implied contract; 
(2) physician's ex part communications constituted 
breach of physician's fiduciary duty of 
confidentiality; 
(3) physician could be liable for negligent breach of 
fiduciary duty of confidentiality; 
(4) physician's ex parte communication was not 
public disclosure required to maintain claim for 
invasion of privacy; 
(5) doctor's statements in deposition were protected 
by judicial proceeding privilege; 
(6) physician's conduct met threshold necessary to 
maintain action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress; and 
(7) judicial proceeding privilege did not apply to 
protect physician from patient's claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
West Headnotes 
HI Appeal and Error €^>842(1) 
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No CI 
Page 1 
Propriety of trial court's decision to grant or deny 
motion to dismiss for failure to state claim on which 
relief can be granted is question of law that Court of 
Appeals reviews for correctness. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 12(b)(6). 
12] Appeal and Error €=>919 
30k919 Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing trial court order granting motion to 
dismiss for failure to state claim on which relief can 
be granted, appellate court must accept material 
allegations of complaint as true, and appellate court 
will affirm trial court's ruling only if it clearly 
appears complainant can prove no set of facts in 
support of his or her claims. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
12(b)(6). 
131 Health €>=>642 
198Hk642 Most Cited Cases 
Conduct of patient's former treating physician in 
engaging in ex parte communications with defense 
attorney in patient's underlying personal injury action 
against alleged tortfeasor would not support claim for 
breach of implied contract; breach of duty of 
confidentiality could not be pursued as breach of 
implied contract. 
J4j Health € ^ 6 0 0 
198Hk600 Most Cited Cases 
141 Health € ^ 6 2 5 
198Hk625 Most Cited Cases 
Statute on liability of health care provider to patient 
for breach of contract does not preclude all contract 
claims against physician absent written contract 
signed by physician or his designated agent, as statute 
specifically provides that claim against physician 
must be in writing if it is based on "guarantee, 
warranty, contract or assurance of result." West's 
U.C.A. § 78-14-6. 
151 Health €^>642 
198Hk642 Most Cited Cases 
Statute on liability of health care provider to patient 
for breach of contract did not apply to patient's claim 
against former treating physician for alleged breach 
of implied contract by communicating ex parte with 
defense counsel in patient's underlying tort action 
against alleged tortfeasor; patient did not contend that 
physician had promised particular result with his 
treatment. West's U.C.A. S 78-14-6. 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
APPENDIX S 
Society of Separatists Inc. and Whitehead 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993) 
12/10/93 SOCIETY SEPARATIONISTS v. RON WHITEHEAD 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 920233 
[3] 1993.UT.309 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 870 P.2d 916, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 67 
[4] December 10, 1993 
[5] SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC., A MARYLAND NONPROFIT 
CORPORATION, RICHARD ANDREWS, AND J. WALKER, PLAINTIFFS AND 
APPELLEES, 
v. 
RON WHITEHEAD, TOM GODFREY, NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, 
ROSELYN KIRK, AND DON HALE, SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, 
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
[6] Third District, Salt Lake County. The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
[7] Brian M. Barnard, John Pace, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
[8] Roger F. Cutler, Bruce R. Baird, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
[9] Paul D. Lyman, Richfield, for amicus Utah League of Cities & Towns and amicus 
Richfield City. Kathryn D. Kendell, Salt Lake City, for amicus American Civil Liberties 
Union. 
[10] Zimmerman, Hall, Durham, Howe, Stewart 
[11] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Zimmerman 
[12] ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
[13] Defendants Ron Whitehead, Tom Godfrey, Nancy Pace, Alan Hardman, Roselyn Kirk, and 
Don Hale, members of the Salt Lake City Council as of September 1991 (collectively 
referred to as "City Council" or "Council"), appeal from a district court order denying their 
motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to plaintiffs Richard 
APPENDIX T 
West Jordan vs. Goodman 135 P.3d 874, 2006 UT 27 
^mmm^^mmmmmmmm 
[1] W&ti& SUPREME COURT OETHESTATE OF UTAH 
J2\ Na20040944 
[3] 135 P.3d 874,2006 UT 27,550 Utah Adv. Rep. 31,2006.UT.0000200< 
http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] April 28,2006 
[5] WEST JORDAN CITY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER GOODMAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. 
[6] Third District, West Valley The Honorable Stephen L. Roth No. 04510000L 
[7] Attorneys: 
[8] Roger F. Cutler, Ryan B. Carter, West Jordan, for plaintiff. 
[9] Michael N. Martinez, Salt Lake City, and Sarah Lynn Mathews, West Valley City, for 
defendant. 
[10] Kent R. Hart, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
[11] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Parrish, Justice 
[12] INTRODUCTION 
[13] [^1 After the West Jordan Justice Court convicted Christopher Goodman of two 
misdemeanor charges, Goodman exercised his statutory right to a trial de novo in the 
district court.*fnl 
[14] There, Goodman raised a constitutional challenge to the statutory scheme authorizing 
municipal justice courts,*fn2 arguing that it violates the separation of powers principles of 
the Utah Constitution. *fn3 Goodman also argued that municipal court judges are biased 
APPENDIX V 
Notes of the Legislative Counsel for the Joint Committee 
MINUTES OF THE 
JUDICIARY INTERIM COMMITTEE 
Wednesday, July 19, 2006 - 9:00 a.m. - Room W130 House Building 
Members Present: 
Sen. David L. Thomas, Senate Chair 
Rep. James A. Ferrin, House Chair 
Sen. Patrice M. Arent 
Sen. Gregory S. Bell 
Sen. L. Alma Mansell 
Rep. Ben C. Ferry 
Rep. Douglas C. Aagard 
Rep. Stephen D. Clark 
Rep. Lorie D. Fowlke 
Rep. Ann W. Hardy 
Rep. Neal B. Hendrickson 
Rep. David L. Hogue 
Rep. Eric K. Hutchings 
Rep. Ross I. Romero 
Rep. La Wanna Shurtliff 
Rep. Scott L. Wyatt 
Members Absent: 
Sen. Scott D. McCoy 
Sen. Darin G. Peterson 
Rep. Susan Lawrence 
Staff Present: 
Mr. Joseph T. Wade, Policy Analyst 
Ms. Esther Chelsea-McCarty, Associate General Counsel 
Ms. A. Brooke 01 lerton, Legislative Secretarv 
Note: A lisi of others present. ;i copy ol ichilecl malerkils. and an audio lecorclint; of the meeting can he found ai www k ...m .iio\ 
1. Committee Business 
Chair Thomas called the meeting to order at 9:16 a.m. 
MOTION: Rep. Hogue moved to approve the minutes of the June 21, 2006 meeting. The motion passed 
unanimously with Sen. Mansell, Rep. Clark, Rep. Ferry, Rep. Shurtliff, and Rep. Wyatt absent for the vote. 
2. Judicial Rulemaking Authority 
Chair Thomas referred the committee to Article VIIL Sec. 4 of the Utah Constitution, which describes judicial 
rulemaking authority. He gave background information on the Utah Supreme Court case Bums v. Boyclen and 
stated that in the 1990s a statute adopted by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature was overruled by the supreme 
court (Utah Supreme Court). 
Sen. Bell asked if the Court has a unified policy on the Legislature's role injudicial rulemaking. 
Mr. Rick Schwermer, Admnistrative Office of the Courts, informed the Committee of a recent meeting of the 
CRC (Utah Constitutional Revision Commission), in which the CRC concluded that the rulemaking process was 
working as intended and that a constitutional amendment was unnecessary. He said that the supreme court 
believes that whichever branch of government acts last determines the state of the law. but pointed out that there 
were only a few instances where the supreme court has overturned an act of the Legislature. He said lie did not 
think there was a need to be concerned over Burns because it sets no new law. 
The Committee discussed the role of the Legislature injudicial rulemaking, the limitations on its authority, and 
the instances in which the Court has overruled a two-thirds vote by the Legislature. 
3. Punitive Damages 
Sen. Lyle Hilyard explained that a disparity exists between punitive damages and other types of damages. He 
outlined some of the problems associated with this disparity and urged the Committee to address the issues. 
k' 
rtW 
Mr. Kevin Olsen, Director, Division of Consumer Protection, explained that the statute originally allowed for the 
division of punitive damages with the state. The Utah Supreme Court decided that this was an unconstitutional 
taking of property rights by the state. He reported on enforcement of the statute and the current protocol for 
collecting damages. In response to a question about how the statute could be clarified, he said that the Committee 
might consider clarifying issues with attorney fees and payment of fees. 
The Committee discussed juries, award amounts, and disclosure of wealth. 
4. Comparative Negligence A mend men ts - Review Issues of Comparative Liability and Intentional Torts 
Rep. Wyatt introduced draft legislation, "Comparative Negligence Amendments." 
Mr. James Jardine, Ray Quinney & Nebeker, (also representing the Salt Lake Chamber), gave a brief history of 
the tort reform movement and Utah's Liability Reform Act. The Act defined "fault" broadly, but did not specify 
whether intentional torts would be included. He explained that through judicial and legislative action, the state of 
the law has been changed since then. This bill, he said, would make it clear that an intentional tort is included in 
the definition of "fault." 
The Committee discussed general issues of negligence, public policy implications, and definitions in the proposed 
legislation. 
Mr. Chris Kyler, Utah Association of Realtors, voiced his organization's support for the bill. 
Mr. James Blanch, Parsons, Behle, and Latimer, said that trial lawyers oppose the bill as written because of 
situations in which the negligence in question is a failure to prevent forseeable intentional conduct. He asked that 
committee not take action, but study the issue further. 
Rep. Romero said he supported the principle of the bill, but wanted to see the proposed language about forseeable 
intentional conduct. 
Rep. Ferrin stated support for the bill, but voiced concern about definitions, fairness. A\K\ dual standards. 
Rep. Wyatt encouraged a committee vote on the bill. 
MOTION: Rep. Wyatt moved to approve "Comparative Negligence Amendments" as a committee bill. The 
motion passed with Rep. Fowlke and Rep. Romero voting in opposition. 
5. Other Items / Adjourn 
Ms. Chelsea McCarty distributed, "Title 78A -- Judicial Code. Draft - Alternative A" and "Title 7*SA - Courts (ov 
Judicial Administration), Draft - Alternative B." She explained that staff was working on the recodification ot 
Title 78. She asked committee members to look over the documents and give staff feedback regarding their 
preferences before September interim meetings. 
MOTION: Rep. Hogue moved to adjourn the meeting. The motion passed unanimously. Sen. Mansell, Rep. 
Clark, and Rep. Ferry were absent for the vote. 
Chair Thomas adjourned the meeting at I 1:45 a.m. 
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APPENDIX X 
Note Signed by Dr. Jaussi 
t UTAH p 
Cache/Rich Drug Task Force 
290 North 100 West 
Logan, UT 84321 
(435)716-9381 
, prescribed valid prescriptions 
for a controlled substance to £>C Q V\ V\ ^J#V Vl^OM 
^P^JMJ ^Qtls^v^ did not disclose to me that they 
were receiving controlled substances from any other source. 
I understand that this statement may be used at a preliminary hearing and that any 
false statement made herein would subject me to criminal prosecution as a Class A 
Misdemeanor. 
Date 
iL / " 7 - <^^ 
Witness Date 
APPENDIX Y 
State vs. Mark E. Anderson 972 P.2d 86 (Utah 1998) 
SLW/UTAH, STATE v. ANDERSON, 972 P.2d 86 (Utah App. 12/24/1998) 
[ 1 ] Court of Appeals of Utah. 
[2] No. 971426-CA. 
[3] 972 P.2d 86,1998.UT.0042134< http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] December 24, 1998 
[5] SLW/UTAH, TATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, 
V. 
MARK E. ANDERSON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. 
[6] Appeal from the First District, Logan Department, Clint S. Judkins, J. [972 P2d Page 87] 
[7] A.W. Lauritzen and Emily Lauritzen, Logan, for Appellant. 
[8] Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee. 
[9] Before Wilkins, Associate P.J., and Bench and Jackson, JJ. 
[ 10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bench, Judge: 
[11] OPINION 
[12] Defendant appeals his conviction on fourteen counts of fraudulently obtaining controlled 
substances by prescription, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(Supp. 1993). Defendant claims that admitting the testimony of his doctors violated the 
physician-patient privilege. We affirm. 
[13] BACKGROUND 
[14] The State charged defendant with twenty felony counts of fraudulently obtaining controlled 
substances by prescription. The information alleged that on various occasions between 
March and November of 1994, defendant fraudulently acquired the controlled substance 
APPENDIX Z 
State vs. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah, 1979) 
07/26/79 STATE UTAH v. KENNETH EUGENE GOTFREY 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 15804 
[3] 1979.UT.142 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 598 P.2d 1325 
[4] July 26, 1979 
[5] STATE OF UTAH, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
v. 
KENNETH EUGENE GOTFREY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. 
[6] Crockett, Chief Justice, wrote the opinion. WE Concur: D. Frank Wilkins, Justice, Gordon 
R. Hall, Justice. Stewart, Justice: (Concurring in Part and Dissenting in part) Maughan, 
Justice, concurs in the views expressed in the Concurring and Dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Stewart. 
[7] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Crockett 
[8] CROCKETT, Chief Justice: Defendant Kenneth Gotfrey appeals from his conviction by a 
jury on two counts of statutory rape, *fhl and one count of forcible sodomy, *fn2 on all of 
which he had been jointly charged. His grounds of attack are: (1) Insufficiency of the 
evidence, (2) error in denying his claim of a psychologist-patient privilege, and (3) in 
denying defendant's motion to quash the information for improper joinder of offenses 
therein. 
[9] The acts of statutory rape charged were upon defendant's step-daughters. Petrita Garcia 
testified that on September 11, 1975, (she was then 12 years of age) the defendant jerked 
her into a bedroom in their mobile home at Wellington, Utah, made her take off her clothes 
and had intercourse with her. Though the evidence was focused upon that occurrence, she 
also testified that the same thing had happened many times (at least 20 times) before. The 
other was a year and a half later, another step-daughter, Rosie Garcia, testified that on 
March 15, 1977, (who by then had also become 12 years old) the defendant took her in the 
bedroom, undressed her, and had sexual intercourse with her. She also testified that the 
same thing had happened many times before. 
[10] The charge of sodomy was upon the brother of the two girls above referred to, step-son 
Michael Gene Garcia, 16 years old. He related that the incident occurred on October 23, 
1976, while they were on a deer hunt in Carbon County. He said that while he was in bed in 
APPENDIX AA 
Berry vs. Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah, 1958) 
11/12/58 ROBERT J. BERRY v. LOUIS G. MOENCH 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 8786 
[3] 1958.UT.99 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 331 P.2d 814, 8 Utah 2d 191 
[4] November 12, 1958 
[5] ROBERT J. BERRY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, 
v. 
LOUIS G. MOENCH, DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
[6] Sumner J. Hatch, Ray S. McCarty, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
[7] Skeen, Worsley, Snow & Christensen, Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
[8] Wade and Worthen, JJ., concur. 
[9] McDONOUGH, C. J., and Henriod, J., concur in the result. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Crockett 
[11] CROCKETT, Justice. Robert J. Berry appeals from an adverse jury verdict and judgment in 
a suit against Dr. Louis G. Moench for publishing in a letter allegedly false and derogatory 
information acquired in connection with treating Mr. Berry as a patient. 
[ 12] Significant portions of the letter are: 
[13] 'DearDr.Hellewell: 
[14] 'Since I do not have his authorization, the patient you mentioned in your last letter will 
remain nameless, 
[15] 'He was treated here in 1949 as an emergency. Our diagnosis was Manic depressive 
APPENDIX BB 
Nasfell vs. Ogden City 122 Utah 344 249 P.2d 507 (1952) 
10/27/52 NASFELL v. OGDEN CITY 
[ 1 ] SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
[2] No. 7628 
[3] 1952.UT.95 <http://www.versuslaw.com> 249 P.2d 507, 122 Utah 344 




[6] Hugh E. Dobbs, Ogden, for appellant. 
[7] Clyde C. Patterson, Paul Thatcher, Jack A. Richards, Ogden, for respondent. 
[8] MCDONOUGH, J., concurs. 
[9] Wade, J., concurs in the results. 
[10] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Henriod 
[11] HENRIOD, Justice. Appeal from a declaratory judgment holding the following Ogden City 
ordinance valid: 
[12] Sec. 27g67: Owner prima facie responsible for illegal parking. 
[13] The presence of a vehicle in or upon any public street or highway in Ogden City stopped, 
standing or parking in violation of any ordinance of Ogden City, shall be prima facie 
evidence that the person in whose name such vehicle is registered as owner committed or 
authorized the commission of such violation.1 
[14] The judgment is reversed with costs to appellant. 
APPENDIX CC 
State vs. Lata 601 P.2d 520 (Wash., 1979) 
Department of Social and Health Services v. Latta, 92 Wash. 2d 812, 601 P.2d 520 (Wa. 10/18/1979) 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON 
[2] No. 45962 
[3] 1979.WA.40286 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 601 P.2d 520; 92 Wash. 2d 812 
[4] October 18, 1979 
[5] THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, APPELLANT, 
v. 
WILLIAM LATTA, RESPONDENT. THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND 
HEALTH SERVICES, APPELLANT, V. K. L. PARTLOW II, ET AL, 
RESPONDENTS 
[6] Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and Walter E. White and David R. Minikel, Assistants, for 
appellant. 
[7] Theodore D. Schultz and E. Robert Fristoe (of Fristoe, Taylor & Schultz, Ltd., P.S.), for 
respondent Latta. 
[8] McPhee, Pope & Phillips and Wm. Thomas McPhee, for respondent Partlow. 
[9] William J. Leedom on behalf of Washington State Medical Association, amicus curiae. 
[10] En Banc. Hicks, J. Horowitz, Dolliver, and Williams, JJ., and Hamilton and Ryan, JJ. Pro 
Tern., concur. Rosellini, J., Utter, C.j., and Wright, J., concur by separate opinion; Stafford 
and Brachtenbach, JJ., did not participate in the disposition of this case. 
[11] Author: Hicks 
[92 Wash2d Page 813] 
[12] In each of these cases, consolidated on appeal, the Department of Social and Health 
Services (DSHS) appeals an order of the Thurston County Superior Court quashing its 
subpoenas seeking medical records of Medicaid 
APPENDIX DD 
In the Matter of the Guardianship of Marie Arkins 790 P.2d 210 (Wash. App. 1990) 
In re Guardianship of Marie Atkins, 57 Wash. App. 771, 790 P.2d 210 (Wa.App. 05/07/1990) 
[1] COURT OF APPEALS OF WASHINGTON, DIVISION ONE 
[2] No. 23545-1-1 
[3] 1990.WA.40393 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 790 P.2d 210; 57 Wash. App. 771 
[4] May 7, 1990 
[5] IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF MARIE ATKINS, APPELLANT 
[6] John Hertog, for appellant. 
[7] Winsor, J. Scholfield and Forrest, JJ., concur. 
[8] Author: Winsor 
[57 WashApp Page 773] 
[9] Marie Atkins appeals from a determination of incompetency and from an order limiting 
payment of her appointed counsel's attorney fees to $1,000. We affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
[10] Seventy-six-year-old Marie Atkins was admitted to Northwest Hospital (Northwest) on July 
11, 1988. On July 28, Medicare ceased paying Atkins' hospital charges because she no 
longer needed acute hospitalization. Northwest sought a nursing home placement for Atkins 
but had difficulty finding one, in part because staff at Atkins' prior nursing homes had found 
her daughter to be unreasonable. Consequently, to facilitate Atkins' placement in a nursing 
home and to ensure her representation by a reasonable advocate, Northwest instituted this 
guardianship proceeding. Pursuant to former RCW 11.88.045(1), the court appointed a 
lawyer to represent Atkins. Through her lawyer Atkins contested the guardianship and 
demanded a jury trial. 
[11] At trial Northwest's director of Social Work Services and Atkins' court appointed guardian 
ad litem testified that 
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[5] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, RESPONDENT, 
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ALBERT M. MARK, ET AL, APPELLANTS 
[6] Kinzel, Acheson & Marshall, William L. Kinzel, Snyder & Middleton, and Thomas T. 
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[7] Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kenneth Sharaga, Deputy, for respondent. 
[8] James, J. Farris and Dore, JJ., concur. 
[9] Author: James 
[23 WashApp Page 394] 
[10] Albert Mark, a licensed pharmacist and the owner of two West Seattle pharmacies, was 
convicted in June 1977 of one count of grand larceny and five counts of forgery in 
connection with obtaining reimbursement for fraudulent Medicaid prescriptions. Mark 
received a 5-year deferred sentence on the condition that he spend 1 year in jail and make 
restitution in an amount to be determined later. Prior to trial, Mark sold one of his 
pharmacies to his daughter and son-in-law, Arlene and Michael Ng, who are registered 
pharmacists and who have continued to operate the business. 
[11] In September 1978, over the objections of both Mark and the Ngs, the trial judge granted an 
order allowing the State to inspect and audit prescription forms in the two pharmacies for 
purposes of determining restitution. The separate appeals of Mark and the Ngs from that 
order have been consolidated. We affirm. 
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[5] THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 
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[6] Appeal from the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable John W. 
Coughlin, Judge. 
[7] Duane Woodard, Attorney General, Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Attorney General, 
Richard H. Forman, Solicitor General, David L. Saine, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, 
Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
[8] Ralph B. Rhodes, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant. 
[9] Opinion by Judge Jones, Van Cise and Sternberg, JJ., concur. 
[10] Jones 
[11] Opinion by JUDGE JONES 
[12] Defendant, Reginald Overton, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict 
finding defendant guilty of one count of sale and distribution of cocaine. We affirm. 
[13] In August, 1985, defendant became acquainted with Sylas William Soules. In the course of 
their friendship, Soules repeatedly requested that defendant procure cocaine for him which 
defendant initially declined to do. During the fall of 1985 Soules became a paid confidential 
informant for the Lakewood police, working with Detective Halpin. From October 6 
through October 22, 1985, Soules was in and out of a hospital, ostensibly to rehabilitate 
himself from a drug addiction. Upon final discharge from the hospital. Soules arranged for 
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The "fair determination'' exception does not necessarily require the 
prosecution to call an informant as a witness rather than relying on the 
informant's out-of-court statement. 
The Roviaro "fair determination'' exception generally does not apply 
if the informant would not be able to give testimony in any event. 
Utah adopted by statute under the former Utah Rule of Evidence 
36, the government informer privilege, incorporating the two exceptions: 
"(1) when the informer's identity is already known, and (2) when 
disclosure is essential 'to assure a fair determination of the issues.' "10 
Under that rule, the court recognized as the "balancing factors" the 
following: "potential hazards to the safety of the parties involved, the 
public interest in protecting the flow of information from informants, 
and the defendant's right to prepare his defense. Based on such factors 
the trial court must determine how the interest of justice will be 
served."11 
Library References: 
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 533-540; Wills § 365. 
West's Key No. Digests, Criminal Law <s=>627.10; Witnesses <S=>216(4). 
UT R REV Rule 505 
RULE 506 
PHYSICIAN AND MENTAL HEALTH THERAPIST-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
[A] STATEMENT OF THE RULE 
Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient. 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(a)(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or 
interviewed by a physician or mental health therapist. 
(a)(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably be-
lieved by the patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in any state. 
(a)(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is 
reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any 
state as a physician, psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, 
marriage and family therapist, advanced practice registered nurse 
designated as a registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, 
10. State v. Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222, fendant already knew who the informant 
1224 (Utah 1980). was); State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 
11. State v. Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222, 1986) (mere allegation of entrapment de-
1224 (Utah 1980) (holding that the need for fense insufficient to justify disclosure of 
disclosure was "academic" because the de- government informer). 
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or professional counselor while that person is engaged in the diag-
nosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including 
alcohol or drug addiction. 
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated 
in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the 
patient, a patient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse 
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1) 
diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician 
or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination 
of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a 
physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participat-
ing in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician 
or mental health therapist, including guardians or members of the 
patient's family who are present to further the interest of the patient 
because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment 
under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed 
by the patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The 
person who was the physician or mental health therapist at the time 
of the communication is presumed to have authority during the life 
of the patient to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(d)(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a commu-
nication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional 
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is 
an element of any claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in 
any proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition as an 
element of the claim or defense; 
(d)(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications rel-
evant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental 
illness, if the mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or 
treatment has determined that the patient is in need of hospitaliza-
tion; 
(d)(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in 
the course of, and pertinent to the purpose of. a court-ordered 
examination of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a 
patient, whether a party or witness, unless the court in ordering the 
examination specifies otherwise. 
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Traditionally the federal courts have not recognized a physician-
patient privilege. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 506 would have 
recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Utah Rule of Evidence 
506 is intended to supersede Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-24-8(4) 
and 58-25a-S. There is no corresponding federal rule with respect to the 
doctor-patient privilege. 
[C] FOUNDATION 
1. The patient or patient's representative on behalf of the patient 
asserts either the physician-patient or the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege. 
2. The information the patient or the patient's representative 
seeks to protect is either a communication or an observation. 
3. The communication was made by or the observation was made 
concerning the patient. 
4. The communication was made to or the observation was made 
by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist or social worker performing 
psychotherapy or their representatives.1 
5. The communication or observation was made in confidence. 
6. The communication or observation was made for purposes of 
facilitating the rendition of psychotherapy. 
7. The communication or observation does not fall within any 
exception. 
8. The privilege has not been waived. 
The physician-patient privilege, unknown at common law, has been 
recognized by statutes in many states, including Utah.2 The privilege 
protects confidential communications made by a patient to a physician 
for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. The "purpose of the privilege is 
to encourage the patient to make a full and complete disclosure to a 
physician in order to receive effective medical treatment, from the 
embarrassment and invasion of privacy, that might result from the 
[B] LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
[D] INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS 
Rule 506 
1. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 
S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996). 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78^24^8(4) 
(1996) provides a separate statutory ground 
for physician-patient privilege, but it ap-
plies only in civil cases. Moreover, the stat-
ute has been superseded by Rule 506, which 
now exclusively controls the privilege. De-
bry v. Goates, 2000 UT App. 58, 360 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 7, 999 P.2d 582, 586, n.2. See 
State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 
App. 1998), citing State v. Dean, 69 Utah 
268, 254 P. 142, 143 (1927). 
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physician's disclosure of the information."3 The privilege belongs to the 
patient, who also bears the burden of establishing the applicability of the 
privilege.4 If the "objective factors show that the relationship . . . was 
indeed a therapeutic one," the privilege applies even though the patient 
may deny the therapeutic relationship.5 
Under the former version of the rule in Utah, Justice Stewart 
explained the policy basis of Utah's psychotherapist privilege as follows: 
privilege is rooted in the belief that individuals and society at large 
may be greatly benefited by fostering a sound therapeutic relation-
ship in the interest of preserving families, enhancing individual 
development and growth, and allowing persons to deal with prob-
lems which might otherwise erupt into serious individual and socie-
tal difficulties, at least some of which would likely end up in the 
court system by way of divorces, crime, and juvenile delinquencies.5 
The physician-patient privilege is somewhat distinctive in that it 
applies not only to communications between patient and physician, but 
also to facts obtained by the physician by examination or observation. In 
assessing whether a privilege applies to the facts of the case, therefore, 
the attorney must focus on (1) whether the person qualifies as a patient; 
(2) whether the person to whom the communication or observation is 
made qualifies as a physician; (3) the purpose of the communication or 
examination; and (4) whether the communication was made in confi-
dence. 
1. Is the Declarant a Patient? [Rule 506(a)(1)] 
The status of a protected patient obviously depends on the scope of 
the protected professional relationships. When the privilege broadly 
applies to physicians as well as psychotherapists, then patients of physi-
cal as well as mental treatments are protected. A person may be a 
patient even though the relationship is established while the patient is in 
an unconscious state. 
2. Is the Person to Whom the Communicat ion or Observation Is 
Made a Physician? [Rule 506(a)(2)] 
The physician-patient privilege in Utah extends to physicians li-
3. State v. Anderson, 359 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8, 972 P.2d 86, 89 (App. 1998), citing 
Clawson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 108 Utah 
577, 162 P.2d 759, 770 (1945) (Larson, C.J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
4. Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App. 58, 
360 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 999 P.2d 582, 585 
5. Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App. 58, 
360 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 999 P.2d 582, 586 
(even though the relationship began in the 
context of a custody evaluation, where the 
patient continued to visit with the doctor 
and to receive medication, the privilege ap-
plied even if the patient denied a therapeu-
tic relationship). 
6. State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325, 1329 
(Utah 1979) (Stewart, concurring and dis-
senting). 
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censed in any state as *'licensed to practice medicine." 
3. Is the Person to Whom the Communication or Observation Is 
Made a Mental Health Therapist? [Rule 506(a)(3)] 
Utah's definition of mental health therapist is so broadly inclusive 
to include almost anyone consulted for and certified in some manner as a 
mental health or family health therapist. 
4. Was the Communication or Observation Given in Confi-
dence? [Rule 506(b)] 
The confidentiality requirement of the physician-patient privilege 
conforms with the same requirement for the husband/wife, clergyman-
penitent, and lawyer-client privileges. A communication is confidential if 
not intended to be disclosed to persons other than those participating in 
the diagnosis or treatment. The rule specifically acknowledges that 
disclosure to family members may be necessary for treatment and 
therefore would not rebut confidentiality. Otherwise, the confidentiality 
analysis previously discussed in connection with the lawyer-client privi-
lege would be applicable. This, disclosure in the presence of necessary 
medical personnel does not rebut confidentiality.7 
5. Was the Communication or Observation Made for Purposes 
of Medical or Psychological Diagnosis or Treatment? 
[Rule 506(b)] 
The physician-patient privilege extends to observations as well as 
communications, if made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
6. Who May Claim [Rule 506(c)] 
The physician-patient privilege belongs to the patient and can be 
claimed by him or his representatives. 
7. Exceptions [Rule 506(d)] 
a. Condition as an Element of a Claim or Defense [Rule 
506(d)(1)] 
The physical or mental condition is often at issue in litigation. 
Indeed, the physician-patient privilege was not recognized at federal 
7. See, e.g., Hofmann v. Conder, 712 client did not waive privilege where the 
P.2d 216 (Utah 1985) (presence of nurse presence was necessary medically), 
during discussion between attorney and 
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common law because the relevancy of physical or mental condition came 
up primarily in those cases in which physical or mental condition was at 
issue. The federal courts, in effect, determined that a claim or defense 
exception would be necessary and would swallow up the rule. 
Where a party has placed his or her physical or mental condition at 
issue, then the physician-patient privilege does not apply. For example, 
in a domestic case the parents each put their physical and mental 
condition at issue if they contest custody. In comparison, if the opponent 
places the physical or mental health in issue, the privilege still applies 
unless the non-privilege holder shows "with 'reasonable certainty' that 
some evidence favorable to his or her claim exists."8 If the opponent 
makes such a showing the court should review the records in camera, 
then require admission of only those portions of the records that are 
essential to the claim or defense.9 
If a claimant raises an issue of privilege and the opposing party 
argues that it is relevant to a claim or defense, then the court should 
conduct an in camera review of the documents to consider whether ( l h 
privilege rule applies and (2) no exception applies under the facts of the 
case. If a privilege rule applies, then the defendant does not have even a 
constitutional right in a criminal case to have access to the privileged 
information.10 However, the opponent of the evidence should request the 
court to seal and retain the records as part of the trial court record to 
preserve the issue for appeal consistent with Rule 4-205(4)(A) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.11 
On the related issue of termination of the privilege, the privilege 
does not terminate with the cessation of the protected relationship or the 
death of the client. 
b. Proceedings for Hospitalization for Mental Illness [Rule 
506(d)(2)] 
8. Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App. 58, 
360 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 999 P.2d 582, 586; 
State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 370 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 982 P.2d 79 (permitting in a 
criminal case an in camera review of a 
victim's confidential records to pursue 
whether the alleged victim's propensity to 
lie was material to the defense, but only 
after a showing of ''reasonable certainty" 
that her mental state was an important 
element of the defense). 
9. Debry v. Goates, 2000 UT App. 58, 
360 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 999 P.2d 582, 586; 
State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 370 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, 982 P.2d 79, 85; Pennsylvania 
v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 
L.Ed.2d40(1987). 
10. The constitutional argument is 
based on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (li\<7) 
(wherein the Court held that the defendant 
of a sexual offense crime against a child was 
entitled to have the court review in camera 
privileged records to determine whether it 
contained evidence material to the defense). 
However, due process claim arguing that 
counsel has a right to direct review, rather 
than in camera review by the court, has 
been rejected by State v. Cramer, 2002 I T 
9, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 44 P.3d 690, W4. 
11. See, e.g., State v. Cramer, 2002 I T 
9, 439 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 44 P.3d 690. 694 
(refusing to reverse an in camera physician-
patient privilege on appeal, in part, because 
the opponent had not preserved the record 
on appeal by preserving in a sealed file the 
actual records reviewed). 
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The privilege does not apply to commitment proceedings for obvious 
policy reasons. 
c. Examination by Court Order [Rule 506(d)(3)] 
An examination undertaken by a court-appointed expert for pur-
poses of pending litigation is not confidential and therefore the privilege 
does not apply. 
d. Child Abuse Reporting [Rule 506] 
Utah Code Annotated Section 62A-4a-403(l) imposes on most li-
censed professionals, except for clergy acting in a confessional setting, to 
report instances of child physical or sexual abuse. The reporting law 
essentially provides a public-policy based exception to the physician and 
mental health therapist privilege.12 
e. Specialized Privilege Under the Confidential Communica-
tions for Sexual Assault Act [Rule 506] 
In 1996, the Utah legislature adopted the Confidential Communica-
tions for Sexual Assault Act.13 Unlike other evidentiary privileges, this 
privilege is absolute.14 It protects statements made by sexual assault 
victims to therapeutic counselors. 
f. Statements to Medical Providers Made in an Unlawful 
Effort to Procure Drugs [Rule 506] 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-6 provides a specific exception 
to the physician-patient privilege: "Any information communicated to 
any licensed practitioner in an attempt to unlawfully procure, or to 
procure the administration of, a controlled substance is not considered to 
be a privileged communication/' This exception has been held control-
ling over Rule 506, partially because a person seeking to procure drugs 
illegally through physicians "is actually attempting to manipulate the 
privilege to protect his fraud."15 
12. See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 797 P.2d 
1133, 1137 (Utah App. 1990). 
13. UTAH CODE ANN. Section 78-3c-4 
(1996). 
14. State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 462 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 63 P.3d 72, 76. 
15. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 
(Utah App. 1998) (where the patient con-
tacted six physicians to obtain drugs, with-
out informing them that they had contacted 
other physicians, the privilege did not apply 
because the purpose was not for medical 
treatment but the illegal acquisition of nar-
cotics). 
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[E] FEDERAL VARIATIONS 
The physician-patient privilege has not been recognized by federal 
common law. When the Supreme Court codified the privilege rules it 
dispensed with the physician-patient privilege in general, but recognized 
a narrow psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Advisory Committee 
explained that while many states recognize the physician-patient privi-
lege, "the exceptions which have been found necessary in order to obtain 
information required by the public interest or to avoid fraud are so 
numerous as to leave little basis for the privilege."16 
In support of special recognition of the psychotherapist-patient 
relationship, the Advisory Committee stated: 
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to main-
tain confidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is completely 
dependent upon their willingness and ability to talk freely. This 
makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being 
able to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged 
communication. Where there may be exceptions to this general rule 
. . . , there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non 
for successful psychiatric treatment. The relationship may well be 
likened to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. Psychia-
trists not only explore the very depths of their patients' conscious, 
but their unconscious feelings as well. Therapeutic effectiveness 
necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and, in order to do 
this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy 
blocks successful treatment.17 
The Supreme Court would have excepted (1) communications rele-
vant to proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness; (2) 
court-ordered psychiatric examinations; or (3) communications relevant 
to a mental condition in which the patient relies upon the condition as 
an element of a claim or defense. 
The United States Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond18 recognized 
for the first time a psychotherapist-patient privilege as part of the 
federal common law of privileges. The case involved questions regarding 
the admissibility of statements made by Mary Lu Redmond, a police 
officer for the Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, during 50 counseling 
sessions with a clinical social worker licensed by the State of Illinois and 
employed by the Village of Hoffman Estates. The counseling sessions 
followed after Officer Redmond had shot and killed one Ricky Allen 
16. Fed. R. Evid. 504 (proposed draft by 18. 518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 
Sup. Ct.) (advisory committee's note). L.Ed.2d 337 (1996). 
17. Id. (quoting Report No. 45, Group 
for the Advancement of Psychiatry 92 
(I960)). 
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while responding to a ''fight in progress." On June 27, 1991, Redmond 
was the first officer to respond to a "fight in progress" call at an 
apartment complex. As she arrived on the scene she was informed that 
there had been a stabbing at the apartment. According to Redmond, as 
she approached the apartment Allen burst out of the building with a 
butcher knife chasing another man. When he refused her repeated 
commands to drop the weapon, Redmond shot Allen, believing he was 
about to stab the man he was chasing. Allen died at the scene. 
The administrator of Allen's estate filed a civil rights action, alleging 
that Redmond had violated Allen's constitutional rights by using exces-
sive force during the encounter. The administrator alleged that Allen 
never had a knife and that Redmond had shot Allen without just cause. 
During pretrial discovery, petitioner sought access to the clinical social 
worker's notes, concerning Redmond's counseling sessions regarding the 
encounter. The social worker and Redmond refused disclosure claiming a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. The district judge rejected this argu-
ment, but neither the social worker nor Redmond would reveal the 
contents of the sessions. The judge instructed the jury that their refusal 
to reveal the contents of the counseling sessions had no "legal justifica-
tion" and that the jury could therefore presume that the conversations 
during the sessions would have been unfavorable to Redmond. The jury 
awarded a verdict for the estate and Redmond appealed. The Seventh 
Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that "reason and experience," 
the touchstones for acceptance of a testimonial privilege under Rule 501 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, compelled recognition of a psychothera-
pist-patient privilege. 
The United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari because of the 
conflict among the federal circuit courts of appeal regarding the validity 
of a federal common law psychotherapist-patient privilege. The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit, validating the privilege. 
The case is significant in several respects. First, the case legitimates 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege at the federal level. Because of a 
fundamental maxim that the public has a right to every man's evidence, 
the creation of a new common law privilege is a rare occurrence. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court in recent years has seemed more concerned with 
narrowing the existing privileges than creating new privileges. The 
Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, warned that testimonial 
privileges "are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are 
in derogation of the search for truth."18-5 Accordingly, the federal courts 
have refused to recognize new privileges in a variety of areas.1875 Second, 
18.5 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
18.75 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 397 
F.3d 964, 972-73 (D.C.Cir. 2005)(denial of 
privilege claim to identity of reporter's con-
fidential sources); Pearson v. Miller, 211 
F.3d 57, 68 (3d Cir. 2000) (denial of privi-
lege claim to child abuse records); In re 
Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1149 (3rd Cir. 
1997) (denial of privilege claim to parent-
child communications); Univ of Pennsylva-
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while virtually every state by statute has adopted some form of a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, most of these statutory privileges are 
limited to professional psychiatrists or clinical psychologists. Indeed, the 
original Advisory Committee proposing the Federal Rules of Evidence in 
1972 recommended the adoption of a psycho-therapist privilege, but 
limited the privilege to "a person authorized to practice medicine , , or "a 
person licensed or certified as a psychologist."19 
In broadening the privilege to protect counseling sessions with a 
licensed clinical social worker, the Court may have opened the door for 
further extension of this privilege to include other forms of counseling. 
Should the privilege extend to any licensed social worker (rather than 
only licensed clinical social workers); if not, why not? How about an 
unlicensed social worker? What about family members, friends or others 
serving the functional equivalent services of a therapeutic counselor? 
Should the emphasis be placed on the importance for treatment purposes 
of being able to communicate freely without the fear of public disclosure, 
as the Court indicated in Redmond, or should the emphasis be on the 
special status afforded specified professionals; a restriction commonly 
imposed on other testimonial privileges such as attorney-client, clergy-
penitent, and in most states physician-patient? Would any such restric-
tion unfairly advantage the rich or insured who may have more access to 
professional counseling than would be afforded the poor and unem-
ployed, who as a matter of sociological circumstances may have a greater 
need of such counseling? 
In dissent Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, lament-
ed this new barrier to the pursuit of truth. Justice Scalia predicted that 
recklessly extending this newly minted and broadly construed psycho-
therapist privilege to social workers and their clients will in the future 
prevent some from proving a valid claim and others from establishing a 
valid defense. Justice Scalia summed up his dissent with the observation: 
"The Court today ignores this traditional preference for the truth, and 
ends up creating a privilege that is new, vast, and ill-defined. " :o 
nia, 493 U.S. 182, 189, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 
L.Ed.2d 571(1990) (denial of privilege claim 
to academic peer review records); In re 
Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C.Cir. 
1998) (denial of privilege claim to Secret 
Service records); Carman v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 
1997) (denial of privilege claim to corporate 
ombudsman records); Linde Thomson 
Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Res-
olution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1514 
(D.C.Cir. 1993) (denial of privilege claim to 
communications between an insured and an 
insurer); E.E.O.C. v. Illinois Dep't of Em-
ployment, 995 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(denial of privilege claim to unemployment 
hearing records); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 
594 F.2d 1106, 1124 (7th Cir. 1979)(denial 
of privilege claim to communications given 
during settlement negotiations). But see, 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Pow-
er Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 076 (6th Cir. 
2003(recognizing a privilege for communi-
cations made during settlement negotia-
tions). 
19. Proposed Rule of Evidence 504, 56 
F.R.D. 183, 240 (1972). 
20. 518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. at 1932-33, 
135 L.Ed.2d 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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R u l e 5 0 6 UTAH EVIDENCE Art. V 
Of course, Rule 501 requires the federal courts to apply state 
privilege law when state law supplies the rule of decision. This has 
always been the practice.21 Also, some courts have held that the right of 
privacy constitutionally requires confidentiality be upheld in the context 
of psychotherapeutic sessions.22 
Library References: 
C.J.S. Wills § 341-355. 
West's Key No. Digests, Witnesses <&=207-214.5. 
UT R REV Rule 506 
RULE 507 
MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS 
[A] STATEMENT OF THE RULE 
Rule 507. Miscellaneous matters. 
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against 
disclosure of the confidential matter or communication waives the 
privilege if the person or a predecessor while holder of the privilege 
voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant 
part of the matter or communication, or fails to take reasonable 
precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does not apply if 
the disclosure is itself a privileged communication. 
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged 
matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if disclo-
sure was 
(b)(1) compelled erroneously or 
(b)(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege. 
(c)(1) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of privi-
lege, whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is 
not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference 
may be drawn therefrom. 
(c)(2) Chiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases, 
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to 
facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of 
the jury. 
21. See, e.g., Gardner v. Meyers, 491 Hosp. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 
F.2d 1184, 118S (8th Cir. 1974); Union Pac. 1006, 1011-12 (8th Cir. 1965). 
R.R. v. Thomas, 152 Fed. 365, 367-71 (8th 22. In re "B", 482 Pa. 471, 484, 394 
Cir. 1907); Bishop Clarkson Memorial A.2d 419,425 (1978). 
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Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 CaUth 1, 865 P.2d 633, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834 (Cal. 
01/28/1994) 
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[2] No. SOI8180 
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[5] JENNIFER HILL ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS, 
v, 
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT; BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR 
UNIVERSITY, INTERVENER AND RESPONDENT. 
[6] Superior Court of Santa Clara County, No. 619209, Conrad Lee Rushing, Judge. 
[7] Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, C. Douglas Floyd, Craig E. Stewart, Swanson, Midgley, 
Gangwere, Clarke & Kitchin, George H. Gangwere, John J. Kitchin, Archer & Hanson, 
Richard J. Archer and Kristina Hanson for Defendant and Appellant. 
[8] Covington & Burling, Gregg H. Levy, Jeffrey Pash, Jeffrey S. Harleston, Paul, Hastings, 
Janofsky & Walker, Robert F. Walker, Mary C. Dollarhide, Schachter, Kristoff, Orenstein 
& Berkowitz, Victor Schachter and Thomas E. Geidt as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Defendant and Appellant. 
[9] Margaret C. Crosby, Alan L. Schlosser, Edward M. Chen, Keker & Brockett, Keker, 
Brockett & Van Nest, Robert A. Van Nest, Susan J. Harriman, Michael J. Proctor and 
Karin Kramer for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
[10] Joseph R. Grodin, John M. True III, Saperstein, Mayeda, Larkin & Goldstein and Brad 
Seligman as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
[11] Debra L. Zumwalt, Susan K. Hoerger, Michael Roster, Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, 
Canady, Robertson, Falk & Rabkin, Jerome B. Falk, Jr., and Steven L. Mayer for 
Intervener and Respondent. 
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Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U. S. 1 (U.S. 06/13/1996) 
[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
[2] No. 95-266 
[3] 518 U. S. 1, 1996.SCT.0000113 <http://www.versuslaw.com> 
[4] June 13, 1996 
[5] CARRIE JAFFEE, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR RICKY ALLEN, SR., 
DECEASED, PETITIONER 
MARY LU REDMOND ET AL. 
[6] SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
[7] Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
[8] No. 95-266. 
[9] Argued February 26, 1996 
[10] Decided June 13, 1996 
[11] Petitioner, the administrator of decedent Allen's estate, filed this action alleging that Allen's 
constitutional rights were violated when he was killed by respondent Redmond, an on-duty 
police officer employed by respondent village. The court ordered respondents to give 
petitioner notes made by Karen Beyer, a licensed clinical social worker, during counseling 
sessions with Redmond after the shooting, rejecting their argument that a psychotherapist-
patient privilege protected the contents of the conversations. Neither Beyer nor Redmond 
complied with the order. At trial, the jury awarded petitioner damages after being 
instructed that the refusal to turn over the notes was legally unjustified and the jury could 
presume that the notes would have been unfavorable to respondents. The Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded, finding that "reason and experience," the touchstones for 
acceptance of a privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, compelled recognition of a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. However, it found that the privilege would not apply if in 
the interests of justice, the evidentiary need for disclosure outweighed the patient's privacy 
APPENDIX KK 
Note From Attending Physician 
Intermountain Health Care 
JOHNSON, DEANN HENINGER 
1357 N 1560 E 
NORTH LOGAN, UT 84341 
Home Phone: (435) 753-4697 
Sex:F 
Date of Service: 02/22/2006 
Status: Preliminary Signable 
Encounter: Not Encounter Related 
MMI: 542112749 
Letters (02/22/2006 17:13) 
(Status: Preliminary Signable) 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Deann was seen in my office on June 6, 2005 for a contusion from getting hit in the face by a baseball. After seeing her 
I referred her to Dr. Jaussi (opthamolgist) for further evaluation. 
Sincerely, 
Patricia S. Jttnes, P.A. -C. 
PSJ/db 
Author: BAILEY, DELENE R 
Author For: JONES, PATRICIA S. 
KX fm{ IHC 
Page: 1 of 1 







A G E : 4 7 Y Age At Date Of Note 
Name: JOHNSON, DEANN HENINGER 
Author: BAILEY, DELENE R 
Author For: JONES, PATRICIA S. 
Pnnted on 02/22/2006 at 17:16 Footer: Version 0.01 01/27/06 
APPENDIX LL 
Personal Information Forms 
P.Ur,o, CWropr.Cc,
 P . C Bnat t ,,,,„„, D c J i j n e f ^ ^ ^ ftc 
Peterson CnlropractJc 
HIS North 400 But 
Lajao, UT 8041 
^ " " ^ ^ M t D b c f a u r . of » . . , f h In f n ,T n M f„„, 
Qiir Privacy F|Trfgt 
>«ve. and always wffl « W l t e j J ^ ^ 'Ct,U'tf"™,0'8ivey0U,hildi,C,0,ufe'P,eMe"«"<«•<»«<**>**• 
T h e , arc
 SCvc,., cWcum.tancc, „ w h i c h W c m . y h m „ „„ „ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
!o «rS°CoT,S,^ inolhM hMlh Mre p t o v i d e r « • h M p i u ' m b "~>to tefw >o u 
~ *e p^^ySle!^ ^ 5 n f c n n , , 5 o n »nd billinB »«>rd, to another party if they are potentially ^po.uiblc for 
We m«y n V e d ^ u I / Z r n,Uh ' ^ T ^ ' 0 " Vrthro o u ' P"*** *>' qwlty wnliol or other operational purpoici. 
" n o v o U . h . n k " y o u Z v m O D ! , t a ^ m * t t o D ' 0 " ^ d y o v o f y o U r a p p o t a t o a ^ m d y o u . b J h U . y c a r d , 
w . l c o m e t V t h ^ 
notify yoTin writ£ w h c n ^ T r i T r * ? p f I c l i c M M Scribed in lhil notice. If wc mike • change to our privacy pncUccs% wo will 
ntmg when you come for trc.irncm or by a«iL Plem fee) free to call us at anytime for. copy of our privacy notice. 
Xs&uiahi to h>,t v,.« ffr jJK|oatir„ 
you woulVliLTonla^ITv051 tllaI^VC d° "0I d i K , M e > 0 U health .information to specific individuals, companies or organizitionj. If 
required to aarcc to vour « . ^ r « ° n "? o r d i , c I w u ' c o f >ou' 1»«W> information, please let us know in writing. Wc arc not 
grcc your restrictions. However, if wc agree wiih your restrictions, the restriction h binding upon us. 
X f l U f rittlU tO r r v n f a yn^ p ^ f a ^ } ^ 
rcvocTtionCrIo!iC ? r ' T ^ " * 1° U* ** *"y U m c ; h o w c v c r- y°ur evocation must be in writing. Wc will not be able to honor your 
you were rco A , W° C d y r c l c M c d >0UT hc*]& information before we receive your request lo revoke your aulhonztcion. If 
hcnifh ;„r ! r8L'VC you.r l u t h o r U A l i o n M • condition of obtaining insurance, the insurance company may have a right to your 
health information if they decide to contest any of your cliinii. 
1 have rc«d your consent policy and agree to it's terms I am also acknowledging that I have received a copy of this notice. 
Print Nome 
Authorized Provider Representative 
Signature " - . — - * _ — 
Date 














What you prefer to be called:. 
Q Male Q Female 














Status: • Minor • Single • Married 3 Divorced • Separated • Widowed 
Spouse's Name: Do you have children? • YES • NO How many?. 
Nearest Relative not living with you: 
NAME ADDRESS PHONE 
REASON FOR VISIT 
The reason for this visit is a result of (please circle): Work 
Explain what happened: 
Major Complaint: 
Sports Auto Trauma Chronic 
When did the condition begin? / __/ Is the condition getting worse? • Yes • No 3 Constant a Comes and goes 
Is this condition interfering with your (please circle): Work Sleep Daily Routine 
If so, please explain: 
Have you lost any days from work? • Yes Q No How Long? 
Have you had this or similar conditions in the past? • Yes 3 No If so, please explain: 
Have you been treated by a Medical Physician for this condition? Q Yes Q No If so, where? 
Have you been treated by a Chiropractor before? • Yes • No If so, whom? 
HEALTH HISTORY 
Are you taking any medications? • Yes 3 No If yes, what: 
Please list any serious medical condition(s) you have ever had: 
Please list anything that you may be allergic to: 
List previous surgeries/treatments with dates: 
List any past serious accidents with dates: 
Family health history: 
Do you: Take supplements or vitamins? G Yes • No Exercise? • Yes • No Do you Smoke? • Yes • No How much? 
For Women: Are you taking Birth Control? • Yes • No Are you pregnant? • Yes Q No If yes, how long? 
How Long'? 
Nursing? Q Yes Q No 
I understand and agree that health and accident insurance policies are an arrangement between an insurance carrier and myself. 1 
assign and authorize payment directly to Peterson Chiropractic of any insurance benefits that I may have payable to me, and understand 
that these funds will be credited to my account(s) upon receipt. I also give Peterson Chiropractic power of attorney to endorse checks 
made out to me, to be credited to my account(s). Furthermore, I clearly understand and agree that I am personally responsible for 
payment of any and all charges for services rendered, if payment is not fully satisfied or financial arrangements agreed to by Peterson 
Chiropractic within 90 days, I agree to be assessed reasonable collection fees, attorney fees, interest and/or court costs in connection ; 
with collecting the full amount owed on my account(s), whether or not a legal law suit is filed. As with any medical procedures, there { 
are inherent risks that can occur. Although these risks are not highly prevalent in the administration of chiropractic care, they are I 
nevertheless present. If I have any concerns in this regard it is my responsibility to discuss them with the doctor. By signing below, I 
acknowledge that I have received satisfactory informed consent for any and all procedures performed by Peterson Chiropractic. 







 — T— ft-mM"--\*t. " " "" ' " ^ 
I 
\#0fc£ REJ-AJEP ACCIPLNT 
Date & Time of Accident: • a.m. Q p.m. 
Was your accident directly related to your work? 
• Yes QNo 
Briefly describe the events that occurred just before and 
during your accident: 
Give the address where accident occurred: (if other than 
employer's address) 
l^ f' 
Was anyone else present during your accident? 
• Yes • No 
Did you report your accident to your employer? 
• Yes • No 
What recommendations did your employer make just 
after your accident? 
Has this type of accident happened to you before? 
QYes QNo 
To the best of your knowledge, has this accident occurred 
in your workplace before? • Yes • No 
In general: 
Is your job physically stressful? • Yes • No 
Is your job mentally stressful? • Yes • No 
Is your workplace noisy? • Yes Q No 
Have you changed jobs in the last year? • Yes • No 
—— .—. . — ^.^lsygagn-•••-, . ;—: :-rr 
NJ\0 IZE.LATE.P ACCIDENT 
Date & Time of Accident: • a.m. • p.m. 
Were you the: • Driver • Front Passenger • Rear Passenger 
If a traffic violation was issued, to whom was it issued? 
Number of people in accident vehicle? 
Did the police come to the accident site? . . • Yes • No 
Was a police report filed? • Yes • No 
Were there any witnesses? • Yes • No 
Were you wearing your seat belt? • Yes • No 
Was this vehicle equipped with airbags? . . • Yes • No 
If yes, did it/they inflate? • Yes Q No 
In relation to the base of your skull, where was the 
headrest? • Above • Below Q At base of skull 
What did your vehicle impact? • Another vehicle • Other 
If other, explain: 
Did any part of your body strike anything in the vehicle?^ Yes • No 
If yes, please describe: 
Make & model of the vehicle you were occupying? 
Name of the location/street on which you were traveling? 
In which direction were you headed? QN QS QE UW 
What was the approx. speed of your vehicle? 
Did the impact to your vehicle come from the: 
• Front G Rear • Right Side • Left Side • Other 
During impact, were you facing: • Right •Left • Forward 
Were you • aware or • surprised by the impact? 
If accident vehicle made impact with another vehicle... 
Make and model of that other vehicle? 
Direction other vehicle was headed? 3 N QS • £ QW 
Speed of the other vehicle? 




i Did accident render you unconscious? • Yes Q No 
If yes, for how long? 
Please describe how you felt immediately after the accident: 
Have you gone to a Hospital or seen any other Doctor? Q Yes • No 
When did you go? • Just after accident • The next day • 2 days plus 
How did you get there? • Ambulance or • Private transportation 
Name of Hospital and/or Attending doctor: 
Was he/she a: • D.C. Q M.D. • D.O. • D.D.S. 
Describe any treatment you received: 
Were X-rays taken? • Yes • No 
Was medication prescribed? • Yes • No 
Have you been able to work since this injury?Q Yes • No 
Are your work activities restricted as a result of this injury? 
• Yes Q No 
Indicate (Efthe symptoms that are a result of this accident: 
• Dizziness • Difficulty sleeping • Jaw problems Q Nausea 
• Memory loss •irritability •Arms/Shoulder pain • Back pain 
•Headache(s) • Fatigue • Numb Hands/Fingers 
•Blurred vision QTension • Chest pain 
• Buzzing in ear • Neck pain • Shortness of breath 
• Ears ringing • Neck stiff • Stomach upset 
•Other 
Is your condition getting worse? 
• Yes Q No • Constant • Comes & goes 
Indicate your degree of comfort while performing the 
following activities: 
Comfortable Uncomfortable Painful 
ZL.C0VUZ.Y is 
To evaluate the effect that continuing work will, have 
on your recovery please complete the following: 
How many hours are in your normal work day? 
Please indicateBfyour daily job duties and any activities 






• Driving • Operating equipment 
• Twisting • Work with arms above head 
• Crawling • Typing 
• Bending • Stooping 
What positions can you work in with minimum physical 
effort and for how long? • N/A 
Prior to the injury were you capable of working on an 
equal basis with others your age?. . • Yes • No • N/A 
Do you work with others who can help you with any 
heavy lifting? • Yes • No • N/A 
While in recovery, is there any light duty work you could 
request? • Yes Q No • N/A 
• Lower back pain 
• Back stiffness 
• L e g pain 
• Numb Feet/Toes 
Lying on back • . . . • 
Lying on side • • 
Lying on stomach • • 
Sitting • • 
Standing • • 
Stretching • • 
Lovemaking • • 
Walking • • 
Running • • 
Sports • • 
Working • • 
Lifting • . 
Bending • . . . 
Kneeling • . . . 
Pulling • . . . 
Reaching • . . . 
Have you retained an attorney: 
If yes, whom: 
• . .. 




QYes • No 
















His/Her Phone #: 
\ \ . 
2nd Insurance Source or Auto Insurance 














_/.. / _ . 
If any of your medical or account information has changed, 
please inform our front desk personnel. 




OFFICE USE ONLY OFFICE USE ONLY OFFICEUSE ONLY OFFICE USE ONLY OFFICE USE ONLY 
SURGICAL/HOSPITAL 
List the year of any Operation/Procedures you have had (if year unknown X): 
Year 
Appendix surgery 
Breast growth removal 
Carpal tunnel 
Cataract surgery 
Cesarean section delivery 
Colonoscopy (looking into bowel) 
D & C I 
Gall bladder surgery/Laparoscopy 















List any Trauma/Broken Bones/Serious Accidents: 
Year: 
List any other Hospitalizations: 
Year: 
What other doctors have you seen? 
FAMILY HISTORY 
Are you adopted? Q Yes Q No 
List the cause of death for those who have died prior to age 50 (Do not include accidental deaths) 
Father Mother's Father Father's Father 
Mother Mother's Mother Father's Mother 
Check any illnesses which have occurred in a blood related brother (b), sister (s), mother (m), father (!) or grandparent (g): 
Who 
Q Alcoholism/Substance Abuse 
a Alzheimers/Dementia 
Q Cancer (Breast) 
a Cancer (Colon) 
Q Cancer (Prostate) 
a Cancer (other) 
Q Diabetes 
Who 
a Emotional/Mental Illness/Suicide 
Q High Blood Pressure 





1 Occupation: 2 Your sender: D Female O Male 
Marital Status:
 Q M a r r i e d Q s i n g l e Q w i d o w e d Q D i v o r c e d If previous!) married, to whom: 
4 List your ethnic oriein: List your etnnic origin: 
Q White Q Hispanic Q American/Alaskan Indian Q Black Q Asian Q Polynesian/Island Q Other: 
5 Please list number of children and year of birth: 
Number of Sons Year of Births Number of Daughters Year of Births 
If you have minor children, do they live in your household?
 Q y e s n No 
fSJ^ I H C W O R K M E D 
I H C A Service of Intermountain Health Care 
PHYSICIANS FIRST REPORT OF WORK INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE - FORM 123 
WHITE: Industrial Commission YELLOW: Employee PINK: Insurance Carrier GOLD: Physicians File 




SOC SEC t 







A M D 
P M D 













HAS THIS PART BEEN INJURED BEFORE? D YES Q NO (14a & b) 




D N O 










X-RAYS ORDERED (18) 





IS THE CONDITION REQUIRING TREATMENT THE RESULT OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL INJURY OR EXPOSURE DESCRIBED? (21) 
• YES Q NO D UNDETERMINED 









TYPE OF TREATMENT, INSTRUCTIONS: (23, 31) 
IF HOSPITALIZED, WHAT HOSPITAL: (24) 
D INPATIENT Q OUTPATIENT 
REFERRAL TO ANOTHER PHYSICIAN? (25) 
GIVE PHYSICIANS NAME: 
REFERRED TO PT / OT? 




IS CONDITION MEDICALLY STATIONARY? 
D YES D NO (26) 
IS FURTHER TREATMENT REQUIRED? 
D YES D NO (27) 
WILL PERM. IMPAIRMENT RESULT? (28) 
• YES D NO D UNDETERMINED 
ARE THERE ANY CONDITIONS THAT 
COULD DELAY RECOVERY? (32) 
D RETURN TO WORK IMMEDIATELY 
• DATE RELEASED FOR WORK 
D RELEASED FROM CARE ON 
D NO LIFTING OVER 
D NO USE OF 
D LTD. USE OF 
D REGULAR DUTY Q MODIFIED DUTY 
I D NO WORK ABOVE SHOULDER 
D NO KNEELING OR SQUATTING 
.lbs. 
D NO REPETITIVE MOTION OF . 
D NO DRIVING OR WORK AROUND 
MACHINERY 
• OTHER _ 
(29-30) 
PHYSICIAN NAME: (33 - 38) 
ADDRESS: 
PHONE: 
tfru^e A. Isaacson, Itavi). 




Home Phone:( ) 
Social Security Number: 
Employer Name: 
Birthday: / 
LAST MONTH DAY 
CITY STATE 
Work Phone:( ) 
Sex:Male Fei 
Marital Status 
In C a s e O f E m e r g e n c y N o t i f y Whom?(Someone livine at a different addressV 
Relationship to Patient: Phone:( ) 
Parent or Responsible Party (If Different from Patient) 
Name: Birthday: / 
FIRST MIDDLE 
Address: 
Home Phone:( ) 
Social Security Number 
Employer Name: 
Insurance Information 
Primay Insurance Company: 
Insured 
Insurance ID Number 
Employer Name: 
Seconday Insurance Company: 
Insured 
Insurance ID Number 
Employer Name: 
LAST MONTH DAY 
CITY STATE 
Work Phone:( ) 
Relationship to Patient: 
Insured Birthday / 
Month 
Relationship to Patient: 
Group Number 
Work Phone:( ) 
Insured Birthday / 
Month 
Relationship to Patient: 
Group Number 
Work Phone:( ) 






D O W E H A V E Y O U R P E R M I S S I O N TO:Leave a message on your answering machine at horn? 
Discuss your medical condition with any member of your household? Yes No 









I hereby authorize Bruce A. Isaacson, M.D. to furnish my designated insurance carrier all information concerning my illness or 
injury. I also authorize benefits under this claim to be made payable directly to Bruce A. Isaacson, M.D. I understand I am 
responsible financially to the physician, for charges not covered by this authorization. 
Patient or responsible party signature: Date: 
mmmmm 32&^mamm& 
••CITY/OTAffe'-^8i^^^vL'>. 
^ JHJO N E W ^ 5 
>v^*DAXE O F BIRTHu^-i 
STATUS: SINGLE MARRIED CHILD SPOUSE/PARENT 




 1 _ _ _ 
THIRD, .. ^^#£&£MU 
ID 
?jf*£ft^>: -








IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE FEDERAL HIPAA LAWS 
( H E A L T H I N S U R A N C E PORTABILITY & ACCOUNTABILITY A C T ) 
HIPAA A R E F E D E R A L LAWS THAT P R O T E C T YOUR PRIVACY AND H E A L T H I N F O R M A T I O N . W E CAN NOT 
GIVE ANY O F YOUR P E R S O N A L / H E A L T H / B I L L I N G INFORMATION O U T ( E X C E P T TO YOU) U N L E S S YOU 
S P E C I F Y W H O YOU W O U L D LIKE T O HAVE A C C E S S , I F YOU W O U L D LIKE A FAMILY M E M B E R O R F R I E N D TO 
HAVE A C C E S S TO YOUR ACCOUNT / H E A L T H / P E R S O N A L INFORMATION P L E A S E W R I T E T H E I R N A M E , 
RELATION, AND PHONE NUMBER ON THE LINES BELOW. 
N O R T H E R N U T A H EYE C E N T E R O F F I C E POLICIES 
W E A P P R E C I A T E T H E O P P O R T U N I T Y T O S E R V E Y O U . T H A N K Y O U F O R C H O O S I N G N O R T H E R N U T A H 
EYE C E N T E R . 
BILLING A N D INSURANCE: 
W E P A R T I C I P A T E WITH MOST I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N I E S . IT IS YOUR R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y TO 
C O N T A C T YOUR I N S U R A N C E TO S E E IF W E A R E P R O V I D E R S F O R YOUR S P E C I F I C PLAN 
A N D F I N D O U T HOW MUCH T H E Y W I L L C O V E R . YOU A R E R E S P O N S I B L E F O R ANY CO-PAYS AT T H E TIME 
O F S E R V I C E . I F YOU HAVE A P O R T I O N / P E R C E N T A G E / D E D U C T I B L E , W E W I L L B I L L YOUR I N S U R A N C E AND 
B I L L YOU T H E A L L O W E D A M O U N T . Y O U A R E R E S P O N S I B L E F O R ANY A M O U N T THAT IS NOT C O V E R E D BY 
YOUR I N S U R A N C E COMPANY. I F YOU DO N O T HAVE I N S U R A N C E AVAILABLE W E W I L L W O R K W I T H YOU TO 
OBTAIN A R E A S O N A B L E PAYMENT P L A N . 
T H E R E W I L L B E A $ 3 0 . 0 0 R E T U R N E D C H E C K F E E . 
D R J A U S S I IS A F E E P E R S E R V I C E D O C T O R , IF W E DO NOT R E C E I V E PAYMENT W I T H I N 9 0 DAYS F R O M 
T H E DATE O F S E R V I C E W E W I L L T U R N YOUR ACCOUNT OVER TO O U R C O L L E C T I O N AGENCY T O OBTAIN 
M O N E Y O W E D . YOU W I L L B E C H A R G E D U P TO 4 0 % C O L L E C T I O N S F E E O F T H E O R I G I N A L A M O U N T DUE 
A N D A $ 2 . 0 0 P E R MONTH S T A T E M E N T F E E I F YOUR ACCOUNT D O E S GO TO C O L L E C T I O N S . 
CONSENT FOR TREATMENT 
I AUTHORIZE AND CONSENT T O T H E MEDICAL TREATMENT/S RENDERED T O ME BY 
W. REED JAUSSI MD AND HIS STAFF AS SEEN NECESSARY BY D R S I A U S S L ; I ALSO 
AUTHORIZE THE RELEASE OF ANY MEDICAL INFORMATION NECESSARY T O PROCESS 
MY INSURANCE CLAIMS OR T O OBTAIN ANY MONEY THAT MAY BE OWED. 
SIGNED PRINTED DATE 
,w..,..y iioaiment the Re 
the Industrial Injury or Exposure Described? 
Q yes O no Q undetermined 
22. Date of First Treatment: 
24. If Hospitalized, What Hospital? 
Q In-Patient Q Out-Patient 
^ _ _ $ g |23^^rf^j^: 
If C&se R 
eferred to Another Physician, Give Physician's Na 
ame and Address 
27. Is Any F u d n T T T r e a t m e n T R ^ ^ T ^ — ~ 
" "Yes- Dale of Next Visit and How Many Estimated? Q ' " ' ^ C * Q G P n e r m a n e n< Impairment" 
Tifte: Industrial Commission 
Yellow: Employee 
Pink: Insurance Carrier 
Goldenrod: Physicians' File 
W. Reed Jaussi, M.D. 
Eye Physician & Surgeon 
afc.--
sfl5^t NORTHERN UTAH 
s-«qsr' E Y E CENTER 
550 £*;r 1400 North, Suite T Tel. (435) 752-2020 
Logan, UT 84341 Fax (435) 752-5475 
Patient Name 
MRN# 
Date of Birth Telephone # 
MEDICAL HISTORY 






































High blood pressure 
HIV/AIDS 
rvu^w,. 








































Over Age 40 
Mammogram 
IF Age 50 or above 
Stool Guaiac 









List all medications you are currently taking which have been ordered by a doctor (including inhalers) and all over the counter 
drugs, vitamins or herbs. Please list prescribed medications first: 









CHECK ANY ALLERGIES 
Q Medications List/Describe: 
Q Food a Animals Q Latex Q Tape Q Pollens Q Iodine Q Other: 
Transcript 1, Pg. 11, 20 
Page 11 
1 THE COURT: Any objection? 
2 J MR. LAURITZEN: Objection. Number one, it's 
3 J hearsay. Number two, it violates the physician/patient 
4 I privilege. Those are my objections. 
5 J MR. WARD: Under the hearsay --
6 MR. LAURITZEN: And improper foundation. 
7 1 THE COURT: Mr. Ward, would you address the 
8 I doctor/patient privilege. 
9 1 MR. WARD: I believe that criminal behavior is not 
10 J protected under that privilege. In fact, actually, it's kind 
11 J of interesting. Counsel raises an objection that it violates 
12 the doctor/patient privilege. But what actually happens in 
13 I this case is a patient goes to a doctor and says I need 
14 I treatment for some condition. And we're not asking what that 
15 1 condition is. And the doctor has the patient fill out a 
16 I medical history. As part of that medical history the patient 
17 J is required to disclose, per statute, any prescriptions being 
18 1 received from any other sources. If a patient fails to 
19 I disclose that information, and the doctor then prescribes 
20 I medication that is similar to or the same as another treating 
21 J physician has prescribed or is currently prescribing, I think 
22 1 it's very difficult for the patient to then claim the 
23 I physician/patient privilege, because what we're asking is for 
24 I the doctor to tell us what the patient didn't disclose, not 










THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen. 
MR. LAURITZEN: I have no questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. Your 1 
next witness. 1 
MR. WARD: The state rests, Your Honor. 1 
THE COURT: Are you going to present any evidence, 1 
Mr. Lauritzen? 1 


















THE COURT: Closing arguments? 
MR. WARD: We'll submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen. 
MR. LAURITZEN: I move to dismiss based on the 
objections I've made heretofore, plus the fact that I don't 
even know whether Oxycodone, Endocet and Hydrocodone are the 
same drug or what they're compared to. I mean, you know, the 
statute is so vague that it sounds to me like you could be 
prosecuted for nose drops. 
THE COURT: All right. The elements of obtaining a 
prescription under false pretenses, each of the elements 
require that the individual receiving those has to receive a 
controlled substance. It was testified at the end of 
Detective Italasano's testimony that Hydrocodone was a 
schedule three controlled substance. And Endocet and 
Oxycodone are schedule two's. So that's all that needs to be 
met with regards for the purpose of a preliminary hearing. 
Transcript 1, Pg. 10 & 11 
Transcript 7, Page 5 & 6 
Page 11 
1 THE COURT: Any objection? 
2 MR. LAURITZEN: Objection. Number one, it's 
3 J hearsay. Number two, it violates the physician/patient 
4 J privilege. Those are my objections. 
5 MR. WARD: Under the hearsay --
6 I MR. LAURITZEN: And improper foundation. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Ward, would you address the 
8 doctor/patient privilege. 
9 MR. WARD: I believe that criminal behavior is not 
10 j protected under that privilege. In fact, actually, it's kind 
11 of interesting. Counsel raises an objection that it violates 
12 the doctor/patient privilege. But what actually happens in 
13 I this case is a patient goes to a doctor and says I need 
14 treatment for some condition. And we're not asking what that 
15 condition is. And the doctor has the patient fill out a 
16 I medical history. As part of that medical history the patient 
17 I is required to disclose, per statute, any prescriptions being 
18 I received from any other sources. If a patient fails to 
19 disclose that information, and the doctor then prescribes 
20 I medication that is similar to or the same as another treating 
21 I physician has prescribed or is currently prescribing, I think 
22 it's very difficult for the patient to then claim the 
23 physician/patient privilege, because what we're asking is for 
24 I the doctor to tell us what the patient didn't disclose, not 
































4ieve so, yes. 
i you visited with Dr. Jaussi, did 





















what was his response, if any? 
anybody talked to her about this. 
you 
right. Had you talked to her yet? 
what proceeded from that? 
I asked him if he knew that DeAnn was 
ed substances from other sources. He 
MR. LAURITZEN: I'll object to that. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. WARD) I'll hand you what has 



















a statement that we routinely give doctors 
that they did not know that the pa 
controlled substances from other sources. 







had no 1 
for 
you 1 
sign 1 
tting 1 
